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1. Introduction
Recently, in many countries both political and monetary authorities have
shown an increasing interest in the objective of monetary stability and the
position of the central bank.l As pointed out by Persson and Tabellini
(1993) recent policy reform, as well as historical experience, suggests
two different routes to price stability.
The first route is the legislative approach, namely to create by law a
very independent central bank with an unequivocal mandate to focus on
price stability. Interest in this approach is motivated by the success of the
Deutsche Bundesbank in maintaining one of the lowest rates of inflation
for several decades. The accepted statutes of the European Central Bank
are strongly influenced by the German central bank law. Broadly
speaking, they guarantee a central bank as independent from national and
European political institutions as the Bundesbank. Moreover, France and
Spain reformed their central bank laws in order to make the Banque de
France and the Banco de Espana more independent of government.
Furthermore, countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Czech
republic, Hungary and Poland increased the independence of their central
banks.2 Finally, in Latin America there are tendencies toward granting
more independence to the central banks in countries like Argentina,
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.
The second route is the targeting approach, namely to let the political
principal of the central bank impose an explicit inflation target for
monetary policy, and make the central bank governor explicitly
accountable for his success in meeting this target. Recently New
Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom have made some progress on
this route. Along these lines New Zealand enacted legislation that
increased the independence of its Reserve Bank, while in the United
Kingdom there is now a lively discussion of the desirability of making
the Bank of England more independent.3
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin
in the ongoing `rules versus discretion' debate; especially in the monetary
policy credibility literature. This literature argues that governments and
central banks are tempted to impart an inflationary bias to the economy
thereby sacrificing long-term welfare to short-run political gains. The
associated time-consistency problem can be overcome by setting up
politically independent central banks.4
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About five years ago Persson and Tabellini tnade some speculations on
where this literature would be headed:
'The future research agenda ought to give high priority to modeling the details of
political institutions. Adding institutional content is necessary to sharpen the empirical
predictions of the theory. It is also necessary to generate interesting normative
prescriptions'S
This book takes up the gauntlet. It deals with two items currently
appearing on the research agenda on positive models of political econo-
my. The first is on how observed differences in institutions affect
political and economic outcomes in various social, economic and political
systems. Important work in this area is on central bank independence and
its relationship with several macroeconomic variables such as output and
inflation. The second itetn is on how the institutions themselves change
and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences
and strategies.ó Here recent research deals with the normative issue of
how independent a central bank should be; that is with the optimal
degree of central bank independence.~
The book starts with an introductory chapter on the rules versus
discretion debate in monetary policy. In Chapter 2 we survey this debate.
We show that there are basically two major theoretical issues in the
controversy. First, policymakers not bound by a rule would be tempted
into excess nctivism, destabilizing rather than stabilizing the economy.
The second argument finds its origin in the introduction of the notion of
dynamic inconsistency. According to this literature, the inflationary bias
of discretionary monetary policy makes the case for a monetary rule or
an independent central bank. However, the dynamic inconsistency
literature dces not dispute the possibility of stabilizing activist feedback
policy. Hence there is a trade-off between the credibility gains of
avoiding the inflationary bias of discretionary policy and the loss of
flexibility due to a distorted response to output shocks. We show that this
trade-off plays an important part in the literature on optimal institutional
design.g
Part I of the book (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) investigates the positive
relationship between domestic monetary institutions and macrceconomic
performance. In doing so we focus on the legislative approach to price
stability. In Chapter 3 we qttantify central bank independence using a
number of legal attributes from central bank laws. Twelve industrial
countries are examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States,
Sweden and Switzerland. First we compare the tneasures (indices) of
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central bank independence as presented in the literature. After a critical
examination of the existing indices we construct a new index of central
bank independence, called the Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) index. According
to this index, for example, central banks in which the only or main
objective of monetary policy (as specified in the law) is price stability,
are classified as being more independent than central banks with a
number of objectives in addition to price stability, or banks in whose law
price stability is not mentioned as an objective at all. In Chapter 4 on the
basis of a monetary policy game with private information about the
economy, we derive several propositions concerning the relationship
between central bank independence and (the variance of) inflation and
output growth. These propositions are tested for the same set of countries
for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1991). In testing the model we
use the indices of central bank independence discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 analyses central bank independence in the coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies. We show that greater economic independen-
ce of the central bank - i.e. lower monetary accommodation of govern-
ment budget deficits - reduces inflation persistence. Thus lower int7ation
persistence may not only be caused by the exchange-rate regime - as
shown by recent empirical research - but also by the way monetary and
fiscal policy are coordinated, i.e. by the domestic monetary regime.
Part II of the book (Chapters 6 and 7) investigates the normative issue
how central banks and monetary regimes themselves change and develop
in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences and strate-
gies. Both chapters are extensions of Chapter 4; the central or workhorse
model of the book. Chapter 6 allows for an inflation sensitive natural rate
of growth, while Chapter 7 features an endogenous natural rate of unem-
ployment. Table 1.1. summarizes the extensions discussed above.
Table 1.1 Classification of chapters
Natural rate of rowth Natural rate of unem lo ment
Endogenous Exo enous
Endo enous - Ch. 6
Exo enous Ch. 7 Ch. 4
Chapter 6 extends Chapter 4 to allow for an inflation sensitive natural
rate of growth. Hence, we integrate the longer-term relationship between
inflation and growth into the literature on central bank independence. As
the evidence points strongly to a predominantly inverse long-term
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relationship, we assume that the supply-side effect of inflation is negati-
ve. We find that this effect reduces the inflationary bias of discretionary
monetary policy and mitigates society's credibility problem. As society's
optimal framework for monetary stability depends on the balance be-
tween credibility and flexibility we show that the higher the supply side
effect of inflation, the lower the optimal degree of central bank indepen-
dence. Hence the inflation growth nexus weakens the case for central
bank independence.
ln Chapter 7 we combine the model of Chapter 4 with labour union
behaviour along the lines of New-Keynesian bargaining theories of
unemployment. This in order to integrate the study of monetary instituti-
ons with that of labour market institutions.9 We characterize wage
setting in a totally unionized econotny under a constant tnoney supply
rule, GNP targeting, full commitment to a simple zero inflation rule, a
discretionary regime and an independent central bank. The wage formati-
on strategy of the union can be either cooperative or aggressive. t~ We
show that the natural rate of unetnploytnent becotnes proportional to the
aggression of the union. Since the natttral rate of unemployment corres-
ponds with the labour market distortion, we find that the more aggressive
the union the higher the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary
policy and the bigger society's credibility probletn. With society's opti-
mal framework for monetary stability depending on the balance between
credibility and flexibility, we show that the more aggressive the union,
the higher the optimal degree of central bank independence. Finally
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes.
NOTES
1. For a concise review of recent theoretical, empirical and institutional issues of monetary
polícy and central banking in America, Canada, Europe, L.atin America and Russia see
Eijffinger (1994).
2. For an interesting survey of central banking in emerging market-oriented economies see
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1990).
3. For a recent discussion about the indapendence of the Bank of England and the associa-
ted inflation targeting framework see CEPR (1993).
4. The monetary policy credibility literature starts from Kydland and Prescott (1977); see
most recently Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1993). The literature on central
bank independence is summarized in Cukierman (1992).
5. See Persson and Tabellini (1990, p. 177).
6. This research agenda is supported by the Harvard UniversitylMlT Research Training
Group in Positive Political Economy.
7. For interesting work in this area see Raith (1993), Cukierman (1994), Debelle and
Fischer (1994) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1995).
8. Walsh (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) claim that incentive contracts for central
bankers, along the lines of the contract of the Govemor of the Reserve Bank of New
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Zealand, may eliminate this tradz-off altogethu. We survay [heir contributions in
Chapter 2.
9. For recent work see L.evine and Pearlman (1994).
10. This terminology follows Funke (1994).
2. A History of the Rules versus
Discretion Debate
I INTRODUCTION
The proper conduct of macroeconomic stabiliza[ion policy poses a
number of interesting questions. An important and time-honoured issue,
particularly relevant for monetary policy, is the rules versus discretion
debate. As pointed out by Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994, p. 112)
this debate has continued to echo, though continuously revived and
discussed in the current setting of its time, mutatis mutandis, through the
history of central banking.
In case of discretionary policymaking central banks optimize their
policy instruments on a period-by-period (or case by case) basis. Poli-
cymaking according to a rule exists when the central bank chooses to
implement in each period (or case) a formula for setting its instrument.
Of course, this formula or rule is then to be applied to periods in gene-
ral, not just the one currently at hand. t Next, if central banks follow
rules should those rules be activist or nonactivist?2 Hence, the rules
versus discretion debate overlaps the argument about fixed and feedback
policy rules.
Originating in the first half of the 19th Century with the British
monetary debate between the Currency and Banking Schools, the rules
versus discretion debate is now over 150 years old. However, empirical
and theoretical issues have not yet been settled.
According to Fischer (1994b, pp. 34-35) there are two major
theoretical issues in the controversy. That is, those who favour rules
have employed two kinds of arguments in order to demonstrate the
undesirability of governmental discretion in monetary policy. First,
Friedman's (1959) view is that policymakers not bound by a constant
money growth rate rule would be tempted into excess activism,
destabilizing rather than stabilizing the economy. The second class of
arguments finds its origin in the introduction of the notion of dynamic
inconsistency, which importantly changed the rules versus discretion
debate. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) saw
their demonstration of the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary
policy as making the case for a monetary rule. Alternatively the time
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consistency problem may be overcome by setting up independent central
banks. Recent work in this area is Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and
Schaling (1993a, 1993b).
However, as pointed out by Fischer (1994b, p. 35) the dynamic incon-
sistency literature does not dispute the possibility of stabilizing activist
feedback policy. There is then a trade-off between the credibility gains of
avoiding the inflationary bias of discretionary policy and the loss of
flexibility due to a distorted response to output shocks.
This Chapter surveys the theoretical literature on rules versus discretion
both from historical and analytical perspectives. The major difference
with previous surveys like Argy (1988) and Fischer (1990) is that we
follow a more analytic line of approach. Throughout we employ
variations of a single log-linear model. This has the advantage of bo[h
clarifying disagreements between different schools of thought and at the
same time identifying common ground. Also we pay more attention to a
central relation in the debate viz the Phillips curve.
The plan of this Chapter is as follows. In Section II we discuss the
origin of the debate in the first half of the 19th Century and the operation
of the gold standard. Next, we turn to the issues raised by the Chicago
school. Sections IV-VI address the first class of arguments against
discretion. The simple Keynesian framework for stabilisation and Fried-
man's attack is the subject of Section IV, whilst Sections V and VI
feature the intellectual history of the Phillips curve. In Section VII we
discuss the basic Phillips curve monetary policy game as introduced by
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon. The Backus and
Driffill (1985) and Cukierman-Meltzer (1986) models of reputation and
credibility are the subject of Section VIII. In Section IX we focus on
central bank independence and on the trade-off between credibility and
flexibility as emphasized by Canzoneri (1985), Rogoff (1985) and
Lohmann (1992). The recent contracting approach to monetary policy as
pioneered by Walsh (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) is the
subject of Section X. Section XI summarizes and concludes. The appen-
dix discusses the short-run leverage of monetary policy in the presence of
rational expectations due to the presence of overlapping wage contracts.
II THE GOLD STANDARD
The rules versus discretion debate in monetary policy finds its origin in
the country where the practice of central banking developed i.e. the
United Kingdom. It dates back to the debate between the Currency and
Banking Schools preceding Peel's Act (The Bank Act) of 1844 that
bolstered the Bank's monopoly privileges and enhanced its status as an
incipient control bank [White (1984)].
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A key leader of the Currency School was the leading economist of his
day David Ricardo. However, Ricardo died in 1823, before the Currency
School became fully established in the 1830s. This school did not view
bank deposits as money. They argued that the quantity of currency
should vary precisely as it would if all money were gold, meaning that
the balance of payments should determine changes in the quantity of
currency. Thus the Currency School favoured the introduction of approp-
riate controls on monetary growth rather than discretionary authority for
the BOE. In this context Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994, p. 115)
point out that Ricardo's comment was that
`the House [of Commons] did not withdraw its confidence from the Bank from any
doubt of its wealth or integrity, but from a conviction of its total ignorance of political
economy, a thrust that was greeted with hear, hear, and a laugh'.
The Currency School tended to think that its programtne would only be
carried out, by the central bankers, if the latter were firmly tied down by
clear, transparent, statutory rules.
The Banking School thought it a mistake to treat only currency as
money. They criticized the gold standard rule since the appropriate
behaviour of the money stock depended on whether movements in the
BOE's reserves were caused by domestic or foreign disturbances, and on
whether the disturbances were permanent or temporary. Thus the Ban-
king School favoured discretionary authority.
However, an informal rule for BOE operations was suggested by the
Banking School's real bills doctrine. The real bills doctrine states that
credit should only be issued upon the discount of bills drawn to finance
real goods in the process of production and distribution. If the real bills
doctrine is followed money can never be excessive, i.e. inflationary,
since it purports to match money creation with real output [Sijben (1990,
p.8) and Humphrey (1988, p.5)].
The Act of 1844 separated the BOE into an Issue Department and a
Banking Department. The Banking Department was to function like any
other private bank. Reflecting Currency School views, the Issue Depart-
ment was to issue Bank of England notes convertible into bars of gold
(bullion) or money in coins (specie) according to a prescribed rule. The
rule was that there was to be a fidttciary issue of about 18 million pounds
above that, at the margin there was to be 100~ gold reserve for notes.
Thus the debate between the Currency and Banking Schools was won3
by the Currency School and monetary policy by the BOE was supposed
to follow a simple rule: Vary the money supply with the gold reserves of
the central authorities.
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The latter were supposed to vary according to the Classical specie-flow
mechanism.4 In case of a British balance of payments deficit, say,
adjustment comes through wealth effects (the outflow of gold (specie)
from England reduces British spending) and through adjustments in
relative prices (British spending is shifted towards home goods).
However because international capital flows responding to interest rate
differentials moved gold far more rapidly than the classical specie-flow
mechanism, in the period from the Bank Act until 1914, the BOE
actively adjusted the rate of discount in response to threatened changes in
the gold stock. For instance, in case of a current account deficit, the
BOE raised the discount rate thereby protecting the gold reserve and gold
convertibility by reducing both capital outflows and domestic demand.
Thus, although the historical gold standard is frequently cited as a
precise simple rule for monetary policy the functioning of the system
involved the British monetary authorities in a high degree of discretion.5
III THE CHICAGO VIEW
In the 1920s the rules vs discretion debate resurfaced in the United
States. It figured prominently in the 1926-1927 debates between Con-
gress and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) concerning the proper
conduct of US monetary policy.
Congressman Strong thought it wise to constrain the Fed's actions by
means of a money-stock-rule aimed at price stability, whilst Fed-admini-
strator Miller favoured discretionary authority following the real bills
doctrine.6 The debate was won by the Fed.
As a matter of fact in the 1920s actual US monetary policy was
characterized by a high degree of discretion. This was made possible by
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the non-functioning of the gold
standard during World War I.
The Act of 1913 made price-stability the main objective of the Fed.
However, as pointed out by Carlson (1988), it did not specify how:
'While the bill instructed that the Federal Reserve's discount rate policy was to be
determined with the view of promoting price stability, no formula [i.e. rule ESl was
specified. It left open the role for discretion in determining haw much the discount
rate should be altered when the price level deviates from its objective of price
stability'~
At the time of its establishment the Fed was supposed to operate within
a gold standard setting. However, in 1914-1918 many countries at war
were effectively not on the gold standard. Therefore during the war
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discount rate changes were neither limited by the Federal Reserve Act,
nor did they face the external constraint of protecting US gold reserves.
As long as it was succesful, the discretionary character of US monetary
policy in the 1920s was not much argued against. However, after the
debacle of monetary policy in the Great Depressiong - when bank runs
reduced the money stock - a group of Chicago economists proposed a
system in which banks would hold 100qo reserves against checkable
deposits. Thus specific arguments for rules in US monetary policy were
first developed in the context of a proposal for monetary reform called
the `Chicago Plan'. Proponents of the Plan included Irving Fisher (1945)
and Milton Friedman's teacher Henry Simons (1936). Fisher proposed
various rules such as a constant money stock, a constant per capita
nominal money stock and a price stabilization rule. Simons also consi-
dered a constant money stock rule, but because of the danger of changes
on the velocity side preferred a price stabilization rule.
Simons made a more general case for rules in his classic paper `Rules
versus Authorities in Monetary Policy'. In this paper Simons compared
two polar monetary regimes. On the one hand he set the authority-
regime. In this regime the monetary policymaker could have several
monetary instruments like the discount rate, reserve requirements and
open market operations at their discretion, and be given the objective of
economic well-being. Therefore following Sijben (1990, p. 9) the
authority regime is constrained by the final-goals of monetary policy. At
the other extreme we have the rules-regime. In the latter regime the
policymaker could be directed to expand the supply of high-powered
money a[ say, xq per year. Therefore the rules-regime is constrained by
the instruments (`intermediate targets')9 of monetary policy. To rephrase
this taxonomy using the terminology of Fischer (1994b, p. 41), under the
authority regime the central bank has goal independence (its goals are
imprecisely defined) whilst under the rules regime it would not have
instrument independence (full discretion and power to deploy monetary
policy to attain its goals).
Being a liberal economist Simons preferred the rules-regime:
`The liberal creed demands the organiaation of our economic life largely through
individual participation in a game with definite rules...[D]efinite, stable, legislative
rules of the game as to money are of paramount importance to the survival of a
system based on freedom of enterprise.'~o
Carlson (1988, p. 3) points out that here the essential notion is that
government is necessary for establishing laws that would define the rules
for a`game' in which competitive free enterprise could flourish, but that
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government should not be a player in the game. The idea that govern-
ment would manage the currency to manipulate aggregate economic
outcomes meant that government would be a player and thus violated the
liberal creed. The views of Simons and the Chicago School were later
elaborated by Milton Friedman.
IV THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION AND FRIED-
MAN'S ATTACK
After World War II the Keynesian revolution shifted the focus of econo-
mic policy from the choice of monetary regimes - i.e. the proper design
of institutions - towards the more specific problem of how to achieve
full employment by appropriately timed and quantified government acti-
on. t t Therefore Keynesians wanted to set the instruments of economic
policy on a period-by-period basis thus favouring discretion.
Typically they saw the economy's structure as deterministic, i.e.
policymakers conduct monetary and fiscal policy in full knowledge of the
structure of the model. Given sufficient information and the theoretical
basis for multi targets and multi instruments provided by Tinber~en
(1966), policymakers were able to choose the appropriate policy mix.t
According to Argy (1988, pp. 147-148) the analytical base for discre-
tionary stabilisation policy in the early post war short run Keynesian
framework can be summarized by the following three propositions: (1)
up to full employment nominal wages were rigid, (2) the private sector
was very unstable due to animal spirits in investment or to insufficient
investment (secular stagnation) and (3) an adverse demand shock could
place the economy below its full employment level, where, in principle,
it could remain for an indefinite period.
With rigid nominal wages there was no automatic adjustment mecha-
nism. Therefore in case of an adverse demand shock policymakers
should increase aggregate demand, increase the price level, reduce real
wages and thus restore full employment. The choice between monetary
and fiscal policies typically depended on the structural coefficients of the
Keynesian system. The steeper (flatter) the IS schedule the stronger the
case for the use of fiscal (monetary) policy.
These ideas are captured by the following simple log-linear model.
Capital will be assumed fixed in the short run and output is given by a
short-run production function of the following type
Yc-slc o~a~ 1 (2.1)
where y is the log of output and 1 is the log of employment.
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For simplicity we do not take account of productivity shocks.l3
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of
labour to the real wage wt - pt. This yields the following employment
function
lc -- 1 a(wc - Pc) (2.2)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p is the log of the price
level.
Following the standard specification of the Keynesian framework we
assume that nominal wages are rigid.
wt - 0
Substituting (2.3) in the labour demand function (2.2), and the resulting
equation in the production function, we get the following relation be-
tween output and the price level.
(2.3)
Yc - iR a Pc (2.4)
A rise in prices reduces the real wage, and causes firms to employ more
labour. Thus, (2.4) is the aggregate supply curve.
Aggregate demand is described by a standard IS - LM framework
Yt-gt-atrtfvt ai ~ 0 (2.5)
(2.6)mt - Pt - Yt - a2 rt a2 1 0
where r is the real interest rate, g is real government expenditure m is
the nominal money stock and v is a demand shock. Thus, (2.5) and (2.6)
are the IS and LM schedules.
Eliminating the real interest rate from (2.5) and ( 2.6), equating the
resulting equation with (2.4) we obtain the following solution for output
ot a m t a2a (gt t vt) (2.7)yt - a}Qt(1-a) t a tatcl -a)
a
where ot - t and QZ -
az
at }a2 al ta,
From (2.7) it can be seen that the relative efficacy of monetary and
fiscal policy depends on the ratio atla2.14
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As pointed out by Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994, p. 34) in the
UK the received view in the late 1950s - as presented in the Radcliffe
Report 1959 - was that monetary management was often regarded a
somewhat subsidiary part of overall demand management. The reason for
this was that at was thought to be rather low, while a2 was felt to be
comparatively higher. For ease of argument in what follows we set mt -
0, that is we focus on fiscal policy. ~
By setting yi equal to its target value y we obtain the optimal value of
the fiscal instrument
gt - a f aZal -a) y,~
- v~ (2.8)
From (2.8) it follows that the optimal period by period - that is discretio-
nary - setting of the fiscal policy variable must be such as to exactly
offset instantaneous demand shocks. Thus Keynesian fine-taning requires
correct and complete information about contemporaneous demand shocks.
It is precisely this point which is questioned by Milton Friedman who
beginning in the early 1950s vigorously attacked Keynesian stabilisation
policies.
Friedman (1951) introduces the problem of information and its relevan-
ce for the choice between rules and discretion. A policymaker intent on
stabilizing the economy will destabilize if he is misled by incomplete or
incorrect information.
Moreover, Friedman (1948, 1953) also emphasized the problem of lags
in the effects of policy. Friedman considered various lags. The data lag
is the time it takes for policymakers to obtain data about the economy.
The recognition lag is the time it takes for policymakers to be sure of
what the data are signalling about the future course of the economy. The
legislative lag represents the time it takes to pass legislation to implement
a particular policy. The implementation lag is the time it takes for policy-
makers to change policy instruments once they have decided on the new
policy. Finally, the effechiation lag is the time it takes for the policy to
actually have an impact on the economy.
Because of these lags and the inability of policymakers to predict the
behavior of the economic system active stabilization policy is likely to
destabilize rather than to stabilize the economy. At a more conceptual
level, Friedman tried to show that for government policies to be counter-
cyclical the correlation coefficient between government actions and
(demand) shocks would have to be significantly negative.
Now following Argy (1988, pp. 130-131) we can demonstrate Fried-
man's case against discretion on the basis of our model. Consider
equation (2.7). Setting m~ - 0, this equation says that the actual level of
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activity yt is the algebraic sum of the level of output without the effects
of policy vt and the addition to the level of output due to the effects of
fiscal policy gt. Taking variances of (2.7) we havel5
~zaZ 2 2~Za2
Var yt - 2(var gt t ov) t 2 pgv vgov (2.9)
[~3 t ot (1- R)] [Q t ot (1-a)]
where ov2 is the variance of vt and pgv stands for the correlation cceffi-
cient between fiscal policy and the demand shock.
To demonstrate Friedman's case against discretion let us suppose for
simplicity that og - vv; that is the standard deviation of these two series
is the same. We can then rewrite (2.9) as
Var yt 2a2a2 (1 }pgv)
2
ov [Q } Qt (1 -a)]2
(2.10)
For fiscal policy to be stabilizing one should have Var yt G av2, that is




To give a numerical example, with at equal to zero and (~ being about
0.717 for policy to be stabilizing the correlation coefficient between
fiscal policy and the demand shock has to be smaller than -0.5. Other-
wise (p v~-0.5) fiscal policy is destabilizing, while if we require 100q
of the initial variance of output to be removed we must have pgv --1.
These results are summarized in Table 2.1
Table 2.1 Lags and the effects of policy
p~, ~0.5 -1 ~ pg„ ~ -0.5 -1
Policy Destabilizing Stabilizing Perfect
Stabili-
zation
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Applying this line of reasoning to monetary policy it is plausible that
because of lags in the effects of policy a constant money rule [Friedman
(1959)] is likely to be superior to discretion in stabilizing the economy.
Of course the truth about the value of p~v is an empirical mattert~
However on the basis of severaly empirical studies [Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) and Friedman (1969)] Friedman concluded that actual
policy, especially monetary policy had been destabilizing.
V PHILLIPS CURVE ANALYSIS
V.1 Keynesianism and the Phillips Curve
In the simple Keynesian framework nominal wages were rigid. Therefore
typical Keynesian models - like the one in Section IV - were unable to
explain inflation. This was apparently resolved by the discovery of
Phillips (1958) of an inverse non-linear relation between the level of
unemployment and the rate of growth of money wages for the United
Kingdom over the period 1861 - 1957. This relationsip became known
as the `Phillips curve', and suggested a trade-off between wage inflation
and unemployment.18 It was not long before a price change version of
the Phillips' relation was developed. Samuelson and Solow (1960)
brought the inflation - unemployment version of the Phillips curve to the
United Statesl9
Initially presented by Phillips as an empirical relationship without
theoretical foundations, it was reformulated as a labour market adjust-
ment process by Lipsey (1960):
~wt --B(lt - It) B 1 0 (2.11)
Equation (2.11) states that the rate of growth in money wages reflects
the degree of excess demand in the labour market as proxied by the level
of unemployment (u - ls - 1).20 Of course, B represents the speed of
adjustment to labour market equilibrium.
Now we incorporate the Phillips curve into the macrceconomic model
of Section IV.
Setting a2 - gi - vt - 0 in equation (2.7), aggregate demand is deter-
mined by a simple Cambridge equation
yi - mt - p~21 (2.12)
Substituting the employmen[ function (2.2) in the production function
(2.1), and the resulting equation into the aggregate demand curve (2.12),
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we get the following relation between the price level, the nominal wage
and the money stock
pt - Q wt -F (1 - a) mt (2.13)
Substituting (2.13) in the labour demand function (2.2) and the resul-
ting relation in the Phillips curve (2.11) yields
Owt - -6 (ics t wi - mt)
Taking first differences of (2.14) and normalising
an interesting feature of the model
~2wt - 6 (~mt - ~wt)
(2.14)
lsc at zero highlights
(2.15)
From equation (2.15) it can be seen that, if the system is, stable,22
wage inflation converges to an equilibrium where OZwt - 0, and hence
Omt - Owt. Substituting the latter result in equation (2.11), it follows
that in inflationary equilibruim
1 - 1IB 21m (2.16)
That is, It ) lts even in the long run. Therefore, in terms of the
Phillips curve (2.11), the monetary authorities can choose a rate of
monetary growth so as to achieve the desired level of employment, and
trade this off against the resulting wage and price inflation.
Since ~w -~- Óp in the long run the rate of growth of real wages
is zero. However, this is not true for the level of the real wage.
Substituting steady-state employment (2.16) in the labour demand functi-
on (2.2) gives the following expression for the long run level of the real
wage
w - - -(1
- Q) ~m (2.17)
p- B
Therefore, our inflationary equilibrium involves money illusion on the
part of trade unions even in the long run.
V.2 The Vertical Phillips Curve
It is precisely this implication of the model that came under serious
attack by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968).
According to Friedman, the Phillips curve was fundamentally misspe-
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cified, and should be cast in terms of the rate of growth of the real wage
rather than the nominal wage. However, in practice unions negotiate
their wages in money terms on the basis of the expected inflation rate.
Therefore Friedman specified the Phillips curve in terms of the expected
real wage, called the `expectations augmented' Phillips curve. In order to
compare Friedman's findings with the early Phillips curve we now model
wage setting on the basis of expected inflation.23 The nominal wage is
set at the end of period t- 1 for period t. In subsequent periods this
process is repeated.
Thus, we have one period wage contracts. Suppose the objective of wage
setters is to stabilize expected employme~t during the period of the
contract around a target employment level 1. Then wages in each period
are set to minimize
Et - 1 (lc - 1~)z (2.18)
where Et - t(.) denotes expectations formed at time t- 1. The minimi-
zation of (2.18) is subject to the labour demand function (2.2). From the
first-order conditions for a minimum of (2.18) subject to (2.2), the
nominal wage is given by,
wt -Et-1Pt-(1-a)l~ (2.19)
Equation (2.19) states that wages are set at the end of period t- 1 for
period t based on unions' expectations of the price level in period t.
Substituting (2.19) in the labour demand function we get the following
relation between employment and unanticipated shocks
1t - 1` } 1 1 R(Pt - Et -1 Pc) (2.20)
An unanticipated rise in prices reduces the real wage, and causes firms
to employ more labour thereby raising employment above its target level.
Subtracting (2.20) from the labour force lts, using that uc -]cs - lt, and
adding and subtracting pc - tl(1 -(3), we get the following expression
for the short-run determination of unemployment
1ut - u- 1- a(Opt - Et-1~Pt) (2.21)
where u is the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment (]cs - 1`).
Thus (2.21) is the famous expectations augmented Phillips curve. Unem-
ployment deviates from its equilibrium rate only to the extent that there
are unanticipated shocks to inflation. Next, consider expectations formati-
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on. Friedman assumed that unions calculate expected inflation on the
basis of past inflation. Suppose expectations of the inflation rate are
adaptive and are governed by
Et - 1 ~Pt - Et - 2 ~Pt - t} a(~Pt - 1- Et - 2 OPt - 1)
(2.22)
where Opt - ~- Et - 2 ~pt - ~ is the forecast error
By setting a- 1 in (2.22) we get
Et - 1 ~Pt - OPt - t
(2.23)
Equation (2.23) states that unions use the inflation rate at the time of the
wage settlement as a proxy for expected inflation during the period of the
contract. Substituting (2.23) in (2.21) we get
ut - u - 1 ~2Pt (2.24)
1-R
Equation (2.24) is the accelerationist hypothesis which says that, to
keep the rate of unemployment below the natural rate of unemployment
the rate of inflation would need to continually accelerate. Substitution of
(2.20) in (2.1), equating the result with (2.12) taking first differences,
using (2.23), again taking first differences and normalising 1~ at zero
yields
02pt - Q 02P t- t f(1 - a) OZm
(2.25)
From equation (2.25) it can be seen that in the absence of accelerating
monetary growth the rate of inflation converges to steady state equilibri-
um where ~p-0 and ~p -~m .24 Moreover, if pp-0 from
equation (2.24) it follows that u - u, i.e. in steady state unemployment
is equal to the natural rate of unemployment. The latter equilibrium came
known as the NAIRU, the non accelerating inflation rate of unemploy-
ment.25
I~tote that since u- u, in the Friedman-Phelps analysis the long run
Phillips curve is vertical: there is no long run trade-off between inflation
and unemployment. There is however a short run trade-off. Following a
once and for all monetary expansion, there will be an increase in prices
and nominal wages. However, because unions have adaptive expectations
they deflate wages not by the current price (evel but by past inflation.
Hence they initially perceive the rise in nominal wages to be an increase
in real wages. Therefore the supply of labour will increase to accommo-
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date the increased demand for labour, thus decreasing unemployment. As
unions' gradually adjust their inFlationary expectations eventually money
illusion will decrease and real effects will be eroded. Next consider the
effects of activist policy in the context of the expectations augmented
Phillips curve.Zó
Suppose monetary policy is governed by the integral policy rule
~mi --dt (Y - y`) dt ~ 0 (2.26)
This rule was introduced by Phillips (1954, 1957) to analyse the perfor-
mance of stabilization policy in achieving a particular policy objective
and in achieving a rapid convergense to steady state equilibrium. Accor-
dingly monetary policy is determined by the (integral) sum of past
deviations in output from its target. The name of this policy rule derives
from the fact that (2.26) may also be written as
~
mc - -d1 ~ L~ íY -Y ~ ) (2.27)
i-0
where L is the backward-shift (lag) operator. Normalizing y~ at zero the
dynamics of output when the policy ( 2.25) is introduced in the mode127
is given by
R (2 } d, ) ,d 1 - ~3
Yt - 1} dlQ Yc-1 t 1} dla Yt-2 - 1} dla Y (2.28)
where y - ae~.
The characteristic equation of (2.28) is
~Z f at~-F az - 0
where a2 - 1}ad and a t- -(2 t dt) a2,a
The following inequalities [Gandolfo (1983), p. 59)]
1 -Fat faz10
1 -a2)0
1 -at f a2 ) 0
(2.29)
(2.30)
Cons[i[ute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in order that the
roots - be they real or complex - of the characteristic equation (2.29)
be less than unity in absolute value. It can easily be shown that if Q G 1
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(2.28) exhibits global stability.
Now we consider the influence of the monetary policy rule on the
adjustment to steady-state equilibrium. The discriminant (D) is given by
D - a12 - 4a2 (2.31)
The sign of D depends on dt. More precisely,
D~ 0 according to d t ~ 4(1-~3) I a (2.32)
Hence, if dt - 0- which in terms of equation (2.26) implies the
adoption of a fixed money supply rule - D G 0. Therefore, adoption of
a fixed money supply rule introduces instability in the tnodel by causing
the variation y- y being described by a sinusoidal function (conjugate
complex roots). This problem can be overcome by activist policy. If dl
exceeds a lower bound (dt ~ 4(1-~i)I,Q ), the integral policy rule
removes the coscillations and causes the adjustment path to be monotoni-
cally convergent. Moreover, the above example fits into a more general
pattern for Argy ((1988), p.160) notes that:
'[As concerns] activist policy in the context of a model of an expectations augmented
Phillips Curve [The] principal conclusion is that some activist policy can potentially
improve on the performance of a[constant money growth rate] rule.'
VI RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND NEW CLASSI-
CAL MACROECONOMICS
The New Classical view of aggregate supply as embodied in the work of
Lucas (1973), Sargent (1973), and Sargent and Wallace (1975) may be
highlighted by the following `typical' New Classical model.
We begin by recalling the short-run produc[ion function, and labour
demand function used in Section IV.
Yt - a It } F~t F~ ~ N(0 , Q~) (2.33)
-1 2.34lt - 1 - a (wt - pt - ~.t) ( )
Note that (2.33) and (2.34) are identical to equations (2.1) and (2.2)
except for the inclusion of a white-noise productivity disturbance with
zero mean and finite variance.
We close the model by adopting the familiar aggregate demand and
wage-setting relations introduced in Section V
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We may obtain the aggregate supply function by first of all substituting
for w from (2.19) into (2.34). This yields the following expression for
employment
lt - 1 1 a(Pt - Et-1 Pt t p.t) f 1' (2.35)
Substituting (2.35) into (2.33) yields the famous Lucas (1973) `surprise'
supply function
y- y t 1 a a (pt - Et-1 Pt) } 1 1 a F~t (2.36)
where y - Q 1~
Equation (2.36) implies that if expectations are fulfilled, actual output
will equal the natural rate of output y. Moreover, when pt exceeds its
expectation Et - 1 Pt~ and hence real wages wt - pt are lower than their
expectation wt - Et - 1 Pt at the time wages were set, output will
increase relative to the natural rate by an amount
R~(1 - Q) (Pt - Et- i Pt) ~
Equating (2.36) and (2.12) we obtain the following equation for the price
level
pt -a Et-1Pt1-(1 -a) (m-Y)-u (2.37)
To solve for the behaviour of p, we must specify how unions form
expectations. New Classical Macroeconomists following Muth (1961)28
typically assume [hat unions have rational expectations, that is, expectati-
ons equal the mathematical expectation of p t based on information at
time t- 1. In defining this rational expectation it is assumed that unions
know the model, namely equation (2.37) and the parameters ,6 and 1~.
Therefore Et - t Pt - E~Pt I It - t], where It - t-{pt - 1, mt -~ ,~ -
~,1 - 1,.. ,oo}
Et - t pt is equal to the mathematical expectation of pt based on the
information set It - t. The information set contains current and lagged
values of exogenous and endogenous variables.
Note that the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) assumes that
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unions exploit all available information i.e. they refrain from making
systematic forecast errors concommitant with backward looking or
adaptive expectations. Taking expectations of both sides of (2.37)
conditional on information at time t- 1 we get
Et-1Pt-Et-tmt-Q1r
Substituting ( 2.38) in (2.37) yields
Pt - QEt - t mt } mt -(Y t F~)
(2.38)
(2.39)
Substracting (2.38) from (2.39) we get the following relation between the
forecast error pt - Et - 1 Pt and unanticipated shocks
Pt - Et - 1 Pt - (1 - ~) (mt - Et - 1 mt) - F~t (2.40)
Equation (2.40) states that rational expectations forecast errors arise
because of unforeseeable deviations of random disturbances at t from
their mean values of zero and from unforeseeable monetary policy. We
assume that the governement wishes to stabilize unemployment around
the natural rate of unemployment u in the face of the exogenous aggrega-
te supply shock ~,t, and that it seeks to do this by adopting the state-
contingent (feedback) reaction function
mt-dlF~t-l~wt ~t -~ N (0, o~,) (2.41)
where dt is the degree of activism and ~t is a random disturbance with
mean zero and no serial correlation, describing the extent to which the
actual money supply deviates unpredictably from its systematic compo-
nent dl p t- 1~
Taking expectations of both sides of (2.41) conditional on information at
time t- 1 we get
Et- 1 mt - dl ~t- 1 (2.42)
Subtracting (2.42) from (2.41) we get the folowing expression for
unforeseeable monetary policy
mt - Et - 1 mt - wt (2.43)
Substituting (2.43) in (2.40) and the resulting equation in (2.36) yields
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yt-Y-R~t}~t (2.44)
From (2.44) it follows that, by adopting the REH, yt and y diverge by
a purely random term: output never systematically deviates from its
natural rate.
Hence (2.44) highlights the famous Sargent and Wallace (1975) policy
invariance or policy neutrality result. Since the policy parameter dt dces
not appear in (2.44) systematic monetary policy cannot affect real output.
Next we link the Sargent-Wallace result to the Phillips curve debate of
the previous section. Subtracting (2.35) from the labour force ls, using
that u- Is - 1, we get the expectations augmented Phillips curve
u- u- 1 a(pi - E~ - l Pc } ut) (2.45)1
Substituting (2.43) in (2.40) and the resulting equation in (2.45) we get
the following expression for unemployment
u - ut - m~ (2.46)
Thus unemployment deviates from its natural rate only to the extent
that there are random deviations of the money supply from its systematic
component.
Equation (2.46) highlights the Sargent-Wallace invariance result in
terms of what we might call the rational expectations augmented Phillips
curve. In the presence of rational expectations there is no trade-off
between inflation and unemployment.29 Since unions know the moneta-
ry policy rule the Phillips curve is vertical even in the short run.
The objective of the central bank was to stabilize unemployment
around its natural rate. If [he monetary authorities seek to minimise the
variance of unemployment around its natural rate the optimal policy
problem faced by the central bank is to find that value of dt in (2.41)
that minimizes
Var (u - u) - a2~ (2.47)
Where Var(.) denotes the variance of a variable and (2.47) is obtained by
taking variances of (2.46). It can be easily seen that the variance of
unemployment is independent of the degree of activism dt. Hence it
appears that any value of dl will yield the same result in terms of
carrying out the governments' optimal policy. Therefore the (fixed) rule
dt - 0 is as good as the discretion (dt ~ 0) in this instance.
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Next consider the consequences of purely stochastic changes in policy.
Suppose the variability of monetary policy is increased. Thus the mean of
wt remains zero but its variance o2~, will be larger. From equation (2.47)
it can be seen that more random policies increase the ex post variation of
unemployment ut around its mean level u, the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Therefore Sargent and Wallace ( 1975) have argued that policy
rules should be as predictable as possible. Also their analysis may be
used to criticize fine tuning and to justify Friedman's (1959) presciption
of a constant money growth rule.
VII THE BASIC PHILLIPS CURVE MONETARY PO-
LICY GAME
As noted by Fischer (1990, p. 1169) the nature of the rules vs discretion
debate was importantly changed by the introduction of the notion of time-
inconsistency by Kydland and Prescot[ (1977). In the post Kydland and
Prescott rules vs discretion debate the case for rules became much
stronger as a policy rule can be a means of overcoming the time- or
dynamic inconsistency problem.
Following Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 592) we define a policy to
be [ime inconsistent when a future policy decision that forms part of an
optimal plan formulated at an initial date is no longer optimal from the
viewpoint of a later date, even though no new relevant information has
appeared in the mean time. In this section we develop the best-known
example of dynamic inconsistency viz the single stage (one shot) Phillips
curve monetary policy game introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
We start with a one period game, then move on to a multiperiod extensi-
on.
VII.1 The Inflationary Bias of Time Consistent Monetary Policy
We begin by recalling the Phillips curve used in Section V
ut - u- 1 1 a(~Pc - Et-1 APc) (2.21)
In Section V the model was closed by the aggregate demand curve
(Cambridge equation)
Yt - mt - Pt (2.12)
In this section unemployment and inflation are determined as in the Barro
and Gordon (1983a) model. That is, time-consistent monetary policy is
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analysed where the central bank minimizes the social loss function
L.t -'h(Opt - Op`)Z f e(ut - u`) e 1 0 (2.48)
Hence the central bank is concerned with both price stability and low
unemployment30 Ap~` and u~ are the inflation and unemployment tar-
gets of the central bank. The parameter e measures the weight of unem-
ployment relative to inflation stabilization in the preferences of the
central bank.
The central bank chooses ~p and wage setters `choose' Et-tOPt.
Normalizing Op and u at zero yields
I.c - 'h(~pt)2 f e ut (2.49)
Hence the model consists of equations (2.20) and ( 2.49). Substituting the
Phillips curve into the loss function yields
Lt - 'h(OPt)Z } E~u - 1OPc } 1 Et-1APt) (2.49)1-(3 1 -Q
From the first order conditions for a minimum of (2.50), that is al.tl80pt
- 0, we obtain the central bank's reaction function given wage setter's
expectations
OPD - 1 Ea 31 (2.51)
where superscript D denotes discretion. Assuming rational expectations,
wage setters predict inflation by solving out the central bank's optimizati-
on problem and forecasting the solution for OptD as well as possible. In
the present case they can calculate exactly the choice of inflation from
equation (2.51).
Taking expectations conditional on information at t-1 of (2.51) gives
Et-1 OPD - E (2.51)1 - (3
Since actual and expected inflation are identical unanticipated inflation is
zero implying that
Dut - u (2.53)
Equations (2.51) and (2.53) highlight the time consistency problem. The
monetary policy strategy of the central bank, that is equation (2.51) is
time consistent in the sense that at each point in time the inflation rate
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selected is best, given the current situation.
However, as can be seen from equations (2.51) and (2.53),the resul-
ting policy is socially sub-optimal. It is sub-optimal since it results in an
excessive level of inflation (AptD 1 Ap~), that is it produces an inflatio-
nary bias with no gains in the form of systematic lower unemployment
(utD ~ u~).
Note that the greater the slope of the Phillips curve ll(1-~i) (that is,
the greater the reduction in unemployment from unanticipated inflation)
and the greater E(the less costly the inflation) the higher the inflation
rate.
Substituting (2.51) and (2.53) into (2.49) and taking expectations, the
implied expected loss at time t-1 under the discretionary regime is
Et-1 LD - E ~u } E ~
2(1 -Q)~
(2.54)
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. 106) suppose now that at time
t-1 the central bank announces a rule for determining inflation.
Suppose the rule is
t - 10p~R - 0 (2.55)
where superscript R denotes rules. Equation (2.55) amounts to a con-
stant-growth-rate-nile, where the rate of growth of the money supply
happens to be zero.32 If wage setters believe that the central bank will
stick to its announcement at time t expected inflation is
Et-i ~Pt - 0 (2.56)
Suppose also that the central bank in fact sticks to its announcement that
is
~ptR - 0 (2.57)
Since actual and expected inflation are identical unantipated inflation is
zero implying that
Rut - u (2.58)
Equations (2.57) and (2.58) highlight the time-inconsistency of socially
optimal monetary policy. As can be seen from equations (2.57) and
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(2.58) inflation is at its target value AptR - Ap~ and unemployment at
the natural rate.33 However, this policy is time inconsistent. It is time
inconsistent since the rule (2.55) is no longer optimal at time t, even
though no new relevant information has appeared in the meantime. This
is because once wage setters have `chosen' expected inflation and wage
contracts have been signed at time t-1 - in order to minimize its loss
function at time t- the central bank has an incentive to deviate ex post
from its announced plan. Thus the plan is time-inconsistent.
Hence the dilemma described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) is that
the socially optimal monetary policy strategy (zero inflation) is time-
inconsistent, while the time-consistent policy (discretion) is socially sub-
optimal. The implied expected value of the loss function under the rules
regime is
Et-1 LR - Eu (2.59)
The welfare losses are obviously higher under the discretionary regime as
2
Et-1~LtD - LtR~ - E ~ 0 (2.60)2(1 -a)Z
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Under the rules regime
unemployment is still at the natural level but inflation is lower. Hence,
the central bank would clearly like to find ways to credibly precommit to
lower inflation, as this could reduce her welfare losses. Precommitment
and the associated issues of cheating and temptation are the subject of the
following sub-section.
VII.2 Cheating, Non-Credible Precommitments and Macroeconomic
Performance across Monetary Regimes
As noted by Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. 107) the central bank is temp-
ted to renege on commitments. In particular if wage setters expect zero
inflation - as occurs under the rule - then the central bank would like
to implement a positive inflation rate in order to drive down unemploy-
ment from an inflation shock. Now we will analyse how much the central
bank can gain by cheating. Assume that wage setters have the expectation
Et-1 OPt - 0 (2.56)
If the central bank treats this expectation as given, the choice of Opt that
minimizes Lt is the one that we found under discretion
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~pIH- 1 Ea 34 (2.61)
where superscipt CH denotes the cheating regime. Subtracting (2.56)
from (2.61) unanticipated inflation is e~(1-a). Hence unemployment
under the cheating regime is
uÍH- u- E G u
(1 -a)2
(2.62)
Thus because of the inflation shock unemployment is lower than the
natural rate. Substituting (2.61) and (2.62) in (2.49) the implied expected
value of the loss function is
Et-1 Lt H- E~u - E ]
(2.63)
2(1 -(3)2
The point is that this expected loss is lower than that, Et-tl.tR, the rules
regime. Following Barro and Gordon we refer to the difference between
these expected losses as the temptation to renege on the rule - or simply
as the temptation. In the present case we have
2
Et-1 ~LR -LtH] - E 1 0 (2.64)
2(1- ,6)2
Note that there is still one more type of outcome. Suppose that the
central bank announces the rule
t-1~PtR - 0
but that the private sector expects the cheating inflation rate
Et-t OPt - OptCH
(2.55)
(2.65)
Suppose also that the central bank in fact sticks to its accouncement that
is
OptR - 0 (2.57)
Subtracting (2.65) from (2.57) and taking account of (2.61) unanticipated
inflation is -el(1 - S). Hence unemployment is
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uRN - u f E 1 u (2.66)
(1 -Q)2
where superscript RN denotes the non-credible rules regime.35 Because
of a negative inflation shock - that is deflationary monetary policy -
unemployment is higher than the natural rate.
Substituting (2.57) and (2.66) in the loss function (2.49) and taking
expectations we get
Et-1LRN
- E ~U } g ~
(1 -a)2
(2.67)
The important thing to note is that this outcome is even worse than under
the discretionary regime for
2
Et-1 ~LRN - LD) -
2(1~a)2
) 0 (2.68)
Therefore at the present stage we have four type of outcomes. Ranging
from low losses to high these are
Et-1 LtCH ~ Et-1 LtR G Et-1 LtD C EL-1 LtRN (2.69)
Rules with people expecting the cheating rate is worse than discretion
because the central bank creates excessive unemployment (even higher
than the natural rate) which is not worth the lower inflation. Next,
discretion is worse than the rule because no inflation shocks arise in
either case, but the commitment under the rule avoids excessive inflation.
Cheating - when wage setters anticipate the rule - delivers the best
results. This is because the inflation shock eliminates art of the unem-
ployment problem which is worth the extra inflation ~6 The foregoing
discussion can be summarized in Table 2.2.37
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~pt -1-,Q 1 - Q
Note that the cheating outcome is feasible only when people can be
systematically deveiced into maintaining low inflationary expectations.
This completes the description of the one period Phillips curve monetary
policy game.
We now move on to a multiperiod extension and the associated issues
of reputation and credibility.
VII.3 Repeated Games, Trigger Strategies and Reputation
In this section we consider a repeated or super game. Following Barro
and Gordon (1983a) we show that repeated interaction between the
policymaker and wage setters may give rise to reputational forces that
can substitute for formal rules. In the following example of a reputational
equilibrium the outcome turns out to be weighted averages of those from
discretion and those from precommitment.
The central bank's objective at date t entails the minimization of the
present value of the loss function (2.49) that is
~ qt [2(~pt)2 f E ut] 0 G q ~ 1 (2.70)
t-o
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where q is the discount factor that applies between periods t and tfl,
that is
q- ll(1 ~-p) and p is the discount rate. Note that if q- 1 equation
(2.70) reduces to equation (2.49). Thus (2.70) is a multiperiod extension
of (2.49).
Suppose now that the central bank announces the inflation rate.
t-t~PtR - ~p (2.71)
That is, the rule specifies constant inflation (a constant-growth-rate rule).
Wage setters choose their inflationary expectations for period t as
follows.
Et-t~Pt - i if Et-20pt-1 - OPt-1 (2.72)otherwise
Hence if actual inflation in the previous period accords with expectations,
wage setters expect the central bank to perform in line with its announ-
ced rule for period t. If the previous period's inflation does not accord
with expectations, wage setters expect instead that the central bank will
inflate at the higher discretionary rate ~ptD. If the central bank follows
its rule every period then it also validates expectations each period. Thus
the central bank maintains its reputation or credibility in each period.
However, if the central bank chea[s during period t, then the second part
of equation (2.72) says that next period's expectations are Et~~tf 1-
~Ptf 1D. Then, if in period tf 1 the central bank chooses ~pt~ t(which
is optimal given expectations at time t), actual and expected inflation
rates coincide, although at the discretionary levels.
Accordingly, the first part of equation ( 2.72) says that at time tf 1
wage setters anticipate the rules outcome for period tf2, Ettl0Ptf2 -
tf 1 OPtt2~
In other words the punishment from violating the rule during period t
is that the discretionary solution obtains during period tf 1. But, credibi-
lity is restored as of period tf2 as though no previous violation has
occured. Hence Barro and Gordon's trigger strategy mechanism, in
which wage setters use their inflationary expectations as a device to deter
the central bank from producing the discretionary rate of inflation,
specifies only one period's worth of `punishment' for each `crime'.38
The central bank minimizes (2.70) subject to wage setters' behaviour.
In considering whether to cheat today, it compares the difference be-
tween the temptation to do so, with the discounted value of the loss in
next period's welfare because of increased inflationary expectations (the
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enforcement not to cheat).
Suppose that the central bank has credibility in period t. If the central
bank cheats then its best choice of inflation is
0 Cx - e (2.61)
pt 1 - a
Following the same procedure as in Section VII.2 the central bank now
gains the temptation
Et-t ILR - Lix] - 2[ 1 Ea- s,p]z
(2.73)
The cost of this violation is that discretion, rather than the rule applies
for period tf 1. Hence, the central bank realizes next period the loss
LDt- E[u t E ]
2(1 -a)z
rather than
LR t- Eu } 2 ~p2
The expected present value of the difference is
2





Following Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. 109) we refer to the difference
between these losses as the enforcement not to renege on the rule. The
central bank abides by the rule during period t - that is, sets ~pt - t-1
~ptR - Op - if the enforcement is at least as great as the temptation.
Hence in equilibrium rules satisfy the enforceability restriction
Et-1 [f-tR
- LCCx] ~ qEt-1 ~Ltf tD - Ltf 1R] (2.76)
The lowest credibly sustainable rate of inflation in found by substituting
(2.73) and (2.75) in (2.76), equating the two sides and solving for
Op.39 The solution is
0 - 1 - q E (2.77)
P - 1}q 1-a
This rate is higher than the first-best zero inflation rate but lower than
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the discretionary rate that would occur in the absence of deterrence.
0 G 1- q ~ G E for 0 G q ~ 1 (2.78)ltq 1-(3 1-a
Note that the higher the discount factor q, the lower ~p. The reason is
that a relatively high value of q(a low rate of discount of future costs)
strengthens the enforcement. Therefore even in the absence of commit-
ments a second-best lower rate of inflation can be credibly sustained by
an appropriate deterrence mechanism. This completes the Section on
repeated games.
VIII AMBIGUITY, CREDIBILITY AND PRIVATE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RELATIVE CON-
CERN FOR PRICE STABILITY
VIII.1 The Backus and Driffill Analysis
In the Barro and Gordon (1983a) framework wage setters and the central
bank are assumed to have the same information. Backus and Driffil
(1985) however, extended a finitely repeated version of the Barro and
Gordon policy game to a situation in which wage setters are uncertain
about the preferences of the central bank. Using the notation of this
chapter, in particular wage setters are uncertain about the parameter e,
that is the weight of unemployment relative to inflation stabilization in
the preferences of the central bank.
Hence, the critical element in the Backus and Driffill analysis is
private information about the relative concern for price stability:~
when the central bank announces its intention to fight inflation wage
setters are uncertain whether this is in fact the case, or whether it is
simply an attempt to manipulate their expectations. Backus and Driffill
point out that a weakness of the Barro and Gordon analysis is that the
punishment strategy utilized by wage setters (equation (2.61)) is essenti-
al(y arbitrary.41
Consequently there is an infinite number of possible reputational
equilibria with no mechanism for choosing among them. In order to
avoid these problems Backus and Driffill apply the Kreps and Wilson
(1982a, 1982b)42 analysis of reputation to a finitely repeated version of
the Barro and Gordon policy game. For ease of exposition we consider
the two-period version of Backus and Driffill as presented in Persson and
Tabellini (1990, pp. 56-66). Hence the following draws heavily on their




uc - u- 1 R(OPc - Ec- I ~Pc)
The central bank minimizes
2





As stated before, a central assumption is that wage setters do not know
the true value of the weight e in the central bank's loss function (2.79).
The central bank is one of two types: `wet' (W) with e~ 0, or `hard-
nosed' (HN) with E- 0. In the latter case the central bank is irrevocably
committed to pursuing a zero inflation policy.
At the start of the game in period l, wage setters assign a prior
probability xl to the event that the central bank is hard-nosed.
xl - Prob (HN ~ t-1) (2.80)
and (1 - xl) to the complementary event that the central bank is wet.
Since the central bank knows its own type the game is one of private
information about the relative concern for price stability.
In the Backus and Driffill framework, monetary policy signals the
central bank's preferences. By observing policy in period 1, wage setters
learn something about the true value of e. Wage setters' beliefs, xt, are
revised according to Bayes' rule.43 Period 2 nominal wages are then
set on the basis of the posterior beliefs, x2.
Let pt - Prob (~pt - 0 ~ e 7 0) be the period t probability assigned
by wage setters to the event that the wet type tries to masquerade as
being hard-nosed by playing zero inflation. If wage setters observe the
policy Opt - 0 or ~pt - EI(1-~i),44 Bayes' rule suggests how to rati-
onally update these prior beliefs.
xtProb(Opt I HN)
(2.81)x2 - Prob(HN ~ Opt) -
Prob (OP1)
Hence the posterior probability that the central bank is hard-nosed is
given by the prior multiplied by the conditional probability to observe the
policy ~pt given that the central bank is hard-nosed (E - 0), divided by
the unconditional probability to observe the policy Op~.
Clearly, if the `discretionary' policy Opt - e~(1-(3) is observed,
(2.81) gives
xt ~ 0 (2.82)
x2 - (1 -x~)(1 -pt)
- 0
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since a hard-nosed policymaker (an `inflation hawk') never inflates.
However, if zero inflation (`the rule') is observed, (2.81) gives
x2 -
xt . 1
xl t pt (1 -xi)
(2.83)
Since the hard-nosed central banker chooses zero inflation with probabili-
ty 1 and the wet type chooses it with probability pl .
In equilibrium pt must be equal to the true probability chosen by a
wet central bank in period 1.45 Inserting this equilibrium requirement
in (2.82) we have the following (rational) private learning process
x2 - 1 xl t pt(1 -xt)
ll 0 otherwise
(2.84)
Note that x2 is a natural measure of central bank reputation. If a positive
inflation rate is observed in period 1, then the reputation of being hard-
nosed is destroyed and x2 - 0. If, on the other hand, zero inflation is
observed, then the central bank could really be hard-nosed; or it could
simply pretend to do so - that is it could be masquerading - in order to
maintain or enhance its reputation. Since only a non-masquerading wet
central bank inflates, and if it does at the `discretionary' one shot rate
el(1-,6), expected inflation is
Et-1~Pt - (1 -pt)(1 -xt) 1 Ea (2.85)
From (2.85) it can be seen that the higher xt the lower expected inflation.
This is the source of the central bank's reputational incentives. As
pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (1990, p. 61) in the last period
(period 2), a wet central bank has no incentive to maintain its reputation.
Hence it always sets
Ap2 - 1 - Q
Thus, p2 - 0 and
w E
xt
if ~pt - 0
(1.2ib)
El~P2W - (1-x2) EI(1-,6) (2.87)
Substracting (2.87) from (2.86) unanticipated inflation is x2el(1-,Q).
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Hence unemployment in period 2 is
W x2E
u2 - u -
(1 -a)Z
(2.88)











We can expand (2.90) as
8L2W BEtOpW 8uZ 8LW
- . ~ c 0
ax2 a x2 waEt Opz au2
(2.90)
(2.91)
From (2.91) it can be seen that an increase in the central bank's period 2
reputation reduces its loss in period 2 because a higher reputation
decreases inflationary expectations which in turn decrease unemploy-
ment.~
Hence the Backus Driffill model features a trade-off between the
short-run benefits of inflation and the long-run costs of losing its reputati-
on. This trade-off can be expressed algebraicly using Barro and Gordon's
(1983a) concepts of temptation and enforcement.
If the central bank inflates in period 1 the implied expected value of
the loss function is
EpLW - e[u - 2(I -a)Z f 1 1 a Ep~pt] (2.92)
rather than
EpLHN - e[u t 1 1 a EpOPI] (2.93)
Following the set-up of Section VII.2 we refer to the difference between
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these losses as the temptation. In the present case we have
2HN W EEp[L1 - Lt ) - 2(1 a)2 (2.94)
Note that this expression is exactly the same as the [emptation in Section
VII.2 (see equation (2.64)). The cost of inflating in period 1 rather than
following a zero inflation policy is that the central bank's reputation in
period 2, x2, is zero rather than xl~[xt f pt(1 -xt)] (see the learning
mechanism (2.84)).
Hence the central bank realizes in period 2 the loss
I.2W - E[u t E ] (2.95)
2(1 -(3)2
rather than
~H N - E[u t (1 -2x2)E
2(1 -a)Z
]
The expected present value of the difference is




Following Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. 109) we refer to the difference
between these losses as the enforcement.
Persson and Tabellini (1990, p. 62) point out that (2.97) plays the
same role as the enforcement of the Barro Gordon model, be it that here
it is due to a genuine change of beliefs rather than to an artificial `pu-
nishment' by wage setters.
Whether the reputational incentives are strong enough depends on the
enforceability restriction.
Ep [LtHN - LtW] G qE~ [L.ZW - L.LHN] (2.98)
They point out that depending on the value of q different equilibria may
emerge.47
The general point however is that reputation can sustain low-inflation
monetary policy, even in a finite-horizon set up. Hence Backus and
Driffill (1985, p. 537) suggest that governments may try to appoint
central bankers with reputations for fighting inflation, even if their own
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preferences place positive weight on unemployment. By doing so they
minimize the costs associated with uncertainty about policy and with the
credibility problem wet central banks have with noninflationary policies.
As pointed out by Cukierman (1986, p. 8) the Backus and Driffill
analysis is restricted by the fact that the policy maker can be one of only
two unchanging types. As a consequence, once a reputation is destroyed
it cannot be rebuilt. Those features are inconsistent with the observed
frequent reversals in the rate of monetary growth in the United States,
England and other democracies. Therefore Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) extend the Backus and Driffill model in the sense that policyma-
ker's objectives are allowed to change continuously through time and to
assume an infinite number of values. In addition, Cukierman and Meltzer
analyse the effect of the precision of monetary control on the choice of
policies. They conceive of credibility as the speed with which wage
setters detect changes in the policy maker's objectives. Their analysis is
the subject of the next subsection.
VIII.2 The Cukierman and Meltzer Analysis
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) (CM) extend the Backus and Driffill
model in the sense that policymaker's objectives are allowed to change
continuously through time and to assume an infinite number of values. In
this section we summarize their findings. A slightly different version of
the CM model is presented in Cukierman (1992), chapter 9.48 The
behaviour of wage setters is captured by the Phillips curve
ut - u - (~mt - Et-1 ~mt) (2.99)
Hence unemployment deviates from the natural rate to the extent that
there are unanticipated boosts to monetary growth. For analytic conve-
nience CM work with a slope coefficient normalized at unity.49 Also
they switch to an infinite horizon environment. Hence the central bank
minimizes
~
ED ~ qt ~,~ (Omt)2 ~ E~ u~~ (2.100)
t-0
Note that equation (2.100) is a more general version of the analogous
equation in the Backus and Driffill model. Apart from (2.100) being
stated in terms of monetary growth rather than inFlation, the major
difference is that e, the weight of unemployment stabilization relative to
inflation stabilization, is time dependent. In the CM analysis e rather than
being restricted to either being wet (e ~ 0) or hardnosed (e - 0), can
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now take an infinite number of values.
Equations (2.101) and (2.101) specify the stochastic behaviour of the
parameter e and indicate that central bank objectives exhibit a certain
degree of persistence
Et - á: t et (2.101)
et - pet-t} vÍ 0 G p e 1 ve-- N(0, Q~) (2.102)
where É is a positive publicily known constant and et a first-order
Markoff process whose realization is known only to the central bank.
Thus, the central bank's aversion to unemployment is not constant over
time, but varies in a serially correlated fashion.
Monetary growth immediately effects inflation. However, there is a
stochastic error in monetary control, so that,
Omt - OmD t ~t ~ -- N (0, á~) (2.103)
where Omt, ~mtD are actual and planned monetary growth.
The information structure is as follows. The coefficients q and p and
the variances o2v and a2~ are common knowledge. The central assumpti-
on in the CM framework is the following. The central bank knows
exactly what it wants to achieve currently, that is, the value of et and vt,
whereas wage setters do not observe et directly but can draw inferences
about the policymaker's objectives from observations of past monetary
growth. Hence, like in the Backus and Driffill analysis the central bank
has private information about its objectives.
The timing of events is as follows. Wage setters sign annual nominal
contracts at the beginning of each year before monetary policy is chosen
for that year. They take the information they have about the central
bank's objectives and its behaviour into account in forming their expecta-
tions. In the second stage the central bank chooses OmtD, taking the
wage contracts and the associa[ed expectations as given. In the third and
final stage the control error for the period realizes and the rate of
monetary growth is determined by equation (2.103).
The central bank picks that part of monetary growth that it controls so
as to minimize (2.100). This gives rise to a discretionary decision rule in
which the actual rate of monetary expansion depends on the current state
of the central bank's objectives (Et) and on the current state of the control
error (~it).
Wage setters know the structure of the decision rule but do not know
the current state et of the central bank's objectives. However they utilize
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information on all past rates of monetary growth to form a minimum
variance estimate of the rate of monetary expansion for the period.50
As pointed out by Cukierman (1992, p. 168) the central bank's decision
rule depends on the process of expectations formation, whilst this process
in turn depends on the central bank's decision rule. Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986, p. 1105) show that the solution to the central bank's
decision problem in equation (2.100) iss~
AmDt - c0~ f ctei (2.104)
where c0, ct are positíve constants that depend on the parameters of the
central bank's objective function and the precision of monetary control.
When equation (2.104) is substituted in equation (2.103), actual monetary
grow[h can be expressed as
~mt - c0É f clet } ~t (2.105)
As stated before the CM model assumes that wage setters do not know
the current state of the central bank's objectives. Wage setters however
do know the central bank's decision rule in equation (2.105) and have
observed ~mt in each period up to and including the previous one. Since
Omt has some degree of persistence, past values of monetary growth
convey noisy but meaningful information about future monetary growth
to wage setters. The noise is induced by the control error tlit.
CM show that the optimal predictor for future monetary growth
adjusts slowly to actual changes in observed money growth; specifically
~
Et-lAmt -~ ~~~(1-P)c0E t(P-)`)Omt-1-j~ 0 G A G
1(2.106)
j-0
Equation (2.106) specifies that expected monetary growth is a geometri-
cally distributed lag, with decreasing weights, of weighted averages of
the unconditional mean money growth c0É and actually observed past
rates of money growth Omt-1-j. The parameter ~ is determined by the
degree of persistence in the central bank's objectives (p), the precision of
monetary control (Q,~2) and the degree of instability in the central bank's
objectives as measured by v~2. The weight ~ in equation (2.106) measu-
res the degree of sluggishiness in expectations. Hence, the higher is ~ the
more attention wage setters pay to the distant past, and the slower the
speed at which they recognize that a change in the central bank's objecti-
ves has actually occurred.
Since CM conceive of credibiliry as this speed of learning, the higher
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A the lower credibility. In addition CM show that ~ is a decreasing
function of ov2 and an increasing function of o,~2.52 Hence, using this
measure of credibility, the more precise monetary control is (the lower
0~2) the higher is credibility. Note that this characterization of credibility
differs from the Backus and Driffill model of the previous section. In the
latter model credibility or reputation is a state variable. It is the current
subjective probability assigned by wage setters to the event that the
policymaker is hard-nosed. Here credibility is a parameter.
At this point it is useful to compare CM with the Barro and Gordon
(1983a) model as presented in Section VII.1. Equation (2.104) specializes
to Barro and Gordon's discretionary solution (equation (2.51)) when
asymmetric information is removed from the model.
Formally, asymmetric information is eliminated when for a given (non
zero) 0~2 the variability of the central bank's objectives av2 is zero. In
this case the weight of unemployment relative to inflation stabilization in
the preferences of the central bank, e~, is common knowledge. The
distributional assumptions on v imply that Et - N(Ë, vE2). The (asymp-




Hence, if ov2 - 0, aE2 - 0 and et - é. Hence, in this case the solution
of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986, p. 1107) specializes to
OmtD - ~ (2.108)
This equation can be obtained from the Barro and Gordon model by
setting e- É, (3 - 0 and Omt - Op~ in equation (2.51).
To this point the level of noise in the control of money was considered
to be a technologically given p~arameter. Suppose however, that technolo-
gy only puts a lower bound Q on the variance of the control error. The
central bank can choose any v~2 ?~. CM assume for simplicity ~-
0. The central bank sets the value of o,~ once and for all so as to
minimize the long-run expected value of its loss function (2.100). The
choice of this variance determines the politically optimal level of ambi-
guity in the conduct of monetary policy, since a higher choice of o,~2,
conveys more ambiguous signals to wage setters.
By manipulating the monetary control parameter, o,yZ, the central bank
affects the speed at which wage setters become aware of changes in
central bank objectives and therefore the average value of benefits from
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monetary surprises.
In particular an increase in ambiguity increases the benefits from
economic stimulation, that is the benefits from u being smaller than u,
but it also increases the average inflation rate which is bad from the
central bank's point of view. The level of ambiguity is chosen by weigh-
ting the effects of those two conflicting elements on the central bank's
objectives. As stated by Goodhart (1994, p. 108), the higher a 2 the
more dust is thrown into the eyes of wage setters, and the central ~ank's
current intentions can be forecast less well from past monetary growth;
hence their is less value to the authorities to restrain inflation now to gain
greater counter-inflation credibility in the future. According to Goodhart
this gives the basic trade-off that emerges clearly from the CM analysis.
The more dust, pervasive uncertainty, that the public encounters, the
greater the power, and the leeway, that the central bank has to carry out
surprise monetary actions with beneficial effects on unemployment, but
the less their resulting credibility and the higher mean inflation. Hence,
the CM analysis is one of the first papers that features the important
trade-off between credibiliry and flexibility. By choosing more noisy
monetary control procedures the central bank loses credibility but gains
the flexibility to lower unemployment by surprise inflation.
This trade-off has also been investigated in the context of models with
private information about the economy by Canzoneri (1985) and Rogoff
(1985). Their models are the subject of the next section.
IX PRIVATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ECONO-
MY: CREDIBILITY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY
IX.1 The Canzoneri Model
Now we move on to a setting in which the central bank has private
information about the economy. This is neatly modelled by Canzoneri
(1985). Suppose the central bank has forecasts of money demand that are
private information. In this case the following scenario may apply.
Monetary aggregates surge ahead of expected or targeted rates: the
central bank claims that it is accommodating a perceived increase in
money demand in order to stabilize the price level; wage setters counter
that the central bank is running an inflationary policy to expand employ-
ment; a period of credibility building ensues, which may focus upon the
personalities of policymakers, targeting produres, or even proposals for
legislative reform. A key element in this scenario is that wage setters
cannot verify the central bank's claim; the central bank's forecast of
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money demand is private information. Canzoneri models this scenario as
a non-cooperative game which can be seen as an extension of the Barro
and Gordon model outlined in Section VII.
The behaviour of wage setters is captured by the Phillips curve
ut - u-(Opt - Et-1 ~Pt)
Sa (2.109)
The central bank minimizes
~ - 'h(Apt)2 t 2(ut)2 (2.110)
Equation (2.110) is the specification of the central bank's loss function
employed throughout the remainder of this book. The central bank
stabilizes inflation and unemployment around their target values (which
here are normalized at zero).
Again the parameter e measures the weight of unemployment relative
to inflation stabilization in the preferences of the central bank. The model
is closed with a simple quantity equation
mt-pt-ytvt (2.111)
where mt is the log of the money supply, y is the equilibrium or natural
rate of output and vt is a stochastic disturbance to money demand.55
First differencing, (2.111) becomes
Om~ - ~pt - wt
If the disturbance to money demand follows a random walk,
vt - vt-1 f S S- N(0, o2g)
Then (2.112) becomes




where St is the white noise innovation.
Now we come to the information structure of the game. The central
assumption in the Canzoneri model is that information is asymmetric.
Wage setters do not see S~ at the time they sign wage con[racts but the
central bank has forecasts of money demand that are private information.
Hence the central bank has some forecast of St. More specifically, let St
be decomposed into s~ and ~t,
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St - st~ ~t (2.115)
where st is the central bank's forecast of St, and ~yt is its forecast error.
The forecast st is private central bank's information and is not observed
by wage setters. The timing of events is as follows. Wage setters form
Et-tOmt on the basis of their knowledge of the central bank's loss
function and their expectation that Si (and st and ~t) is zero. Next, the
central bank sets Omt to minimize its loss function (2.110), knowing Et-
10mt and its own forecast of St.
Ex post, wage setters can calculate St from (2.112) for they will then
observe both ~mt and Opt. However, since information is asymmetric,
they cannot decompose St into the central bank's forecast, st, and the
forecast error, t[it.
The equilibrium can now be found as follows. From the first order
conditions for a minimum of Lt taking Et-tOmt as a fixed parameter we
obtain the central bank's reaction function to wage setters' expectations
Omt - 1E~ [u t Et-i t,mt - Et-I Ovt] t Ovt (2.116)
Taking expectations conditional on information available to wage setters
at t-1 of (2.116) gives
Et-10mt - eu (2.117)
Equation (2.117) is the reaction function of wage setters. Upon substitu-
ting (2.117) into (2.116), noting that wage setters cannot forecast shocks
to velocity (Et-t~vt - 0) and that the central bank uses st as a signal for
~vt we obtain the discretionary rate of monetary expansion under private
information
OmDP - Eu t st (2.118)
where superscript DP denotes discretion under private information.
Substituting (2.113) and (2.118) into (2.112) we get the discretionary rate
of inflation
~ptDP - Eu - ~t
Hence unexpected inflation is
~ptDP - Et-10PtDP - -~t
(2.119)
(2.120)
46 Instituiions anc! Monctury Policy
Finally, the level of unemployment can be found by substituting (2.120)
into (2.109)
utDP - u f ~t (2.121)
Now the outcome will be compared with the benchmark case of symme-
tric information. In the latter case the central bank is as ignorant as the
private sector about shocks to money demand. Setting st - 0 in equation
(2.118) we obtain the discretionary rate of monetary expansion under
symmetric information
~mtDS - eu (2.122)
where superscript DS denotes discretion under symmetric information.
Proceeding as before the DS-regime counterparts of equations (2.119)
and (2.121) are
OptDS - Eu - St
utDS - u -F- St
(2.123)
(2.124)
We are now prepared to evaluate both information structures from the
perspective of society. Substituting the results relevant for the central
bank [(2.119) and (2.121), (2.123) and (2.124)] into the central bank's
loss function (2.110) and taking expectations we obtain
Et-tI-DP - 12e [eu2 t á~] (2.125)
Et-tLDS } 12E [El'IZ t ab] (2.126)
Subtracting (2.125) from (2.126) the per-period difference in welfare
losses between the symmetric information regime and the private infor-
mation regime is given by
Et-1 [LDS - LDPI - 12E [Qg -o,~) (2.127)
Since v2g 1 Q,~2 welfare losses under symmetric information are higher
than under priva[e information.
The reason is that with private information the central bank is left with
more flexibiliry to accommodate st, before it passes on to inflation and
unemployment; this benefits society as a whole.
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However, as stated at the beginning of this section under private
information the central bank is faced with a credibility problem. Suppose
the central bank sets a high ~m~, claiming to be accommodating an
unexpectedly high money demand; wage setters charge that it is instead
running an inflationary policy to increase employment, and a credibility
breakdown ensues. If the central bank's forecast of money demand is
private information, the central bank's adherence to mere stabilization
policy cannot be verified directly. Hence, then the problem becomes the
trading off of the flexibility needed for stabilization with the credibility
constraint required for eliminating the inflation bias; this problem is the
main subject of the next subsection.
IX.2 Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: the Rogoff-Loh-
mann Analysis
Rogoff (1985) considers an alternative approach to the time consistency
problem. He demonstrates that society can make itself better off by
selecting an agent to head the central bank who is known to place a
greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to unemployment
stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function L.
Suppose that in period t-1 society (the principa156) an selects agent
to head the central bank in period t. The reputation of this individual is
such that if he is appointed to head the central bank, he will minimize the
following loss function.
It - (1 22) (~Pc)2 } 2 (ut)Z (2.128)
When d2 is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater
relative weight on inflation stabilization than society does. Note that if d2
- 0 equation (2.128) reduces to the social loss function (2.110).
The central bank minimizes (2.128) subject to the Phillips curve
ut - u-(~Pc - Et-t ~Pt f F~~)57 (2.129)
where
'.,,t - v~t vt`t -- N (0, ~~,) (2.130)
As in the Canzoneri (1985) analysis the central bank here has private
information about the economy. This fact is reflected in the timing of the
game.
First nominal wage contracts are signed. In the present set-up nominal
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wage contracts are reflected in expected inflation. Next, the productivity
shock (vt`t) realizes. This shock is unknown to wage setters at the time
contracts are signed but is observed by the central bank. After observing
the shock the central bank sets monetary policy (the inFlation rate).
Finally unemployment is determined.
The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium is as
follows. Substituting the Phillips curve (2.129) in the loss function
(2.128), from the first order conditions for a minimum of (2.128), i.e.
8Itl80pi - 0, we obtain the central bank's reaction function to wage-
setter's expectations
I E E I E It
Opt - (1~d2)}EU } (1}d2)}EEt-IAPi - (1}d2)}EVc (2.131)
where superscript I denotes the independent central bank regime. Taking
expectations conditional on information at t-1 of (2.131) gives
I E
Et-l~pt - (1}d2)u (2.132)
Equation (2.132) is the reaction function of wage-setters. Upon substi[u-
ting (2.132) in (2.131) we get the solution for the inflation rate
pÍ - E E ~C
0 (1 td2) u - (1 ~d2) ~EVt (2.133)
A comparison of inflation under discretion (dz - 0) and (2.132) shows
that average inflation (the inflationary bias) will be lower under an
independent central bank. This result confirms the intuition that credibly
increasing the central banker's commitment to inflation stabilization
reduces the discretionary rate of inflation.
Subtracting (2.132) from (2.133) we
for unanticipated inflation.
I I -E v




Substituting (2.134) in (2.129) we get the solution for unemployment
the following expression
lfd
ui - u-~(1 d )) E] v~
(2.135)
} 2 }
Rulca versus Discre~ion 49
Now we evaluate central bank independence as an institutional device to
overcome the time-inconsistency problem. We show that for society the
optimal central banking institution depends on the balance between
credibiliry and flexibiliry.
As in the Canzoneri model the problem is the trading off of the
flexibility needed for stabilization with the credibility constraint required
for eliminating the inflation bias. To see this following Rogoff (1985, pp.
1175-1176), we whall first develop a notation for evaluating the expected
value of society's loss function under the independent central bank
regime "I", Ei-tL~1 58
Et-1Lt1 - 'h[eu2] f III f I'I (2.136)
where III -'~z(~p~I)2 and ~p~I is the mean inflation rate as determined
by equation (2.132).
I't - 'hEt-1 {E[vr t Ap~ -Et-IOP~)]~ } (AP~ -Et-tAp~)~}
The first component of E~-tLtl, '~zeuz is nonstochastic and invariant
across monetary regimes. If represents the deadweight loss due to the
labour market distortion (u 7 0).59 This loss cannot be reduced
through monetary policy in a time-consistent rational expectations
equilibrium.
The second term depends on the mean inflation rate. This term is also
nonstochastic but does depend on the choice of monetary policy regime.
The final term, I'I, represents the "stabilization" component of the loss
function. It measures how succesfully the central bank offsets disturban-
ces to stabilize unemployment and inflation around their mean values. By
subsituting the relevant results [(2.133) and (2.135)] into (2.136) and
abstracting from the (regime invariant) deadweight loss, one gets
2 E[E t(1 } d2)2] 2III } I't - E u2 t v (2.137)2(1 } d2)2 2[(1 } dZ) } E]2 w
To solve for the value of dz that minimizes EC-tLtI, differentiate (2.137)
with respect to d2
IaEaa,I.~ - áaI} áa I (z.138)
2 2 2
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ari EZaz
ad2 - ~(ltd2)tE~3
anI - E2 ~2
aá2 - (1 td2)3
(2.139)
(2.140)
From (2.140) it can be seen that increasing the central bank's commit-
ment to inflation stabilization decreases the credibility component of the
social loss function. On the other hand, from (2.139) it follows that
having a more independent central bank increases the stabilization
component of the loss function. Hence, optimal commitment in monetary
policy involves trading off the credibility gains associated with lower
average inflation versus loss of flexibility due to a distorted response to
output shocks.
Rogoff (1985, p. 1178) using an envelope theorem shows that the
ideal agent, that is the central banker that maximizes social welfare,
places a large but finite weight on inflation stabilization.~ Hence, the
optimal central banking institution is characterized by 0 G d2~ G oo.
Following the Rogoff paper, in an interesting contribution Flood and
Isard (1989) propose that the central bank be motivated to follow a
simple zero-inflation rule in `normal' times and to deviate from the rule
when large output shocks are realized. Hence they propose a mixed
strategy that combines a simple verifiable rule with discretion. The
proposed arrangement mitigates the loss of flexibility arising from the
lack of response to output shocks, at the cost of lower credibility arising
from reintroducing an inflationary bias into monetary policy.
Flood and Isard's proposal is implemented if the central bank commits
to the simple rule ~pi - 061 and incurs a strictly positive but finite
cost if she reneges on the rule. Using the notation of this book their
framework may be summarized as follows. The political principal sets
the cost ds in the central bank's loss function
LiB-'h(~pt)Z } 2(ut)Z t ds DUM (2.141)
where superscript CB denotes central bank.
This loss function is identical to the social loss function (2.110) except
for the additive cost term. This cost is incurred by the central bank if it
deviates from the simple zero inflation rule; DUM is a dummy variable,
which takes on the value of unity if the central bank deviates from the
rule, and zero otherwise.
The time sequence in the Flood and Isard model is as follows. Af[er
the central bank's political principal has set dg wage setters form inflatio-
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nary expectations Et-lt1p~. Then the shock v~t` is realised. Finally, the
central bank sets the inflation rate ~p~. The central bank either follows
the simple zero inflation rule or deviates from it (at cost ds) to set the
inflation rate at its discretion.
In a comment on Flood and lsard's paper Lohmann (1990) shows that
the optimal degree of commitment to the simple rule ds~ will depend
crucially on the probability distribution of the shock vt~`. Since we
assumed a normal distribution, in the context of this Chapter the optimal
degree of commitment depends on the variance of the shock o~Z. The
reason for this is that the higher the variance of productivity shocks, the
greater the need for a flexible response to output shocks.ó2
Note that in the Lohmann (1992) version of the Flood and Isard
(1989) proposal considered here in normal times the central bank is
motivated to follow a zero inFlation rule. Using the formal apparatus of
the Rogoff (1985) model Flood and Isard propose that the central bank
be motivated to be fully independent (d2 -~ in equation (2.131)) in
`normal' times and to behave in a purely discretionary manner (d2 - 0
in equation (2.131)) when large output shocks are realized. The problem
for the central bank's political principal is then to set dg in such a
manner that the expected value of the social loss function is minimized.
Hence the proposed institutional arrangement can be parametrized as a
fully independent central bank supplemented by an escape clauseó3 (d2
-ocandOGdgC ~).
In a recent paper Lohmann (1992) sheds some new light on the trade
off between credibility and flexibility. Her paper can be seen as a mix of
the Rogoff (1985) model and the Flood and Isard (1989) proposal. She
examines the optimal design of a central banking institution that lends
credibility to a low-inflation monetary policy while allowing for a
flexible policy response to unforeseen contingencies.
The policymaker grants partial independence to a conservative central
banker, who places a higher weight on inflation stabilization than the
policymaker. If the policymaker retains the option to override the central
banker's decisions at some strictly positive but finite cost, she induces
the central bank to implement a nonlinear policy rule.~
In normal times, the central bank sets the inflation rate independently
at his discretion. In extreme situations, he implements a flexible escape
clause: the larger the output shock, the more the central banker accom-
modates the policymaker's ex post demands in order to avoid being
overridden. Using the notation of this book the Lohmann framework may
be summarized as follows.
The policymaker sets the parameter d2 in the central banker's loss
function (2.128). In addition, the policymaker's commitment to the
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central banker is explicitly formalized by the introduction of the additive
cost term into the policymaker's loss function (2.141). Hence, in the
Lohmann model the cost ds is incurred by the policymaker and not by
the central bank. She assumes that the policymaker can choose a cost ds,
which she incurs when she ex post overrides the central banker's moneta-
ry policy decisions. The set of central banking institutions is then charac-
terized by two variables: the central banker's additional weight d2 on
inflation stabilization, dZ E IR, and the cost ds incurred by the policy-
maker when overriding the central banker, ds E[0, o0 1. The model of
delegation consists of three stages:
Stage 1. The policymaker chooses the central banker's additional
weight d2 on the inflation goal and sets the cost ds of overri-
ding the central banker.
Stage 2. Wage setters form inflationary expectations Et-l~pt.
Stage 3. (i) The output shock vtt` is realized (ii) The central banker sets
the inflation rate (iii) Either the policymaker accepts the
inflation rate set by the central banker; or she pays the cost dg
of overriding the central banker and resets the inflation rate
(iv) Inflation Opt and unemployment ut are realized.
In the institutional design stage the policymakeró5 commits to a central
banking institution (d2, ds). The wage setters, the policymaker, and the
central banker play a noncooperative game in the second and third
stages. The players' equilibrium strategies are a fimction of the institutio-
nal parameters ds and d2. Under the optimal insititutional arrangement,
the noncooperative game played is that in which the equilibrium outcome
minimizes the policymaker's expected loss, evaluated at the institutional
design stage. The model is solved by backwards induction.
Lohmann shows that the optimal central banking institution (d2~, ds~)
which minimizes the policymaker's ex~ected loss at the institutional
design stage is characterized by 0 G d2 G oo , 0 G d5~ G oo . Hence
the policymaker appoints a central banker who places a higher but finite
weight on inflation stabilization, and she retains the option to override
the central banker's decisions at some strictly positive but finite cost.
This arrangement minimizes the credibility loss~ induced by the
inflationary bias and the distortionary response to the output shock.
Lohmann's result on optimal commitment in monetary policy implies that
the institution of a partially independent conservative central banker
dominates a number of other arrangements which are contained in the set
of feasible central banking institutions: discretion (d2 - 0 or d5 - 0),
full commitment to the simple zero-inflation rule (d2 - oo and ds -
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oo), and the Rogoff ( 1985) model (0 G d2 G oo and ds -~). Hence
Rogoff s model corresponds to the case where the policymaker faces an
infinite cost of overriding a political appointee.
The conclusion of the Lohmann model is that by extending the Rogoff
model with an escape clause the policymaker obtains lower losses
because of an improved balance between credibility and flexibility. By
now, the most recent developments in the so-called optimal contract
literature [Persson and Tabellini ( 1993), and Walsh (1993)] claim that
optimal contracts between governments and central bankers may elimina-
te the trade-off between credibility and flexibility altogether; zero avera-
ge inflation and an optimal response to supply shocks can be achieved
simultaneously. This literature is the subject of the next section.
X OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BAN-
KERS
As pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1993) the
issue of central bank design can also be seen as one that involves structu-
ring a contract between the central bank and the government. They show
that a contract between the government and the central banker in which
the central banker's remuneration - the central bank's transfer - declines
in proportion to inflation can attain the first best equilibrium.ó7 Not
only does this contract remove the inflationary bias of monetary policy,
but the central bank's countercyclical policy is optimally active.
Hence, the trade-off between credibility and flexibility as emphasized
by Rogoff and others is eliminated. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. In the standard Barro-Gordon mode1,68 the inflationa-
ry bias is constant across states of nature, a contract therefore only needs
to raise the marginal cost of inflation to the central banker by a constant
amount, leaving the central banker free to respond with discretion to
economic disturbances. The contract can be interpreted as an inflation
targeting rule even though such rules are normally thought to be subopti-
mal in the presence of supply shocks.ó9
Persson and Tabellini (1993) owe a great deal of inspiration to Walsh
and they consider some of the same issues. However, their framework -
while more general than the standard Barro-Gordon model employed by
Walsh - makes it more difficult to relate their results to the existing
literature. Therefore, in reviewing the contract literature we restrict
attention to Walsh (1993).~~
Using the nota[ion of this book his framework may be summarized as
follows. The bahaviour of wage-setters is captured by the Phillips curve
54 Institutions and Moneiary Policy
u~ - u - (OPt - Ec-1~Pt}kt) (2.129)
where
~t - vt~` vtt` - N (0, o~~) (2.130)
The central bank minimizes the social loss function
I-t - '~ (~Pt)2 t 2 (ut)Z (2.110)
Using (2.110), (2.129), (2.130) the reaction function of the central bank
under discretion is given by
(2.142)
where superscript D denotes discretion and equation (2.142) is obiained
by setting d2 - 0 in equation (2.133). Following Lohmann (1992, p.
275) figure 2.1 graphs the inflation rate set under discretion and under
the regime of full commitment to the simple zero inflation rule (R). Fi-
gure 2.1 clearly illustrates the conventional trade-off between rules and
discretion.
Figure 2.1 Reactiori functions under various monetary
regimes
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Under the discretionary regime the central bank reacts optimally to the
supply shock (the slope of the reaction function --el(lfe)); that is it
has full flexibility, but this is at the expense of the credibility loss associ-
ated with an inflationary bias (the intercept term Eu).
On the other hand under full commitment to a zero inflation rule (e -
0 or d2 -~) the central bank solves its credibility problem (the inter-
cept term is zero), but loses flexibility (the slope term is also zero).
As stated earlier an appropriately drawn up contract between the
government and the central bank may serve to obtain a first best equili-
brium, a rules-cum-discretion solution~t that combines zero inflation (a
zero intercept term) with an optimal countercyclical policy (the slope
term should be -el(1 fe)).
In Figure 2.1 the first best state-con[ingent policy rule with commit-
ments is denoted by C, where the superscript C stands for commitment.
Accordingly, the first best state-contingen[ rule is given by
p ~ - - e v~ (2.143)Pt 1}E c
As is well known, the policy rule given by equation (2.143) is time
inconsistent and therefore not credible [Persson and Tabellini (1990, p.
21), Lohmann (1992, p. 275)] if implemented by a central bank whose
objective funtion is given by equation (2.110). However, now we will
consider a contract that changes the central bank's incentive structure
such that (2.143) emerges as its optimal strategy.
Suppose that at the institutional design stage t- t- 1 the government
(the political principal) establishes a contract with the central bank under
which the central bank is rewarded or penalized on the basis of observa-
ble macrceconomic outcomes. Supipose the central bank's transfer, Tt,
depends on the actual inflation rate. 2
The objective of the central bank then becomes one of choosing ~pt to
maximize
CB - ~-L t - Tt (2.144)
where L is the social loss function (2.110). The first order condition for
the central bank can be solved to show that
~PD- it E ~} 1 t E Et- t ~PD' 1 t E vt } aTD
(2.145)
a~pt
Taking expectations conditional on information at t-1 of (2.145) yields
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D aTt
Et-l~pi - Eu t(1 te) D (2.146)
8~pc
Substituting (2.146) in (2.145) we get the solution for the time-consistent
inflation rate
aT
OpD- eu - 1}E vi }(1 } E) D (2.147)
a0pt
Thus, the central bank can be induced to implement the optimal commit-
ment policy (2.143) under discretion if
OptD - ~pi~ (2.148)




This suggests the optimal transfer function will take the form
EU
Tt(Opt) - ca - 1}E Opt
(2.149)
(2.150)
Equation (2.150) is like a targeting rule in which the central bank is
penalized based on the observed rate of inflation. The target rate of
inflation is equal to zero.73
Since the transer is linear in inflation, it has the effect of raising the
marginal cost of inflation to the central bank by a constant amount. Since
wage-setters expect the central bank to set Opi to equate the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of inflation, the contract serves to reduce the
rate of inflation.
As pointed out by Walsh (1993, p. 13) in the standard analysis of
monetary policy, the inflationary bias arises because the central bank
fails to account for the effect of its systematic behaviour on wage setters'
expectations. This externalíty is overcome by making the transfer decline
with the realized rate of inflation. By raising the marginal cost of inflati-
on to the central bank, the contract causes the central bank to internalize
[his externality. Because the inflationary bias is independent of vit`, the
contract is not contingent on vt~.
Thus, it is not necessary for the government to verify the central
bank's observations of viw. Under the contract given by equation (2.150)
there is no trade-off between lowering average inflation and inducing an
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optimal stabilization response to shocks. Thus, the trade-off between
credibiliry and flexibility emphasized by Rogoff (1985), Lohmann (1992)
and others disappears. This completes the section on the contracting
approach to central bank design. We now move on to the summary and
the conclusions of this survey.
XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section we will summarize the rules versus discretion debate and
try to make an assessment.
During the early debate the gold standard prevailed. Therefore in this
period the debate was most often about how this simple rule for moneta-
ry policy could reduce the variability of activity and prices. However, as
was pointed out in Section II the actual functioning of the gold standard
involved the monetary authorities in a high degree of discretion.
After World War II the Keynesian Revolution shifted emphasis for
concern for the stability imposed by insitutions to the idea that central
banks should act to offset specific events. The choice between monetary
and fiscal policies depended on the structural coefficients of the determi-
nistic Keynesian system viz the slopes of the IS- and LM curves. Keyne-
sians shifted the focus from institutional design to the problem of how to
achieve full employment by appropriately timed and quantified govern-
ment action.
We showed in Section IV how Friedman attacked the Keynesian
framework. Because of incomplete or incorrect information and various
lags, policymakers not bound by a constant money growth rule would be
tempted into ezcess activism, destabilizing rather than stabilizing the
economy.
Was the literature in the 1950s dominated by Friedman's contentions,
the 1960s saw the (expectations augmented) Phillips curve and the
associated debate. A typical model used at that day for the analysis of
various policy rules was presented in Section V.2. There it was shown
that an integral (feedback) policy rule outperforms a constant money
growth rate rule by removing rather than introducing oscillations from
the adjustment path. Hence, as concerns activist policy in the context of
an expectations augmented Phillips curve, the principal conclusion is that
some activist policy can potentially improve on the performance of a
constant money growth rate rule.
The analysis of Sections IV - VI seem to justify one major conclusion:
the pre-1977 literature proved indecisive. Using the first class of argu-
ments, that is excess activism, it was not proved that rules were better
than discretion. This point has also been stressed by Argy (1988, p.
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155): `Much of the theoretical analysis in the end proved inconclusive.
Everything depended on how dynamics were represented and how policy
reacted' Argy's view is shared by Fischer. According to Fischer (1990,
p. 1169) the pre-1977 arguments of principle for rules lacked any
convincing demonstration that rules might be systematically better than
discretion.
However, the notion of dynamic inconsistency importantly changed the
debate. This is because in the post 1977 debate a rule represents a means
of overcoming the time-inconsistency problem.
In Section VII it was shown that in the Barro and Gordon (1983a)
model time consistent monetary policy has an inflationary bias: it results
in an excessive level of inflation with no gains in the form of systematic
lower unemployment. Therefore the central bank would clearly like to
find ways to credibly commit to lower inflation (possibly a constant
money growth rule), as this could reduce her welfare losses. The trouble
with the latter policy is that it is time inconsistent. This is the dilemma
described by Kydland and Prescott. The socially optimal monetary policy
strategy (zero inflation) is time inconsistent, while the time consistent
policy is socially sub-optimal.
Much of the succeeding literature has dealt with the development of
credible commitment technologies. Barro and Gordon (1983a) and
Backus and Driffill (1985) showed that repeated interaction between
wage setters and the central bank can give rise to reputational forces that
may substitute for formal rules.
However, in the Barro and Gordon model of Section VII the expectati-
on formation strategy of wage setters to deter the central bank from
producing the discretionary rate of inflation is essentially arbitrary. This
limitation is overcome in the Backus and Driffil (1985) and Cukierman-
Meltzer (1986) models of Section VIII.
In the Backus and Driffill model expectations play the same role,
however there they are due to genuine changes of beliefs (Bayesian
learning) rather than to an artificial punishment strategy.
Cukierman and Meltzer extend the Backus and Driffill model in the
sense that the central bank's objectives are allowed to change continuous-
ly through time and to assume an infinite number of values. In addition
they analyse the effect of the precision of monetary control on the choice
of policies.
They conceive of credibility as the speed at which wage setters learn
about changes in the central bank's objectives. The latter speed depends
on the precision of monetary control. Viewing the variance of the control
error as a choice parameter, we get the basic trade-off that emerges from
the Cukierman and Meltzer analysis. The higher the level of ambiguity
Rules versus Discre~ion 59
(the variance of the control error), the more uncertainty that wage setters
encounter and the greater the power and the leeway that the central bank
has to carry out surprise monetary actions with beneficial effects on
unemployment, but the less their resulting credibility and the higher
mean inflation.
Hence, the Cukierman Meltzer analysis is one of the first papers that
features the important trade-off between credibiliry and .flexibiliry. By
choosing more noisy monetary control procedures the central bank loses
credibility but gains the flexibility to stimulate employment by surprise
inflation.
In Section IX this trade-off has been investigated in the context of
models with private information about the economy.
The Rogoff (1985) model is a fine example of a model in which -
dynamic inconsistency issues notwithstanding - there is an important role
for activist stabilization policy. Rogoff demonstrates that society can
make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the central bank who
is known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to
unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function.
However, because the central bank has private information about produc-
tivity shocks it also pays for society to have the central bank partly
accommodate these shocks before they pass on to ínflation and unem-
ploymen[. As in the Canzoneri (1985) model, the problem is the trading
off of the flexibility needed for stabilization with the credibility constraint
required for eliminating the inflation bias.
Also in Section IX we discussed the contribution of Lohmann (1992)
who shows that the appointment of a conservative central banker (as in
the Rogoff model) supplemented with the option to override the central
banker (an escape clause) in case of large output shocks, dominates a
number of other institutional arrangements proposed to balance credibility
and flexibility.
Finally, in Section X we discussed the recent developments in the so-
called optimal contract literature. Persson and Tabellini (1993) and
Walsh (1993) claim that optimal contracts between governments and
central bankers may eliminate the trade-off between credibility and
flexibility altogether; zero average inflation and an optimal response to
supply shocks can be achieved simultaneously.
The contract may serve to obtain a first best equilibrium, a rules cum
discretion solution, that combines the benefits of rules (solution of the
credibility problem) with those of discretion (optimally active stabilizati-
on policy). Attractive as this result may seem, we do not expect it to
settle the rules versus discretion debate. Rather, paraphrasing Capie,
Goodhart and Schnadt (1994, p. 112) we expect this debate to continue
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to echo, through the history of central banking.74
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APPENDIX A2 STABILISATION POLICY UNDER
OVERLAPPING WAGE CONTRACTS
Following the work of Sargent and Wallace a lot of research has been
devoted to the robustness of the policy invariance result. Following
Fischer (1977b) we will show that the rational expectations hypothesis is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the policy invariance result
to hold. Fischer examines the consequences of introducing multiperiod
wage contracts, where nominal wages cannot be renegotiated every
period, but are valid over two time periods. The model we employ to
analyse the policy non-neutrality in the presence of rational expectations
is identical to the one in Section VI except for the wage-setting relation.
Hence we have
Yt - a lt t l~ F~ ~ N(p, Q~) (2.33)
lt - 1- 1~ (~,t - pt
- ut) (2.34)
Yt - mt - Pt (2.12)
Wage-setting no longer follows the pattern described in (2.18), but
instead
wtt - Et - 1 Pt -(1 - Q) 1~ and
"'2t - Et - 2 Pt -(1 - a)
1.
where wt represents wage contracts negotiated at time t- 1 based upon
the minimization of Et - 1(lt - l~)2 subject to (2.34) and w2 represents
wage contracts negotiated at time t- 2 based upon the minimization of
Et - 2 (]t - 1~)2.
Fischer assumes that half of all wage contracts in the economy are
negotiated in alternate years. Therefore at time t the average nominal
wage is given by
wt -'hEt - 2 Pt f'hEt - l Pt -(1 - Q)
1: (A2.1)
We obtain the aggregate supply function by substitution of (A2.1) in
(2.34) and the resulting equation in (2.33)
Yt - S(Pt - 1~t - 2 Pt } Ec - iPt)) } Y } 1F~t (A2.2)1-a 2 1-a
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Equilibrium in the goods market prevails when (A2.2) is equal to
(2.12) implying that the price level is being governed by the following
expectational equation
Pt - 2 Et - 2 Pt } ~ Et - 1 Pt } (1 - ,Q)(mt - y) - Fct (A2.3)
Taking expectations of both sides of (A2.3) conditional on information
at time t- 2 we get
Et - 2 Pt - Et - 2 mt - Y (A2.4)
whilst at time t- 1 we get
Et-1Pt-Et-lmt-Y
Hence the average expected price level for period t is
'h(Et - 2 Pt } Et - 1 Pt) -'~(Et - 2 mt } Et - 1 mt) - y
(A2.5)
(A2.6)
Subtracting (A2.6) from (A2.3) we get the following relation between the
average forecast error and unanticipated shocks
pt -'h(Et - 2 Pt ~- Et - 1 Pt) - (1 - a) (mt - '~
(Et - lmt } Et - 2mt)) - ~.c (A2.7)
As in Section VI we assume that the central bank wishes to stabilize
unemployment around the natural rate of unemployment by adopting
mt - dl Pt- 1} wt wt -- N(0, aW) (2.41)
Taking expectations of both sides of (2.41) conditional on information at
timet-2weget
Et - 2 mt - 0




Subtracting 'hEt - t mt from (2.41) we get the following expression
for unforeseeable monetary policy
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mt - 'h(Et - tmt } Et - 2n~t) - 2 ~`t-I } ~t
(A2.10)
Substituting (A2.10) in the expression for the average forecast error
(A2.7) and the resulting equation in (A2.2) yields
adt ( )Yt - Y- a Wt }~t } 2 l~t-t A2.11
Contrast (A2.11) with (2.44), its equivalent in the New-Classical
model. The difference between these equations is the term (~3dt12)~t-t at
the extreme right handside of (A2.11). With staggered contracts moneta-
ry policy can affect real output due to the presence of dt in (A2;11).
The policy invariance result disappears because at the beginning of
period t half of the wage constracts in the economy cannot be reopened.
They have been entered into at the end of period t- 2 and have one
more year to run. In the last year of operation of that contract, the
monetary authorities react to the disturbance ~t - t. It is precisely this
reaction which could not have been anticipated at time t- 2 since Et - z
mt - 0. Hence given the predetermined second-period nominal wage, the
value of dt will affect the real wage for the second period of the contract
and thus output.
Now we link the Fischer analysis to the Phillips curve debate. Subtitu-
ting the nominal wage (A2.1) in the labour demand function (2.34) we
get the following expression for employment
lt - 1 1 Q(Pt -'h(Et - 2 Pt } Et - t Pt) } l~c) } 1~ (A2.12)
Subtracting (A2.12) from the labour force 15, using that u- ls - 1,
yields the expectations augmented Phillips curve
u- u- 1(Pt -'~i(Et - 2 Pt t Et - 1 Pt) t~t)
(A2.13)
1-Q
Substituting (A2.10) in (A2.7) and the resulting equation in (A2.13) we
get the following relation for unemployment
dt
u- u- mt } 2~t - l (A2.14)
From (A2.14) it can be seen that in the presence of overlapping wage
contracts the short-run Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and
unemployment is reestablished. For the deviation of unemployment from
its natural rate now also depends on the degree of discretion dt.
If the monetary authorithies wish to minimize the variance of unem-
ployment around its natural rate they have to find that value of dl in
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(2.41) that minimizes
Var (ut - u) - v~ t 56 d j Q~ (A2.15)
It can be easily seen that the optimal policy in this instance is to set dt
- 0, which in terms of equation (2.41) implies the adoption of a fixed
money supply rule. This result derives from the assumption that all
disturbances hitting the economy are purely random. Since such distur-
bances cannot be off set by counter-cyclical policy, setting dt 1 0 makes
matters worse by making activity more volatile around its steady state.
However, following Fischer it can be shown that if there are lag patterns
in the productivity disturbance a feedback rule again dominates a fixed
rule. For suppose that productivity follows a simple random walk
~t - ~t - t } vt~ vt -- N (0, o~) (A2.16)
and the objective of the authorities is to stabilize activity ( y) around its
natural rate. Substituting (A2.16) in (A2.11) we get~s
Yt - Y- Q~t t(1 } a2t)F~t-1 } vÍ (A2.17)
Taking variances yields
Var (Y - Y) - Q2v~ t a~ t( 2}2ad t )2 a~ (A2.18)
If the authorities wish to minimize (A2.18) a fixed money supply rule is
now suboptimal. The optimal value of dt is obtained from the first-order
condition for a minimum of
'~ ,Q2 d12 t(3 d t f 1 (A2.19)
Hence the optimal state contingent rule is now one which sets dt --2 .
Thus, the optimal policy rule becomes Q
mt - á ut - 1 } ~t (A2.20)
Hence in order to stabilize output around its natural rate the central




L This characteriiation of the distinction between rules and discretion is based on McCal-
lum (1987, p. 10).
2. It needs to be emphasized that the issue of rules vs discretion is not the same as the
issue of activist vs nonactivist policy. This is important because leading undergraduate
textbooks e.g. Mishkin (1992, p. 682) continua to muddle together the two distinct
issues.
3. Prime Minister Peel was of the Currency School persuasion.
4. This goes back to the analysis of Hume (1752a).
5. On the actual operation of the gold standard see Bordo and Schwartz (1984) and M.
June Flanders (1990).
6. See Sijben (1990).
7. Carlson (1988, p. 3).
8. For an in-depth discussion of Fed policy in the Grent Depression see Wheelock (1992)
9. In this paper we do not address the instrument problem. See Poole (1970).
10. Simons (1948, pp. 160-162), the original appeared ín Simons (1936).
11. See for example Lerner (1944).
12. Tobin (1990, p. 2) points out that before the Tinbergen framework was properly under-
stood the idea was to throw everything available at the problem of the moment,
depression, unemployment or war-generated inflation. Against unemployment, for
example, spend more on public works, cut taxes, print more money, and lower interest
rates - all.
13. This assumption is relaxed in Section VI.
14. Of course monetary and fiscal policy are not always independent instruments. If printing
money is the only way to finance government deficits, then there is no monetary policy
independent of fiscal policy. For an analysis along these lines see Chapter 5.
15. The variance of a linear function fo two stochastic variables is obtained from Var (ax t
(3y) - a2 Var (z) t Rz Var (y) f 2a R Cov (x, y), see for instance Cuddy (1974, p.
15).
16. The value of Q is taken from Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 2l1).
17. Moreover, Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 582) point out that if the ccefficients in
(2.1) -(2.6) are stochastic - i.e. when there is multiplier-uncertainty [Brainard (1967)] -
the optimal policy-rule will be less activist.
18. According to Humphrey (1985) Phillips was far from the first to postulate an inflation-
unemployment trade-off or to draw the curve bearing his name. Humphrey states that at
least ten precursors are neglected. Humphrey associates the folowing authors with the
pre-history of the Phillips-Curve: Hume (1752b), Thornton (1802), Fisher (1926),
Tinbergen (1936, 1951), Klein and Golberger (1955), Brown (1955) and Sultan (1957).
19. As pointed out by Smyth (1994d, p. 6), in their paper Samuelson and Solow used the
expression 'Phillips curve'. This may have been the first use of the term.
20. Holmes and Smyth (1970) show that there is no justification to assume it possible to
draw a line linking excess demand for labour and the unemployment rate.
21. Following Argy (1988, p. 148) we label this case 'simplistic Monetarism'.
22. A necessary and sufficient condition for global stability is (ï G 1.
23. In setting up the expectations augmented Phillips curve framework, I borcowed fairly
heavily from the recent survey of Alogoskoufis (1994).
24. Again the model is stable since ex hypothasi (3 G 1.
25. A recent (New-Keynesian) interpretation views the NAIRU as the rate of unemployment
at which the claims of workers to raal wages and firms to real profits are recoonciled
and inflation is constant. See Carlin and Soskice (1990, p. 136).
26. Typical papers are Ferguson-Gupta (1981) and Keller-Review (1981).
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27. The expectations augmented Phillips Curve malel consist of equations (2.1) (2.2)
(2.12) (2.20) and (2.23).
28. However, Keuzenkamp (1991) notes that thirty years earlier a model with explicitly
rational expectations was published by Tinbergen (1932). Hence, Tinbergen being the
founding father of activist macroeconomic policy also anticipated the stick by which
this research programme was hit most severely much later.
29. In the presence of overlapping wage contracts as analysed by Fischer (1977b) the
short-run trade-off is reestablished. For an analysis along these lines see the appendix
to this chapter.
30. Accordingly the central bank cares about the (conditional) variance of inflation and the
level of unemployment. This specification follows Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. ]04)
in Chapter 4 we switch to the more complicated form in which botó arguments are
quadratic.
31. With the more complicated form of the loss function used in Chapter 4, Apl would
depend also on Et-tGpt and 'u.
32. Depending on operahng procedures the policymakers sets the money stock or the
interest rate. However, it is simpler to think of the central bank to choose inflation
directly. For a lucid exposition of monetary policy games with the money stock as a
policy instrument see Cantoneri and Henderson (1991).
33. Monetary policy cannot reduce unemployment below its natural rate.
34. With a more complicated form of the loss function, the result for ~pt~H generally
differs from that under discretion ~pt~.
35. Barro and Gordon (1983a) do not analyse this regime.
36. With a loss function in which both arguments are quadratic in general the ranking of
regimes will depend on e.
37. This table is based on a similar one in Sijben (1992).
38. For a critical look at deterrance via trigger strategies see Cukierman (1992, pp. 209-
210).
39. Since this is a quadratic equation there are two roots, the smallest of whicó corres-
ponds to the aunimum crulibly sustainable inflation. See Barro and Gordon (1983,
p.112).
40. This terminology follows Cukierman (1992, pp. 323-325).
41. To say this in more technical tertns using the Folk theorem of supergames any rate of
inflation below e~(1-Q) can be sustaíned by an appropriately chosen triger strategy. See
Cukierman (1992, p. 209).
42. The Kreps and Wilson (19826) analysis of reputation is in the field of industrial
organiiation and deals with the question about whether or not entry occurs in a
monopolistic market.
43. Bayes' rule is Prob (A ~ B) -
Prob(B ~ A) ~ P(A) see for instance Berck and
Prob(B)
Sydsaeter (1991, p. 149).
44. Recall that E~(1-Q)is the one-shot optimum policy. See equation (2.51).
45. For more details see Persson and Tabellini (1990, p. 64) especially their footnote 52.
46. Note that with the more complicated loss function used in Chapter 4, in which both
arguments are quadratic, ~p~"' would depend also on Et Gp~`" and hence on x2.
47. The equilibrium may be separating (y G'k), pooling (q ~'kxt) or semi-separating
('á 5 q 5'áxl). See Persson and Tabellini (1990, pp. 63-64).
48. According to Goodhart's (1994) review of Cenlral Bank Straregy, Credibiliry and
Iruleperulence: 7iteory and Evirlence, Chapter 9 is the most important central chapter
of the book.
49. Equation (2.99) is obtained by setting ~l{ - ~nti and (i - 0 in equation (2.21).
50. The signal extraction exercise is dependent on the relative variances of e, the stochas-
tic process influencing the central hank's preferences, and tG, the stochastic error in
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the money control process.
51. The following draws heavily on Cukierman (1986).
~
, á
52. i` ~ b- 1 l4 b'- - 1 whera b~ p t 1-` r and r~ c t ~.
2 p Q
~
53. See Bartlett (1962, p. 145) and appendix A to Schaling and Smyth (1994).
54. Equation (2.109) is obtained by setting a- 0 in equation (2.21).
S5. With Q being set equal to zero (see the previous note) full consistency with section 6
(especially equation (2.36)) implies that "y - 0. The latter implicatioa does not
inFluence further results in this section.
56. The political principal is the set of politicians who have the power to bring about
changes in the institutional arrangemznts underlying the making of monetary policy.
57. Equation (2.129) is obtained by setting (3 - 0 in equation (2.45) and adding and
subtracting p~-t.
58. The derivation of this expression can be found in appendix C of Chapter 7. By setting
Q- 0 and A- I in this derivation one obtains equation (2.136).
59. In the context of the model of Section V.2 a positive natural rate of unemployment
follows from the assumption that P', the target employment level of wage-setters is
smaller than the effective labour force P5. Hence the natural rate of unemployment is
inefficiently high. See also Section IIL2 of Chapter 4.
60. Using the notation of this book the proof of the Rogoff theorem can be found in
Section V1.1 of Chapter 7 for the (more general) case that Q 1 0.
61. Strictly speaking Flood and Isard consider rules of the form Op~R(Op) - Op. Here,
following Lohmann (1992) we focus on a simple zero inFlation rule.
62. By similar reasoning d5' will also depend on e and "u. For instance, a higher natural
rate of unemployment implies a higher time consistent rate of inflation and conse-
quently a higher credibility problem for society. We leave a formal proof for further
research.
63. The use of terminology here is somewhat different than in Lohmann (1992). Using the
notation of this book Lohmann views the parameter d, as tha degree of 'conservative-
ness' and the parameter ds as the degree of central bank independence. Neumann
(1991) gives a detailed account of the various meanings of central bank independence.
64. For an interesting variant of the Lohmann model, based on the revenue motive for
monetary expansion, see Lippi and Swank (1994).
65. This is different from the Rogoff model where in the insitutional design stage society
appoints a central banker that is 'too conservative'.
66. Lohmann speaks here of a deadweight loss induced by the inFlationary bias. We
reserve the term deadweight loss for the component of the expected loss that is
invariant across monetary regimes. This component is associated with the labour
market distortion.
67. Fischer (1994, p. 39) points out that one example of such a contract occurs when the
salary of the govemor is fixed in nominal terms during his or her term of office, as
for the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
68. This is the Rogoff model of the previous section for the case that d~ - 0.
69. In Chapter 7 inflation targeting is parametrized as full commitmant to a zero inflation
rule.
70. In fact we focus on a'bare bones' version of Walsh (1993). In particular we do not
consider such issues as the role of the central bank's announcements of its private
information or reappointment. Also, we treat the inFlation rate as a directly controlla-
ble policy instrument.
71. This terminology follows Minford (1993).
72. In Walsh (1993) the transfer also depends on a publicly observed noisy signal on the
supply shock. Using the notation of this hook we have s( - v~~ t tG~ where s and ~
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are the signal and the normally distributed measurement error. Hence, the expected
va~ue of vt` conditional on s will equal erNSl(o'-~ f o'-,y). In this section we assume
o~,` ti oo, hence Ei.t v~~ - 0.
73. In Walsh ( 1993, p. 12) the target rate of money growth depends on the central bank's
forecast of the supply shock. Since we assumed this forecast to be zero (see the
previous footnote), the target rate of inflation is zero.
74. For a survey of recent developments in the context of financial stability see Sijben
(1994).
75. A better avenue would be to reconsider the optimi7ation procedure used to derive
(A2.1). However for convenience we take a short-cut and simply plug in the new
disturbances in the surprise-supply function.
3. Central Bank Independence in
Twelve Industrial Countries
I INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter 2 the theoretical rationale for central bank
independence finds its origin in the ongoing `rules versus discretion'
debate. Governments and central banks may be tempted to impart an
inflationary bias to the economy thereby sacrificing long-term welfare to
short-run political gains. The associated time-consistency problem can be
overcome by legislative rules and by setting up politically independent
central banks. Hence one would expect central bank independence to be
an important determinant of policy choices, and through them - of
economic performance.
In order to test this hypothesis one needs quantitative measures of
central bank independence. The first attempt to quantify central bank
independence is Bade and Parkin (1988) who used a number of legal
attributes from central bank laws to create measures of political and
financial independence for twelve countries during the floating exchange
rate years 1972 to 1986. Alesina (1988, 1989) extended their sample of
industrial countries by using institutional information provided by Fair
(1980) and Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988). A subsequent attempt to
quantify central bank independence was made by Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991) who compared the monetary regimes of eighteen
industrial countries by focusing on political and economic independence.
Recently, broadly based measures of legal independence for over sixty
countries (including LDCs) have been developed in Cukierman (1992)
and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).t
By confronting the legal measures (indices) with macroeconomic data
these studies try to verify whether and to what extent central bank
independence matters for economic performance. Typically, the results of
this li[erature are stated in terms of correlations between indices on the
one hand, and inflation, output growth and interest rates on the other
hand.z We survey the empirical evidence on central bank
independence in Chapter 4.
For now, it needs to be emphasized that empirical results are
particularly sensitive to the numerical values of indices. [Swinburne and
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Castello - Branco (1991)].
These values are dependent on (i) criteria used in the examination of
central bank laws (statutes), (ii) the interpretation of the relevant statute
as to whether a central bank meets this criterion, i.e. possesses a certain
attribute, and (iii) the way these attributes are aggregated to a composite
index of central bank independence.
Of course there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing criteria. Also the
interpretation of the relevant statute is a delicate matter because one has
to make a distinction between purely formal or legal issues, and more
substantive issues regarding the conduct of monetary policy. Again in
making this distinction there is an unavoidable arbitrariness. For each
economist when building an index of this kind is somewhat biased in
favour of hislher own country, because the greater acquaintance with the
case brings recognition of the greater freedom of behaviour acquired in
current practice by the national central bank compared to the formal rule.
Finally as pointed out by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991, p.
367) there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating these criteria or
attributes to a composite index. Hence, there are unavoidable subjective
elements in the construction of indices of central bank independence.
In order to view these elements in a broader perspective this Chapter
compares the indices of central bank independence as presented in Bade
and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991).3 Such a comparison does not yet exist in the literature.
We focus on three aspects: (a) is the index based on the best possible
interpretation of the central bank law within the context of monetary
policy making;4 (b) is the index consistent in using all relevant criteria
in determining the independence of each central bank; (c) are the indices
of the various authors different or not?
In order to answer the questions mentioned above, the Chapter is
organízed as follows. We analyse the competence of central banks on the
base of central bank laws within the context of monetary policy making.
Twelve industrial countries are examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
the United States, Sweden and Switzerland.s We describe the central
bank laws of these countries focusing on three areas: (i) relationships
between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary
policy, (ii) procedures for appointing the board of the central bank, and
(iii) formal responsibilities (objectives) of the central bank with respect to
monetary policy. This description can be found in the appendix. After a
critical examination of the existing indices in Section II, in Section III we
construct a new index of central bank independence. This index is used
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to reach a critical perspective of other indices.ó For instance, according
to this index we qualify the Bank of Japan as less independent than
Alesina (1988, 1989), while for the Nederlandsche Bank the reverse
applies. Finally, our conclusions can be found in Section IV.
II INDICES OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
II.1 Bade and Parkin's Courageous Attempt
A seminal paper concerning indices of central bank independence is Bade
and Parkin (1988) (BP). The paper investigates the cross-country
relationship between monetary policies and the laws which establish and
delimit the powers of central banks. The study is empirical and deals
with the experience of twelve industrial countries (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands the United
Kingdom and the United States, Sweden and Switzerland) during the
floating exchange rate years 1972 to 1986.~
They describe the central bank laws of the twelve countries focusing on
three features: (i) the relationship between central banks and government
in the formulation of monetary policy, (ii) the procedures for appointing
the board of the central bank, and (iii) the financial and budgetary
relations between the central bank and the government.
On the basis of features (i) and (ii) BP classify the twelve central banks
according to their degrees of policy independence. On the basis of
feature (iii) they identify the degree of financial independence from
government. In this paper we focus on features (i) and (ii). BP's
description of financial and budgetary relations is discussed in Eijffinger
and Schaling (1992). BP conclude that central banks which are indepen-
dent both in policy making and in the appointment of directors deliver a
lower rate of inflation than other central bank types.
On the basis of feature (i) the relationship between central banks and
government in the formulation of monetary policyg and feature (ii) the
procedures for appointing and removing central bank directors, BP
construct their index of policy independence. The degree of policy inde-
pendence is determined using three criteria:
1. Is the bank the final policy authority?
2. Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the
bank board?
3. Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of
the government?
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Since each criterion can be met or not, 23 potential policy types can be
distinguished. This is summarized in Table 3.1.

























- - ~ (a) no -
- ` ' (b) no -
~ - ~` (c) no -
` - - (d) no -
- - - (e) Y~ 1
- . - (~ Yes 2
rt ~ - (S) Yes 3
~ ~. t ( h) Yes 4
1) Operationalized as proportion of inembers not appointed directty or inderectly by the
govemment. ~ 11121.
2) It should be noted that the letters have nothing to do with similar symbols used in other
tables.
However, BP find that in all cases were the government is responsible
for the formulation of monetary policy, it also appoints over 12I14 of the
policy board. That is, there is no central bank which makes some board
appointments independent of the government, although it is not in charge
of monetary policy. Therefore, types (a) and (b) do not exist. Moreover,
a central bank being itself in charge of monetary policy and also having a
government official on its board (types (c) and (d)), does not exist.9
Therefore, the potential policy types (a)-(d) do not occur in reality. This
means that no actual central bank corresponds to the first four configura-
tions of institutional features.
So, only the bottom half of Table 3.1 is relevant for the construction of
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the BP index of policy independence. The overall degree of policy
independence is determined by a combination of attributes 1. - 3. It
should be noticed that there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating them.
However, from Table 3.1 it can be easily seen that BP choose the
simplest one: they simply summed the attributes possessed by the central
bank, meaning that each attribute is weighted equally. Thus, the four
remaining (existing) central bank types are ranked from 1(least indepen-
dent) to 4(most independent) depending on the number of asterisks. For
instance, the least independent central bank (zero asterisks) is not in
charge of monetary policy, has a government official on the board, and
dces not make any board appointments independent of governmen[.
BP's ranking of the twelve central banks can be found in the first column
of Table 3.2.
BP now turn to an investigation of the relationship between central
bank types and monetary policy. In their analysis of monetary policy they
focus on two aspects its inflationary stance (level) and the variability
(variance) of inflation. The inflationary stance is measured by the
average rate of change of consumer prices (CPI).
Concerning policy variability, what is of interest is the variability of
inflation as well as output and employment. However, BP point out that
if they were to measure variability of policy by examining both nominal
and real variability, inevitably conflicting rankings would result from
cross-country differences in slopes of short-run trade-offs between output
and inflation. t~ Regarding these trade-offs well outside the scope of
their study, they examine only the variability of inflation.l
t
Furthermore, consider Table 3.2 which permits a direct examination of
the relationship between policy independence and monetary policy. From
Table 3.2 it appears that there is no association between any of the policy
types and the measure of variability of policy presented.
Moreover, consider the association between categories of central bank
independence and the inflation performance. From Table 3.1 it is clear
that the first category (policy type 1) differs from the second only in the
presence of a governnment official on the bank board. According to BP
it is immediately apparent that there are no discernible differences in
inflation rates between the first two groups. The third and fourth groups
(Japan, United States, Germany and Switzerland) are the independent
central banks.
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Table 3.2 Average inflation and its variability grouped according to
central bank policy type: flexible exchange rate period
1972-1986
Inflatioo rate Policy variability
Standard
Country Type Percent Rank deviation Rank
Australia 1 9.9 (10) 3,2 (~)
Belgium 2 7.1 (6) 3.0 (5)
Canada 7.9 (7) 2.8 (3)
France 9.5 (9) 3.2 (7)
Italy 14.0 ( 12) 4.6 (10)
Netherlands 5.8 (3) 3.0 (5)
Sweden 8.9 (8) 2.5 (2)
United Kingdom 11.2 (11) 6.0 (11)
Japan 3 6.6 (4) 6.1 (12)
United States 6.9 (5) 3.5 (9)
Germany 4 4.3 (1) 2.0 (1)
Switzerland 4.4 (2) 2.8 (3)
BP think it striking that the two most independent central banks, those of
Germany and Switzerland, have delivered a lower inflation rate than the
intermediate central banks of Japan and the United States. Also, BP point
out that the mean inflation rate of the eight government dominated
central banks (policy types 1 and 2) is in excess of ten percent; thus
although the U.S. and Japanese inflation rates are well within two
standard deviations of that mean, those of Switzerland and Germany are
signficantly below the mean.
On the basis of these facts BP conclude that there is an association
between the degree of central bank policy independence and the average
rate of inflation. By and large, the more independent the central bank,
the lower the inflation rate.I2
II.2 Alesina's Extension
Bade and Parkin~'s work has been integrated in the positive theory of
economic policyl by Alesina (1988, 1989). Alesina uses the BP index
of policy independence to illustrate the relationship between the degree of
politico-instititutional stability and economic performance. Alesina
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extends BP's sample of industrial countries to include New Zealand,
Spain, Denmark, Norway and Finland, by using institu[ional information
provided by Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988) and Fair (1980),
respectively. Alesina likewise concludes that there is an inverse
relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and the
average inflation rate (Alesina (1988), p. 41).14 Alesina's results can
be summarized in Table 3.3.15






Bade Parkin index of
central bank
independence
Italy 13.7 1.5 ?
UK 10.7 2 2
Australia 9.7 1 1
France 9.2 2 2
Sweden 8.7 2 2
Canada 7.8 2 2
Belgium 6.9 2 2
US 6.9 3 3
Japan 6.4 3 3
Netherlands 5.5 2 2
Switzerland 4.1 4 4
Germany 4.1 4 4
As can be easily seen from this Table, the numerical values of the
`Alesina index of central bank independence' are identical to those of the
BP index of policy independence, except for the case of Italy. Alesina
has the following argument for classifying Italy as 1.5 rather than 2, as
in BP:
`Bade and Parkin's classifications disregard institutional changes in the period
considered. The Italian Central Bank obtained more economic independence in 1982.
Given this change we classified Italy as 1.5 rather than 2, as in Bade-Parkin.'16
Therefore, Alesina's argument contains two major elemen[s:
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1. Criticism of BP for their disregard of institutional changes
2. The identification of institutional changes with changes in economic
independence.
The first element of Alesina's criticism has implications for the way of
aggregating the attributes which make up his index. We will return to
this issue later. The second element is based on Tabellini's (1988)
account of the divorce (`divorzio') between the Treasury and the Italian
Central Bank in 1981. After divorce the CICR17 no longer obliged the
Banca d'Italia to absorb all excess supply of short-term Treasury bills.
This step decreased the scope for accommodating monetary policy by
monetary financing of government deficits and increased the independen-
ce of Banca d'Italia.
In the preceding sub-section we saw that the BP index of policy
independence is determined by the total number of statutory attributes
(`asterisks') concerning policy making and the appointment of directors
(BP (1. - 3.)). If the Alesina index is an extension of the BP policy
index, in the sense that it is `richer' and more informative, it must follow
that:
1. Alesina implicitly uses a fourth criterium say A4: Is the central bank
not required to absorb excess supply of short-term Treasury bills?
2. The Alesina indicator of central bank independence is determined by a
combination of attributes (1. - 3.) and A4.
Having four BP policy types combined with criterion A4 yields 4 x 2-
8 potential policy-economic types.
From this Table it can be seen that, according to Alesina, only five
central bank types can be discerned among the twelve industrial coun-
tries. These existing central bank types can be found in the bottom half
of Table 3.4.
Again, there is no non-arbitrary way to aggregate attributes BP 1. - 3.
and A4, i.e. to rank these types from least independent to most
independent. However, from Table 3.4 it can be easily seen that Alesina
did not follow BP in summing the attributes possessed by the central
bank. For if he had, Banca d'Italia would have been qualified as type 3
(upgrade) rather than type 1.5 (downgrade).tg
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Table 3.4 Alesina rypes and central bank laws
(See note below)
BP policy Criterion A4 Potential central Central bank type Alesina
type met? bank type dces exist? type
(a) (a)
t ~ (a) no -
3 } (b) no -
q ~ (c) no -
1 - (d) Yes 1
2 ~ (e) yes 1.5
2 - (t) Yes 2
3 - (g) Yes 3
4 - (h) yes 4
(a) See Table 3.3
Therefore, if the Alesina index is internally consistent, it can be
considered asymmetrical in the sense that attributes are not weighted
equally.
From Table 3.4, reflecting our assumption that criterion A4 was applied
to all the twelve industrial countries, it follows that:
1. All central banks, except Banca d'Italia, are forced to accommodate
fiscal policy with monetary policyl9
2. Not withstanding the former Banca d'Italia, being Alesina type 1.5, is
less independent than the central banks of France, Sweden, Belgium,
Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. All of them are of
the type 2 category.
Since 1. is obviously counterfactual it follows that the Alesina (1988,
1989) synthetic indicator of central bank independence is internally
inconsistent (Reductio ad absurdum). However, if the Alesina index is
internally inconsistent, i.e. it is not the case that in determining the
independence of each central bank all relevant criteria are used, the
numerical values in table 3.4 cannot be compared and therefore do not
qualify as 'indices' of central bank independence.
II.3 The Broad Index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
A recent index of central bank independence is that of Grilli, Mascianda-
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ro and Tabellini (1991) (GMT). They compare the monetary regimes of
eighteen industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States) during the post-war period (1950-1989) by focus-
ing on political and economic independence of the central bank.20
Like BP and Alesina, they find that in countries with more politically
independent central banks inflation is on average lower and less variable.
On the other hand, GMT find no indication that the monetary regime
matters for real economic performance.
According to GMT, political independence is the capacity to choose the
final goal of monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of economic
activity. The latter capacity is primarily determined by the following
features:
1. Relationships between central banks and government in the formu-
lation of monetary policy
2. Procedures for appointing the board of the central bank
3. Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with
respect to monetary policy.
On the basis of features 1. - 3. GMT construct their index of policy
independence. The degree of policy independence is determined using
eight criteria:2t
1. Is the governor not appointed by the government?
2. Is the governor appointed for more than five years?
3. Are all board members not appointed by the government? (Compare
with BP 3: are some board appointments made independent of the
government?)
4. Is the board appointed for more than five years?
5. Is there no mandatory participation of a government representative in
the board? (Compare with BP 2: is there no government official on
the bank board?)
6. Is there no government approval of monetary policy required?
(Compare with BP 1: is the bank the final policy authority?)
7. Are there statutory requirements that the bank pursues monetary
stability among its goals?
8. Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's position in case
of conflicts with the govermnent?
The overall index of policy independence is determined by a combination
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of the attributes 1. - 8. Again, there is no non-arbitrary way of aggrega-
ting them. Like Bade and Parkin, GMT choose the sitnplest one: they
simply summed the attributes possessed by the central bank. Thus, each
attribute is weighted equally. The eighteen central banks are ranked from
1(least independent) to 6(most independent). GMT's results can be
summarized in Table 3.S.Zz







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Australia s` ~` ~ 3
Belgium ~ I
Canada ~ s` ~ ~` 4
France t ; Z
Germany ~ ` ~` ~ " s` 6
Italy ~ ~ ` ` 4
Japan ~ 1
Netherlands ' " ' " ~` s` 6
Switzerland ~ ` ~` ' ~` 5
U.K. ' 1
U.S. ,~ r~ ~ ~ : 5
Sweden - - - - - - - -
Notes:
1- Governor nor appointed by government
2- Govemor appointed for ~ 5 years
3- All the Board not appointed by govemment
4- Board appointed for 1 5 years
5- No mandatory participation of government representative in the Board
6- No govemment approval of monetary policy formulation is required
7- Statutory requírements that central bank pursues tnonetary stability among its goals
8- Legal provisions that strenghtened the central bank position in conFlicts with the govem-
ment are present
9- Ovetall índex of political independence, constructed as the sum of the asterisks in each
row
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From this Table it can be seen that the GMT policy index is richer, i.e.
more informative, than the BP index of political independence. The
GMT is more informative because more criteria are taken into account.
BP use only three criteria, whilst GMT consider eight attributes. It can
be easily seen that GMT criteria 5 and 6 are identical to BP criteria 2
and 1. One is tempted to make a similar inference concerning GMT
criterion 3. However, concerning the appointment of directors GMT
require all board members not to be appointed by the government, whilst
BP require only ? 1112123 of board members not to be appointed by
the government. Therefore, GMT's criterion 3 is more strict than BP's
criterion 3.
II.4 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini versus Bade and Parkin
In order to compare GMT's findings with these of BP, we restrict
attention to attributes 3, 5 and 6 of GMT. Since aggregation procedures
are identical, differences in numerical values of the BP and GMT indices
are dependent on:
(a) differerences in the interpretation of the central bank laws with
respect to GMT-attributes 5 and 6(or BP attributes 1 and 2)
(b) the difference between GMT attribute 3 and BP attribbute 3.
We label differences (a) and (b) respectively interpretation effect and
criterion effect. Thus numerical differences depend on both these effects.
The total effect is decomposed in Table 3.6.
With respect to the interpretation effect, from Table 3.6 it can be seen
that GMT and BP differ in their interpretations of the central bank laws
of Canada, France, Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands. Canada,
France, and Belgium are downgraded (-1), because contrary to BP
GMT believe a government representative to be present on the central
bank boards. The Nederlandsche Bank is upgraded (f 1), because unlike
BP, GMT consider the central bank to be the final authority in policy
making. The differences are most striking in the case of Japan. The Bank
of Japan is severely downgraded (-2), because GMT believe that the
government has an official on the bank board, while according to BP
there is no official. GMT are also of the opinion that the government is
the final authority in policy making, contradicting BP.
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(See note (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
below)
Australia 1 1
Belgium 1 2 -1 -I
Canada 1 2 -1 - I
France 1 2 -1 -1
Germany 3 4 -1 -1
Italy g 2 t 1 t 1
Japan 1 3 -2 -2
Netherlands 3 2 t 1 } 1




(a) (Number of asterisks in columns 3, 5 and 6 of Table 3.5) f l.
(b) See Table 3.2
(c) (Number of asterisks in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.5 t number of asterisks in column
3 of Table 3.1) t 1- BP Policy Type.
(d) (Number of asterisks in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.1 f number of asterisks in column
3 of Table 3.5) t 1- BP Policy Type.
(e) (c) t(d) - total difference between GMT and BP.
We will return to these differences in Section IV.
With respect to the criterion effect, by using a stricter version of BP 3,
GMT change the ranking of the Bundesbank, Banca d'Italia and the
Swiss National Bank vis à vis BP. Both the Bundesbank and the Swiss
National Bank are downgraded (-1), whilst Banca d'Italia is upgraded
(-~I). It should be noticed that because the BP type 4 banks (Germany
and Switzerland) do not meet GMT criterion 3, they become intermediate
banks. That is, in terms of political independence, they get the same
status as the Federal Reserve (BP type 3). This is intuitively not very
appealing. Neither is the fact that Banca d'Italia is the only central bank
that meets GMT criterion 3. Therefore, we conclude that by introducing
a very strict criterion concerning the appointment of directors, GMT
severely bias the ranking of the central banks of Germany, Switzerland
and Italy.
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III TOWARDS A NEW INDEX OF POLICY INDEPEN-
DENCE
III.1 A New Index of Policy Independence
Following GMT, we identify policy independence with the capacity of
the central banks to choose the final goals of monetary policy. This
capacity is primarily determined by the following features:
1. The procedures for appointing the board of the central bank
2. The relationship between central banks and government in the
formulation of monetary policy
3. Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect
to monetary policy.
On the basis of features 1. - 3. we construct a new index, which is
called the Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) index of policy independence. The
degree of policy independence is determined using three criteria:
1. Is the bank the sole final policy authority (b), is this authority not
entrusted to the central bank alone (blg), or is it entrusted completely
to the government (g)?
2. Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the
bank board?
3. Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of
the government?24
Now we can distinguish 3 x 2 x 2- 12 potential policy types. This is
summarized in Table 3.7.
The first four types are the BP potential types (a)-(d). In Section III it
was shown that these types do not exist. For sake of convenience we
repeat the argument. A central bank being itself in charge of monetary
policy and also having a government official on its board (types (c) and
(d)) does not occur in reality. Besides, there is no central bank that in
spite of its not being in charge of monetary policy, makes some board
appointments independent of the government. Therefore, types (a) and
(b) do not exist.
From our examination of central bank laws in the Appendix, it follows
that this argument includes the `twin-authority' central banks, i.e. the
central banks which have some but incomplete policy authority (blg).
That is, a`twin-authority' central bank that has a government official on
its board (type e) dces not exist. Finally, there is no twin-authority bank
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that makes some board appointtnents independent of the government.


























- (g) - ~` (a) no -
- (g) ~ ~ (b) no -
t~ (b) - (c) no -
s~ (b) - - (d) no -
~ (blg) - - (e) no -
~ (b~g) ' r (t) no -
~` íb~8) - ` (8) no -
- (8) - - (h) Yes 1
- (S) ~ - (i) Yes ?
" ~~S) ~` - (1) Yes 3
~~ (b) r - (k) Yes 4
~`~ (b) ~` ' (I) yes 5
Consequently potential types (f) and (g) do not exist either. So, only the
bottom part of Table 3.7 is relevant for the ES index of policy indepen-
dence. The overall degree of policy independence is determined by a
combination of attributes ES 1- 3. Contrary to BP and GMT, we do
not weigh each attribute equally. This becomes clear if we take a look at
ES 1. If policy making is exclusively entrusted to the central bank a
country gets two asterisks. If it is not exclusively entrusted to the central
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it gets one asterisk. Finally, if the government is the sole authority in
policy making it gets zero asterisks. Therefore, regarding our first
criterion the maximum amount of asterisks is higher (two) than that with
respect to criteria ES 2 and 3(one). This means that criterion 1 has a
weight of 214, two times the weight of the other criteria (ll4). Hence,
our index is asymmetrical in the sense that attributes are not weighted
equally.
We have the following argument in favour of asymmetrical weighting.
Like GMT, the ES index of policy independence is based on:
1. The relationship between centra( banks and government in the
formulation of monetary policy
2. The procedures for appointing the board of the central bank
3. Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with
respect to monetary policy.
However, GMT separately assess features 1 and 3. For example, the
following conclusions can be drawn considering the Reserve Bank of
Australia. From Table 3.5 it follows that according to GMT the Reserve
Bank Act of 1959 contains provisions that the central bank pursues
monetary stability (GMT 7) among its goals. On the other hand, accor-
ding to Table 3.5, the government is the final policy authority (GMT 3).
Therefore, GMT assess the contents of the final goals of monetary policy
(GMT 7) irrespective of the capacity to choose these goals (GMT 6). By
their separate assessment GMT allow for a one for one trade-off between
the capacity to pursue a monetary policy goal and the contents of such a
goal. That is, restricting attention to GMT 6 and 7, a subservient central
bank with provisions for monetary stability is as independent as a autono-
mous central bank without these provisions. Of course, this trade-off is a
natural consequence of symmetrical weighting.
Like GMT, the ES index of policy independence is based on features
1. - 3. However, we want to avoid the mentioned trade-off phenome-
non. Therefore, feature 1, the final authority in policy making, is
assessed in conjunction with feature 3, the policy goals of monetary
policy. That is, the extent to which a central bank is regarded to be the
sole policy authority (ES 1), also depends on the presence of statutory
requirements concerning monetary stability. Hence, we think a double
weigth (2l4 vs ll4) with respect to ES 1 can be justified.
IIL2 Comparison with the Literature
The five remaining (existing) central bank types are ranked from 1(least
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independent) to 5(most independent) according to the number of
aste-
risks. Our findings are sutnmarized in Table 3.8. In order
to facilitate
comparison with the literature we include BP's results.

















(See note be- (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (~
low)
Australia 1 1 1 0
0 0
Belgium 3 2 2 t 1 0
t 1
Canada I 2 2 -1
0 -t
France 2 2 2 0 ~ ~
Germany 5 4 5 0 t 1
t 1
Italy 2 2 2 0 0 0
Japan 3 3 4 -1
t 1 0
Netherlands 4 2 2 t2 0
t2
Switzerland 5 4 5 0
t 1 t 1
VK 2 2 2 0 ~ ~
US 3 3 4 -1 tl 0
Sweden 2 2 2 0 0 ~
(a) (Number of asterisks in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3.7)
t 1.
(b) See Table 3.2
(c) BP Asytnmetrical Policy Types; BP types if BP l has two times the
weight of BP 2 and 3.
(b - '~`).
(d) ES -~- BPA.
(e) BPA. -I- BP.
(f) (d) t (e)
Again, differences in numerical values are dependent on both
interpreta-
tion - and criterion effects. In order to isolate the criterion effect
we
construct `BP Asymmetrical Policy Types' (BPA). The latter types
result
when BP outcomes are entered into our (asymmetrical)
aggregation
procedure. For instance, consider Japan. According to BP the bank is
the
final policy authority. In terms of our aggregation procedure
this means
two asterisks, rather than one. Therefore as a consequence
of the higher
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relative weight attached to this criterion the Bank of Japan becomes BP
(asymmetrical) type 4. Now the total difference between ES and BP can
be decomposed according to the following formula:
ES - BP - (ES - BPA) f (BPA - BP) (3.1)
Where the first term on the right hand side is the interpretation effect and
the second term is the criterion effect. From Table 3.8 it follows that the
interpretation effects (see column (d)) concern Belgium, Canada, Japan,
The Netherlands and the United States.
The National Bank of Belgium is upgraded (f 1), because we regard it
a twin-authority (blg) rather than a government dominated institution
(g). This is because the bank gained more independence by the reform of
the money market and monetary instruments in January 1991 (see Section
I). The Bank of Canada is downgraded (-1) because, contrary to BP, we
find a government official on the board, namely the Deputy Minister of
Finance (without voting power). The Bank of Japan is downgraded (-1)
because unlike BP we consider it to be a twin-authority (b~g) rather than
a bank dominated (b) institution. The Nederlandsche Bank is upgraded
(f2), because we consider it independent in policy making (b) rather
than dependent (g) as a consequence of the only formal right of the
Minister of Finance to give directions to the Bank. Finally, the Federal
Reserve System is downgraded because unlike BP (b), we consider it a
twin-authority institution (blg).
In Table 3.9 our findings are confronted with GMT's.
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(See note (a) (b) (c) (d)
below)
Australia 1 1 0 0 0
Belgium 3 1 t l f 1 t2
Canada 1 1 -1 t 1 0
France 2 I 0 t 1 f L
Germany 5 3 f 1 t 1 f2
Italy 2 3 0 -1 -1
Japan 3 1 0 t 2 t2
Netberlands 4 3 t2 -1 tl
Switzerland 5 3 t I t 1 t2
VK 2 2 0 0 0
US 3 3 0 0 0
Sweden 2 - o - -
(a) See Table 3.6.
(b) See column ( t) Table 3.8.
(c) See column (e) Table 3.6 (signs must be reversed)
(d) (b) f (c).
Also, the total difference between ES and GMT may be decomposed,
taking the following formula:
ES - GMT - (ES - BP) f (BP - GMT) (3.2)
Where the first term on the right hand side is decomposed in Table 3.9
and the second term is decomposed in Table 3.6.
IV CONCLUSIONS
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds it origin in
the ongoing `rules versus discretion debate'. A recent kind of analysis
employed in this longstanding debate is to assess central bank indepen-
dence by means of the tools of qttantitative indices. Numerical values of
these indices are dependent on (i) criteria used in the examination of
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central bank laws (statutes), (ii) the interpretation of the relevant statute
as to whether a central bank meets this criterion, i.e. possesses a certain
attribute, and (iii) the way these attributes are aggregated to a composite
index of central bank independence. Since in principle features (i) -(iii)
are arbitrary there are unavoidable subjective elements in the construction
of indices of this kind.
In order to view these elements in a broader perspective we compare
the major indices of central bank independence as presented in Bade and
Parkin (1988) (BP), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991) (GMT). Also we construct a new index of central bank
independence. This index is then used to reach a critical perspective of
the mentioned indices and to re-assess central bank independence in
twelve industrial countries.
Our findings regarding the existing indices can be summarized as
follows. Alesina (1988, 1989) made some serious mistakes in updating
Bade and Parkin (1988). Hence, the Alesina revision of the position of
the Banca d'Italia implies counterfactual statements concerning e.g
monetary accommodation of government deficits. Therefore, the Alesina
revision is ad hoc and his index inconsistent. Furthermore, GMT and BP
differ in their interpretations of the central bank laws of Canada, France,
Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands. These differences refer to both the
presence of government officials on the bank board, and the final autho-
rity in policy making. Also, by using a very strict criterion with respect
to the appointment of directors GMT change the ranking of the Bundes-
bank, Banca d'Italia and the Swiss National Bank vis à vis that by BP.
Finally, in re-assessing central bank independence in twelve industrial
countries we qualify Banca d'Italia as less independent than GMT, while
for the Nationale Bank van België, the Banque de France, the Bundes-
bank, Bank of Japan, the Nederlandsche Bank and the Schweizerische
Nationalbank the reverse applies.
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APPENDIX A3 CENTRAL BANK LAWS IN TWELVE
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
This appendix contains the source material behind Section III.1
(including Tables 3.7 and 3.8). It provides information on the final
authority in monetary policy making, on the presence of government
officials on the bank board, on the number of board members not
appointed by the government, and on the presence of statutory
requirements concerning monetary stability.
A3.1 Sweden
Established in 1668, the Sveriges Riksbank is the oldest central bank in
the world. Although this central bank is legally independent of the
government, it is not in practice. The legal base for the policy making by
the Riksbank is the Sveriges Riksbank Act (`Lag fór Sveriges Riksbank')
of 1934.25 The Act provides no specific objectives for the central
bank, like in other countries.
In practice, monetary policy is a part of the economic policy by the
government and fits into this `to quite the same degree as where this
obligation has been given a legal basis'.26
According to Article 1 of the Act, the Riksbank is directly
subordinated to the Riksdag (parliament) and formally independent.
Furthermore, Article 32 states the following: `The Directors may not
receive instructions with regard to the administration of the Riksbank
from anyone except the Riksdag and its Banking Committee in cases in
which that Committee is competent to give instructions on behalf of the
Riksdag' .27
In addition to this Act, the Riksdag approved special regulations, such
as the Credit Policy Instruments Act of 1974, in which `a government
authorization is required before the Riksbank may exercise its
powers'.28 Thus, the policy making by the Riksbank is influenced
considerably by the government through these special regulations, in
particular by the Ministry of Finance and Economics.29
The Board of Directors (`Bankofullmíiktige') of the Riksbank has eight
members, of which seven are appointed by the Riksdag for a period of
three years.30 These Directors appoint a Governor, who plays only a
representative role, for a period of five years and elect among themselves
a Chairman on recommendation of the government. The Board takes
decisions by a majority with a decisive vote of the Chairman. However,
until 1976 and in 1982 Social-Democratic governments used to appoint
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the Chairman, mostly a former (Deputy) Minister of Finance or Econo-
mics.
A3.2 United Kingdom
The Bank of England, established in 1694, was nationalized by the Bank
of England Act of 1946.31 This Act provides only information on the
appointment of the Court of Directors and the right to give instructions to
the Bank of England.
According to Article 4(1): `The Treasury may from time to time give
such directions to the Bank as, after consultation with the Governor of
the Bank, they think necessary in the public interest'. At the introduction
of the Act it was stressed that this right to give directions was not meant
to lead to `any day-to-day interference by the Government or the
Treasury with the ordinary work of the Bank'.32 The right was to be
used merely in `exceptional and unusual cases', which has never occured
until now.
It was the Banking Act of 1979 (revised in 1987) that formulated the
responsibilities of the central bank. The first task of the Bank of England
is the (prudential) supervision of the banking system. `Other activities of
the Bank governed by statute include its note-issuing powers, its manage-
ment of the Exchange Equalisation Account on behalf of the Treasury,
and its duties as banker to the Government and as Government's agent in
managing the National Debt'.33 Nevertheless, monetary policy is
regarded as a component of economic policy and therefore conducted by
the government with the central bank as its major adviser. As stated in a
memorandum by the Bank: `Economic policy is the responsibility of the
Government and is determined by Ministers. Policy decisions are,
however, the end product of the assimilation and discussion of studies,
forecasts, advice and proposals available to Ministers from a wide range
of sources, in which processes the Bank of England has a role to play
which can be distinguished from that of Government departments'.34
The Bank of England is managed by the Court of Directors, which is
made up of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and sixteen
Directors.35 All members are appointed by the Crown on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister. The term of office for the
Governor and the Deputy Governor is fixed at five years and for the
Directors at four years. Four of these Directors are full-time Executive
Directors, the other twelve being part-time External Directors who
represent various sectors of society: the business sector, the banking
system, the insurance industry and the trade unions. The last may be
asked to make recommendations. The Governor is chairman of the Court
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of Directors, heads the day-to-day operations by the Bank and plays the
most important role in formulating advice or proposals to the
government.3ó
A3.3 France
Es[ablished in 1803, the Banque de France was nationalized under the
Law of December 2, 1945, which `had been decided and passed in the
perspective of a greater subordination of the Banque de France to the
State'.37 After discussions between its Governor and the Minister of
Finance regarding central bank independence,38 as a compromise the
Statutes of the Banque de France (`Les Stahits de la Banque de France')
of January 3, 1973 were introduced. These Statutes define in rather
general terms the policy goals of the central bank and its relationship
with the government.3g According to Article 1 of the Statutes: `The
Banque de France is the institution which, in the framework of the
economic and financial policy of the nation, receives from the State the
general mission of watching over the currency and credit'. Thus, the
government determines the economic and financial policy to which the
monetary policy has been subordinated. Further, Article 4 states that `It
contributes to the preparation and participates in the implementation of
the monetary policy that has been decided by the Government and with
the assistance, within the framework of its competence, of the Conseil
National du Crédit'. Although the central bank is legally always subject
to directions from the government, its Governor implements in
consultation with the Minister of Finance the monetary policy in
practice.40 Founded in 1945 as an institution to broaden the po]itical
and social base for monetary policy, the Conseil National du Crédit with
its 51 members, chaired by the Minister of Finance, advises the
Governor (who is his vice-chairman), but is not directly involved in the
monetary policy making.
The Banque de France is headed by the Governor, who is supported by
two Deputy Governors. Both the Governor and the Deputy Governors
are appointed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the
Cabinet for an indefinite period, which makes their position rather vulne-
rable. In practice, the term of office is limited to 5-7 years.41 In
France the Governor has a strong personal responsibility in conducting
the management, which may be viewed as a factor that increases his
flexibility in negotiations.4Z The Governor is also chairman of the
Conseil Général consisting of twelve other members, among them the
Deputy Governors. One member is elected by the staff of the Banque and
the remaining nine are appointed by the Cabinet on the nomination of the
92 Insritutions and Monerary Policy
Minister of Finance, representing the economic and financial sectors of
society. The Minister also appoints two government auditors with the
power to object to decisions by the Conseil Généra1.43 The Conseil
Général supervises all activities of the Banque and must approve
afterwards its administration, and agreements and treaties with other
authorities.
A3.4 The Netherlands
The Nederlandsche Bank was established in 1814 and only nationalized
in 1948. The statutory task of the Dutch central bank regardin~ monetary
policy is embedded in the Bank Act (`Bankwet') of 1948.4 Article 9
(1) of this Act states that `The Bank shall have as its duty to regulate the
value of the Dutch currency in such a way as will be most conductive to
the nation's prosperity and welfare, and in doing so seek to keep the
value as stable as possible'. Further, Article 9(3) of the Act reads: `It
shall supervise the credit system in pursuance of the Act on the Supervi-
sion of the Credit System'. The latter Act gives the Bank the power to
implement rules to be followed by credit institutions in their lending.
Thereby, the policy goal of the Nederlandsche Bank is to stabilize the
internal and external value of the currency, i.e. p rice level and exchange
rate, but not as a sole and independent objective.as
The Bank Act also provides for a procedure, if a conflict should arise
between the government and the Bank with respect to monetary policy.
According to Article 26 (1) of this Act: `In cases, that Our minister (of
Finance) may consider it necessary for the purpose of coordinating mone-
tary and financial policy of the Government and the policy of the Bank,
he may give, after consultation with the Bank Council, the necessazy
directions to the Governing Board to attain those objectives'. Although
the Minister of Finance legally has the right to give directions to the
central bank, the application of this right is always considered by both
authorities as an ultimate remedy (`ultimum remedium') because of the
very complicated procedure to solve the conflict.4ó Article 26 reflects
the democratic principle that the Minister of Finance is responsible for
central bank policy to the parliament. Ultimately, it is to the parliament
to assess whether the policy pursued by the Bank must be deemed
`conducive to the nation's prosperity and welfare'. The Minister of
Finance has never exercised the right to give directions until now. He
and the Governing Board of the Bank are compelled to reach agreement
with each other and, thus, the independence of the Bank is sufficiently
guaranteed by Article 26.47
The Nederlandsche Bank is managed by the Governing Board
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(`Directie') being composed of the President, the Secretary and presently
three Executive Directors.4S They are nominated by a joint meeting of
the Governing Board and Supervisory Board (`Raad van
Commissarissen') and appointed by the Crown on the proposal of the
Cabinet for a fixed period of seven years. In practice, these nominations
were always accepted by the Crown.49 The Supervisory Board
consisting of twelve members, appointed by the Minister of Finance,
supervises the Governing Board. Finally, the Bank Council (`Bankraad')
of seventeen members is chaired by the Royal Commissioner (`Konink-
lijk Commissaris') and may seek information from the Bank and offer
independent advice to the Minister of Finance.
A3.5 Belgium
Established in 1850, the National Bank of Belgium (`Nationale Bank van
België') is owned half by the state and half by the public.50 The legal
base for the functioning of the Belgian central bank are the Organic Law
(`Organieke Wet') and the Statutes of 1939, which provide no specific
objectives for the Bank.51 Article 29 of the Organic Law states the
following: `The Minister of Finance shall have the right to supervise all
the opera[ions of the Bank. He may object to the execution of any
measure which would be contrary to the Law, the Statutes or the
interests of the State. This supervision shall be entrusted to a
Government Commissioner'. According to Article 30 of this Law: `The
Government Commissioner is appointed by the Crown. He shall
supervise all the operations of the Bank. He may suspend and report to
the Minister of Finance, every decision that would be contrary to the
Laws, the Statutes or the interests of the State'.52 Therefore, the
National Bank of Belgium can not be considered as formally independent
of the government. The Bank is forbidden to pursue targets conflicting
with the general objectives of the government.S3 Nevertheless, the
relationship between the central bank and government has changed, in
favour of more independence, by the reform of the money market and
monetary policy instruments which started on January 29, 1991. The
reform was intended to improve the access to the market for Treasury
bills, to introduce a regime of primary dealers and to innovate and
extend the monetary policy instruments. As a consequence of this
reform, the responsibility of the central bank for monetary policy was
more clearly defined and its touch with financial markets on behalf of
policy making improved.5a
The Board of Directors (`Bestuurscomité') of the National Bank of
Belgium is made up of the Governor and three to six Directors of which
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one acts as Deputy Governor. The Governor and Directors are appointed
by the Crown for a fixed period of five and six years respectively. The
Board of Directors is chaired by the Governor and collectively
responsible for the management of the Bank and the formulation of
monetary policy. It may change the discount rate and the rate for
advances in a case of emergency, but must report to the Council of
Regency (`Regentenraad'). The Council of Regency determines,
however, the policy goals of the Bank and deals with general questions
concerning the Bank, the currency, credits and the economic develop-
ment.55 The Council of Regency consists of the Board of Directors and
ten Regents elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders for a period
of three years, representing the Minister of Finance (3), financial
institutions (2), trade unions (2) and organisations of industry, commerce
and agriculture (3). The Governor is chairman and has a decisive vote.
A3.6 Germany
The legal predecessors of the Deutsche Bundesbank were the Reichsbank,
established in 1876, and the Bank deutscher L~nder, founded together
with the introduction of the Deutsche Mark by the currency reform of
1948. The Deutsche Bundesbank was established by the Deutsche
Bundesbank Act (`Gesetz uber die Deutsche Bundesbank') of 1957.56
Its main policy goals are provided for in Article 3 of this Act: `The
Deutsche Bundesbank shall regulate the amount of money in circulation
and of credit supplied to the economy, using the monetary powers
conferred on it by this Act, with the aim of safeguarding the currency,
and shall arrange for the handling by banks of domestic and external
payments'. Article 3 clearly reflects the special responsibility of the
central bank for maintaining the internal and external value of the
currency, i.e. price level and exchange rate.57
The relationship between the Bundesbank and the federal government is
embedded in Article 12 of the Act reading: `Without prejudice to the
performance of its functions, the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be required
to support the general economic policy of the Federal Government. In
exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act it shall be independent
of instructions from the Federal Government'. Thus, Article 12
guarantees the independence of the central bank regarding monetary
policy making. It should be noticed that the Act does not cover any
procedures in case of a major conflict between the Bundesbank and the
federal government. Nevertheless, Article 13 of the Act provides for
certain procedures for the coordination of monetary and economic polícy
and for consultation between central bank and government as independent
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bodies. According to Article 13 (2,3) members of government
may
attend meetings of the Central Bank Council, without
voting ri~ht, and
the President of the Bank those of the government on invitat~on.s
The Central Bank Council (`Zentralbankrat') of the
Deutsche
Bundesbank is made up of the Directorate (`Direktorium') and
the
Presidents of the Landeszentralbanken (main offices).
The Council
determines mone[ary policy under chairmanship of the President
or
Deputy President of the Bundesbank and meets every
two weeks.59
The Directorate, consisting of the President, Deputy President
and at the
maximum eight (now four) other members, implements the
decisions
taken by the Central Bank Council. The at most ten
members of the
Directorate are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic
on the
nomination of the Federal Government, while the eleven Presidents
of
the Landeszentralbanken are appointed by him on the
nomination of the
Bundesrat based on a proposal by the Government of
the Land
concerned, all after consultation of the Central Bank Council. Both
the
members of the Directorate and the Presidents of the
Landeszentralban-
ken have a maximum term of office of eight years which is
usually
realized.60 During this term they can not be removed from office
on
political grounds. The appointment of the members of the
Central Bank
Council reflects also a large degree of independence of the
Bundesbank.
A3.7 Japan
Established in 1882, the Bank of Japan was reorganized by the Bank
of
Japan Law of 1942.61 According to Article 1 of this Law:
`The Bank
of Japan has for its object the regulation of the currency,
the control and
facilitation of credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering
of
the credit system, pursuant to the national policy, in order
that the
general economic activities of the nation might adequately
be enhanced'.
The latter part of Article 1 may be taken to mean 'to foster
the stable
development of the Japanese economy'.62 Thus, the main objectives
of
the Bank are to stabilize the value of the currency
and to maintain
orderly credit conditions. Regarding the relationship between
the central
bank and government, Article 43 states that: `The
competent Minister (of
Finance) may, if deemed particularly necessary for the attaimnent
of the
object of [he Bank of Japan, order the Bank to undertake any
necessary
business, or order alterations in the By-Laws as well as other necessary
actions'. Although the Minister, fonnally, has the right
to give
instructions, in practice this right has never been used as a result of
the
regular, informal contacts between Bank management
and govern-
ment.ó3 With respect to its main goal, price stability, the
actual
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influence of the Bank is much greater than what is legally defined. For
example, the Bank of Japan has been fairly succesful in advocating the
liberalization of Japanese financial markets and in arguing for a more
market-oriented implementation of monetary policy, which the Ministry
of Finance has resisted for a long time.~ The influence of the Ministry
is, above all, based on financial regulation (regulatory leverage) and
decreases gradually by financial liberalization. However, the Bank of
Japan derives its inFluence mainly from guiding the financial markets
(market leverage), which increases by the strengthening of market forces.
Thereby, the independence of the central bank has continued to
grow.65
The highest policy making body of the Bank of Japan is the Policy
Board, consisting of the Governor, two representatives from the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning Agency (without voting right) and
four other members, representing banking (2), commerce and industry
(1), and agriculture (1). The Governor and the other members of the
Policy Board are appointed by the Cabinet for a period of five and four
years respectively. Since 1969, the Governor has been chosen alternately
from Bank officials and former Ministry of Finance officials.~ The
Governor conducts the operations of the Bank according to the directions
of the Policy Board and heads the Executive Board, which further
includes two Deputy Governors (formerly one), at least three Executive
Directors and two Executive Auditors (now six and four respectively),
and a number of Counsellors.67 The Deputy Governors are appointed
by the Cabinet for five years, while the other members of the Executive
Board by the Minister of Finance on recommendation of the Governor
for two to four years. Despite the fact that the Policy Board is, from a
legal point of view, the most important policy making body, the major
responsibility for formulating monetary policy resides with the Executive
Board.ó8
A3.8 Italy
The Banca d'Italia, established in 1893, is owned partially, through
public financial institutions, by the State.69 The legal base for its
functioning are the Statutes (`Statuto della Banca d'Italia') of 1936,
which provide no specific objectives for the central bank.70 The
relationship between the Banca d'Italia and the government is embedded
in Article 20 of the Statutes stating that the Board of Directors (`Comita-
to') is just responsible for the general management of the central bank
and not for monetary policy making. Furthermore, Article 25 reads: `He
(the Governor) shall make proposals to the Minister of the Treasury
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concerning change in the discount rates and in the interest rate on
advances'. Obviously, the Governor prepares monetary policy and the
Minister of the Treasury has to approve it formally.~t
The Statutes of 1936 were amended in 1947 by providing the Banca
d'Italia with supervision on the financial system and by the foundation of
the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings (`Comitato
Interministeriale per il Credito e il Risparmio' or CIRC).72 According
to Article 1 of the Decree of 1947, the CICR,' whose duty it shall be to
supervise, at the highest level, the safeguarding of savings, the carrying
on of credit activities, and exchange matters', will give directives to the
central bank for its operations. The CIRC is made up of the most
important ministers and the Governor, and chaired by the Minister of the
Treasury. In general, this committee detennines the goals of monetary
policy with the Banca d'Italia in an advisory role. The central bank has
always been integrated with economic policy making, which explains
why it scarcely had any conflic[ with the Treasury. Until the mid-
seventies the central bank was, clearly, subordinated to the government.
However, from 1975 on the Banca d'Italia paid more attention to gaining
independence with respect to monetary policy.73
The Governor, having a personal responsibility for the implementation
of monetary policy, is appointed by the Board of Directors of the Banca
d'Italia, for an indefinite term of office. The Board of Directors consists
of thirteen Directors, elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders at
the thirteen regional offices of the central bank for a fixed period of three
years, the Governor with a casting vote and a representative of the
Ministry of the Treasury as an observer without voting right. Although
the appointment of Governor and Directors seems to be independent of
the government, Article 19 of the Statutes of 1936 states that: `Appoint-
ments and dismissals must be approved by decree of the President of the
Republic on the proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers in
agreement with the Minister of the Treasury, the Council of Ministers
having been heard'.
A3.9 Switzerland
Established in 1905, the Swiss National Bank (`Schweizerische
Nationalbank') has enjoyed a high degree of independence from the
government, reflecting the deep-rooted distrust of the Swiss public in
centralized approaches to policy making.74
The main policy goals of the Swiss central bank are provided for in
Article 2(1) of the Federal Law on the Swiss National Bank (`Bundesge-
setz iiber die Schweizerische Nationalbank') of 1953: `The principal task
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of the National Bank shall be to regulate the country's monetary
circulation, facilitate payments transactions, and implement a credit and
monetary policy serving the general interests of the country. It shall
advise the Federal authorities in monetary matters.'75 The central bank
interprets this Article as a mandate to achieve and to maintain a stable
price level, which view is shared by the federal government and largely
accepted by the public.76 The relationship between the Swiss National
Bank and the federal government (`Bundesrat') is one of legal and
administrative separation. The National Bank Law dces not contain any
provision giving the government influence on monetary policy making.
In case of important policy decisions, both authorities should consult
each other, but mutual consent is not required.~~ The independence of
the central bank is also guaranteed by Article 63, limiting the competence
of the federal parliament to approving an increase in the Bank's basic
capital and that of the federal government to appointing representatives to
the Bank Council, the members of the Directorate, their deputies and the
managers of the branch offices, and to other formal approvals.
The Bank Committee (`Bankausschuss') is the principal policy making
body of the Swiss National Bank and has the right to participate in the
setting of the Bank's official lending rates.~g Representing the various
parts (cantons) of the country, this Bank Committee is made up of the
Chairman and the Deputy Chainnan of the Bank Council (`Bankrat') and
eight other members, which are appointed by the Bank Council for a
fixed period of four years. The Bank Council, consis[ing of forty
members, is responsible for the supervision and control of the Bank's
management, but plays a limited role with respect to monetary policy. Its
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and twenty-three other members are
appointed by the federal government and the remaining fifteen members
are elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders also for a period of
four years.~g Thus, only one-fifth of the Bank Committee and five-
eighths of the Bank Council are directly appointed by the federal
government. Finally, the highest managing and executive authority is the
Directorate (`Direktorium') of the Bank, which is composed of three
members elected by the federal government, on recommendation of the
Bank Council, for a fixed term of six years.g~ The government also
appoints among these three members a President and a Vice-President,
although there is a collective responsibility.
A3.10 Australia
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was established in 1911, initially
as a trading bank. Steps toward the acquisition of central banking powers
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were taken in the 1920s, especially in 1924. Again, during the Great
Depression of the 1930s, it began to acquire further central banking
responsibilities (e.g. for the exchange rate) and, ttnder etnergency powers
in World War II, established ititer alia exchange control and a wide
range of credit controls. These were continued under the Banking Act
1945.81 Then in 1959, central banking functions were separated from
trading bank operations and a new Reserve Bank of Australia was
established.
The functions of its Board are set out in Article 10 (2) of the Reserve
Bank Act of 195982
`It is the duty of the Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the
monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the grearest advantage of the
people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank under this Act, the Banking Act
1959 and the regulations under that Act are exercised in such a manner as, in the
opinion of the Board, will best contribute to: the stability of the currency of
Australia, the maintenance of full employment in Australia and the economic
prosperity and welfare of the people in Australia'.
Thus, the threefold policy goal of the Reserve Bank also includes the
fostering of economic activity and employment. Regarding monetary
policy making the central bank is bottnd to inform the federal
government on a regular base: `The Governor and the Secretary to the
Department of the Treasury shall establish a close liaison with each other
and shall keep each other fully informed on all matters which jointly
concern the Bank and the Department of the Treasury' (Article 13). In
practice, the relationship between the Reserve Bank and the federal
government is characterized by both fortnal and informal contacts.
Nevertheless, the Bank is completely subordinated to the Secretary of the
Treasury, being the final competent authority with respect to monetary
policy. In case of differences of opinion between the central bank and the
Treasury, Article 11 (2) states that `the Treasttrer and the Board shall
endeavour to reach agreement.'83
Furthermore, according to Article 50 (1) of the Banking Act of 1959
the Reserve Bank's setting of rates on discottnts and advances needs to be
approved by the Treasury.84 So, the central bank is more or less an
agent of the government.
The Reserve Bank Board, responsible for implementing monetary
policy, consists of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Secretary to
the Treasury as an ex offico member and seven other members. The
government official on the Board has a voting right. The Governor and
Deputy Governor are appointed by the Governor-General (the executive
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branch of the federal government) for a term of office, not exceeding
seven years. The seven other members comprise at most two members
who are officers of the Bank or Public Service, holding office `during the
pleasure of the Governor-General',85 and at least five members
selected from the academic, agricultural and general business sector by
the Governor-General for a fixed period of five years. The Governor is
chairman of the Board and has a casting vote.
A3.11 United States
Established in 1913, the Federal Reserve System is a federal government
authority comprising the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, whose shares are
owned by commercial banks being its members, and formerly (until
1935) the Federal Reserve Board as it main policy making body. The
legal base for its functioning was embedded in the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913.86 The Preamble of this Act constituted the powers of the
Federal Reserve System: `To provide for the establishment of Federal
Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of redis-
counting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of
banking in the United States, and for other purposes'. By the Banking
Act of 1933 the Federal Reserve Board was granted more autonomy vis-
à-vis the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) was created to make policy recommendation to the
Board for conduc[ing open market operations.87 Further, the Banking
Act of 1935 replaced the Federal Reserve Board by the Board of
Governors and strengthened its position by removing the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Treasurer from the Board. Through the `Accord' of
1951 the Federal Reserve gained more autonomy as a consequence of its
agreement with the Treasury that its open market policy should no longer
support the market for government debt.gg The goals of the central
bank regarding monetary policy were clearly formulated in Section IIA
of the 1977 amendment to the Act by stating that: `The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market
Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote the goals of maximum employ-
ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates'. So, the
Federal Reserve should aim both at price stability and at economic
activity and employment.89 Furthermore, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
of 1978 was meant to improve the coordination of economic and
monetary policy between the federal government, Congress (parliament)
and Federal Reserve by reporting requirements for the central bank to
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Senate and House of Representatives at semi-annual hearings on the
Board's and FOMC's objectives and plans with respect to the growth of
monetary and credit aggregates.90 In practice, both the Federal
Reserve and the government have a shared responsibility for monetary
policy making. Although the central bank maintained the same degree of
formal autonomy, it lost some of its independence after the mid-
1960's.91
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acting as its
highest policy making body, is composed of seven members which are
selected in order to maintain a geographical balance and a balance
between bankers and non-bankers. These seven Governors are appointed
by the President of the United States for a fixed period of fourteen years,
with approval by the Senate. After a full term of office the Governors
may not be reappointed. The President appoints two members of the
Board of Governors as Chairman and Vice-Chairman for a fixed period
of four years.92 Political influence on the appoinhnent of the Board is
minimalized by the long term of office, exceeding more than three
administrations, and the impossibility of dismissal an political grounds.
Furthermore, the formulation of global monetary targets its carried out
by the FOMC.93 The FOMC is made up of the Board of Governors
and five of the twelve Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. The
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 1Vew York, conducting open
market operations and exchange market interventions on behalf of the
System, is an ex officio member of the FOMC. The other four members
are elected for a period of one year on a rotating basis. The Presidents of
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks are appointed by the Board of
Directors of each Bank, with consent of the Board of Governors.94
A3.12 Canada
The Bank of Canada, only established in 1935, had its functioning
originally based on the Bank of Canada Act of 1934.95 The policy
goals of the Canadian central bank were given in the Preamble of this
Act, reading: `Whereas it is desirable to establish a central bank in
Canada to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the
economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external value of
the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in
the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as
may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to
promote the economic and financial welfare of the Dominion'. Until
1967, this Act did not confine the threefold task of the central bank
regarding monetary policy making.9ó However, in 1967 the
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relationship between the Bank of Canada and the federal government was
changed by the introduction of the Bank of Canada Act of 1967.97 This
was caused by a major conflict of the Governor with the Minister of
Finance on the implementation of tnonetary policy. The Governor,
wanting to conduct a restrictive policy, was forced to resign. The Act of
1967 gave the Minister of Finance the right to promulgate instructions to
the Bank and, therefore, the ultimate authority for monetary policy.
Article 14 (1) of the revised Act states that: `The Minister and the
Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on its relation to
general economic policy'. Furthermore, Article 14 (2) continues: `If,
notwithstanding the consultations provided for in Subsection (1) there
should emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank
concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister may, after
consultation with the Governor in Council (executive branch of
government), give to the Governor a written direction concerning
tnonetary policy, in specified terms, and the Bank shall comply with such
directive'. Although the Minister of Finance has, up to now, never used
his right to give instrttctions, this possibility has severely affected the
independence of the central bank after 1967.
The highest policy making body of the Bank of Canada is its Board of
Directors, consisting of the Governor, Depttty Governor, twelve
Directors and the Deputy Minister of Finance as an ex officio member
without voting power.98 Both the Governor and the Deputy Governor
are appointed by the Directors, with the approval of the Governor in
Council, for a fixed period of seven years. The Minister of Finance
appoints the twelve Directors,99 with the consent of the Governor in
Council, for a period of three years. The (Deputy) Governor and
Directors may be reappointed. The Governor is the chief executive
officer and supervises the Bank. Moreover, the Bank has an Executive
Committee, which is competent to deal with any matter within the
competence of the Board. The Executive Committee is composed of the
Governor, Deputy Governor, two Directors and the Deputy Minister of
Finance and mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary
policy.
NOTES
1. As pointed out by Cukierman (1993, p. ?72) there are often serious gaps , particularly
in LDCs, between the letter of the law and its application. Indices that reflect some of
these gaps are the actual (as opposecl to [he legal) term of office of the CB governor
and the responses of experts on monetary institutions to a yuestionnaire on central bank
independence.
2. Exceptions are Bade and Parkin (1988, pp. Z1-23), and Schaling (1993).
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3. A meaningful comparison of the indiczs of Cukizrman (1992), (LVAU) and Cukizrman,
Webb and Neyapti (LVAW) with thz othzr indices (BP, AL, GMT and ES) is
practically impossible. The rzason is that thz LVAU and LVAW indices focus on
different Izgal attributes from central hank laws than those includzd in thz other indices.
This pointis also illustratul by Eijffingzr and dz Haan (1994, p. 34).
4. We focus on intzmal monztary policy, i.e. we take no account of the relations of
govemments and central banks in thz conduct of exchangz ratz policy. We leave this for
further research.
5. Eijffinger and Van Keulzn (1994) zxtend this samplz to includz Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Nzw Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and
the Czech republic.
6. In Eijffinger and Schaling ( 1993c) we restrict attzntion to this nzw index.
7. Bade and Parkin (p. 18) point out that a commitmznt to a fixzd exchangz rate Izaves
monetary policy with the task of detzrmining thz stock of foreign rzszrves. Therzfore,
they think it pointless to look to thz zffzcts of central bank laws on monztary policy in a
fixed exchange rate era. Empirical support for this vizw can bz found in De Haan and
Sturm ( 1992).
8. BP's results conczrning both the relationship bztwzzn thz czntral bank and thz govzm-
ment in monetary policy making and the proczdurzs for appointing and removing
central bank dirzctors arz zxtensivzly discussed in Eijftin~-zr and Schaling (1992a, pp.
18-20).
9. Of course, in this case the przsznce of a government ofticixl without voting power on
the policy board would not make much sznsz.
10. For an zxamination of aegregatz dzmand policy and zxchangz ratz policy rules in a
multi-country Phillips-curve framzwork see Taylor (1982).
11. Even though interest rates are the proximatz instrumznts of monetary policy, according
to Bade and Parkin (p. 19) therz is no inhzrentinconsistzncy in using the variability of
inflatíon as the appropriatz mzasure of thz variability of policy. Short-term interest rates
are typically manipulatzd with a view to achieving a particular bzhaviour for the growth
rate of various monetary agcregates, and thzsz aggregatzs arz further regardzd as
appropriate intermediate targzts in achieving predictablz and Izss variable inflation. A
diagrammatic presentation of this line of roasoning is given in Eijffinger and Gzrards
(1990, p. 13).
12. This [entative conclusion is given formal content by estimating first ordzr autoregres-
sions for inFlation (where all the cozfficients on lagced intlation wzrz restricted to be
equal) with inclusion of a dummy variablz for thz Gzrman and Swiss czntral bank type,
see Bade and Parkin ( 1988, p. 21-23).
13. Alesina supports the rational partisan theory, a theory that combines Hibbs' (1977)
partisan theory with rational expectations macrozconomic thzory.
14. This research was also puhlished in the Report hy the Europzan Commission 'One
market, one mm~cy'. Szz Commission of the European Communities (1990, pp. 97-98).
15. For ease of comparison wz focus on thz BP sxmplz, skipping Nzw Zzaland, Spain,
Denmark, Norway and Finland.
16. See: Alesina ( 1988, p. 42). Howevzr, Tabzllini ( 1988a, p. 96) states this change to
have taken placz in the summzr of 1981.
17. See Section II.
18. Correspondence with Alzsina did not clarify the weighting procedurz of Alzsina (1988,
1989).
19. Note that this assertion follows from oar (countzrfactual) hypothesis that the Alzsina
index is intemally consistznt.
Z0. Accordine to Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabzllini, economic indepzndence is the capacity
to choose the instruments of monetary policy. Their trzatment of economic indzpenden-
ce is extznsively discussed in Eijftin~-zr and Schaling ( 1992a).
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21. To facilitate comparison corresponding BP critaria are given in italics.
22. Again, for ease of comparison we focus on the BP sample, skipping Austria, Den-
mark, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain.
23. The threshold for meeting BP's criterion 3 is the composition of the Central Bank
Council of the Bundesbank.
24. Following BP this criterion is operationalized as: proportion of inembers not appointed
directly or indirectly by the govemment ? 11l21.
25. See: Aufricht (1967, pp. 663-671). The last revision of this Act was made in 1988.
26. From: Skanland (1984, p. 16).
27. Aufricht (1967, pp. 668-669).
28. In: Sveriges Riksbank, Credit and Foreígn Exchange, 1990.
29. See: Fair (1979, p. 40).
30. See: Sveriges Riksbank, Annual Report 1990, p. 5.
3l. See: Aufricht (1967, pp. I85-192).
32. From: Eizenga (1991, p. 4). Eizen~a (1991) distinguishes three differences between the
right to give instructions in the United Kingdom and that prevailing in the Netherlands.
33. See: Caimcross (1988, p. 68).
34. Memorandum by the Bank of England, 'The relationship between the Bank of England
and the Treasury', G.B. House of Commons, Treasury and Civil Services Committee,
Session 1979-1980, Memorandum on monetary policy, 1980, pp. 177-180 (in partícular
paragraph l4).
35. According to Article 2(1) of the Bank of England Act of 1946.
36. See: Fair (1979, p. 41) and Eizenga (1991, pp. 6-7).
37. Translated from: Koch (1983, p. 371). The Law of December 2, 1945 is given by:
Aufricht (1967, pp. 199-210).
38. See: Bouvier (1988, pp. 96-97).
39. In: Banque de France, 'La Bnrrque de Frnnce er !n Morumie', Paris, 1986, pp. 149-157.
40. See: Eizenga (1990, pp. 2,12); Eijffinger (1991, pp. 3-4).
41. From: Skanland (1984, p. 13).
42. From: Skanland (1984, p. 13).
43. See: Fair (1979, p. 39) and Eizenga (1990, pp. 4-5).
44. This Act is given in: Wetten Binnenlands Geldwezen, Zwolle, 1979, pp. 5-27. See also:
Eizenga (1983, p. 10).
45. See: Eijffinger (1986, pp. 8-9) and Eizenga (1987, p. 12).
46. This procedure is extensively discussed by: A.M. de Jong, 'De Wetgeving nopens De
Nederlnudsche Bmrk', 1814-1958, een historische studie, The Hague, 1960.
47. From: Eizenga (1987, pp. 13-14).
48. Article 22 of the Bank Act providas the possihility to appoint at most five Executive
Directors. The Governing Board has a collutive responsibility for the Bank's manage-
ment.
49. See also: Eizenga (1987, p. l4).
50. The latter half is held by various authorities and, thus, under indirect control of the
govemment.
51. The Organic L.aw and Statutes are revised on January 2 and 23, 1991. See: 'Belgisch
Srnnrsblod',January, 25 and 29, 1991.
52. This Commissioner is mostly the hi~hest Ministry of Finance official.
53. However, Fair (1979, p. 37) is of the opinion that 'in practice the National Bank is
lareely independent'.
54. See: Hervorming van het monetair belaidsinstrumentarium, aspecten en documenten,
Belgische Vereniging van Banken, No. 1 l4, January 1991, p.25.
55. According to Articles 63 and 64 of the Statutes of 1939.
56. See; The Deutsche Bundesbank - Its monetary policy instruments and functions,
'Deensche Burrdeshnnk Specinl Srric.r', No. 7, 2nd edition, Frankfurt-am-Main, October
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4. Central Bank Independence: Theory
and Evidence
I INTRODUCTION
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin in the
ongoing 'rules versus discretion' debate. Authors like Barro and Gordon
(1983a) and Rogoff (1985) argue that governments and central banks are
tempted to impart an inflationary bias to the economy, thereby sacrificing
long-term welfare to short-run political gains. The associated time-
consistency problem can be overcome by legislative rules and by setting up
politically independent central banks. Hence, one would expect countries
with independen[ central banks to have a lower sustainable rate of inflation.
In addition the well-developed theoretical literature, t there are also some
studies that compare actual monetary regimes between a large number of
countries. The most comprehensive studies are Bade and Parkin (1988),
Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman
(1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling
(1992b, 1993a, 1994), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijffinger, Van
Rooij, and Schaling (1994). It is striking that the conclusions of the latter
are less clear-cut than the theoretical literature. For instance, contrary to
Alesina and Summers, Bade and Parkin find no correlation between central
bank independence and the variability of inflation. Next, unlike the
prediction of the Rogoff (1985) model,2 both Alesina and Summers and
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini find no association between central bank
independence and (the variability of) real output growth.
In this Chapter on the basis of a single-stage Phillips-curve monetary
policy game with private infonnation about the economy3 - i.e. supply
shocks - we derive several propositions concerning the relationship between
central bank independence and (the variance of) inflation and output growth.
These propositions are tested for twelve industrial co~mtries (Australia, Bel-
gium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) for the post-Bretton-Woods period
(1972-1991). In testing the game-theoretic model we use the indices of
central bank independence introduced in Chapter 3.
The main conclusions of this Chapter can be swnmarized as follows. First
of all, both our model and estimation results, give further support to the
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well-known inverse relationship between the degree of central bank
independence and the level of inflation found by e.g. Alesina (1988, 1989)
and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). Secondly, contrary to Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Alesina and Summers (1993), we
find little empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank is,
the lower the variability of inFlation. Thirdly, our estimation results reject
clearly the proposition - implied by the Rogoff (1985) model - of a positive
relation between independence and the variability of real output growth. In
other words, inflation-averse central banks do not bear the costs of
triggering recessions nor do politically sensitive central banks reap the
benefits of avoiding recessions. Finally, no empirical relationship can be
found between central bank independence and the level of real output
growth in the long run. Hence, our empirical results support the proposition
of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) that having an independent
central bank is like having a free lunch. There are benefits (lower inflation)
but no apparent costs in tenns of real output growth.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section II we combine the
Rogoff (1985) Phillips-curve monetary policy game with the Alogoskoufis
(1994) model of wage and employment determination, to allow for
persistence in the natural rate of output. 1n Section III we use this model to
analyse the theoretical relationships of central bank independence with the
means and variances of inflation and real output growth. Finally, in Section
IV we confront the propositions from the game-theoretic model with
empirical evidence using various indices of central bank independence.
II A SIMPLE CLOSED ECONOMY MACROMODEL
IL1 The Model
The main purpose of Sections II and III is to combine the Rogoff (1985)
Phillips curve monetary policy game with the Alogoskoufis ( 1994) model
of wage and employment determination, to allow for persistence in the
natural rate of output. Next, following Cukierman (1992, pp. 415-431) we
use this model to analyse the effects of central bank independence on the
mean and variance of inflation and real output growth.
We assume that there are two types of agents, wage-setters and the central
bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage every time period,
and the central bank controls monetary policy to determine the inflation
rate.
The timing of events is as follows. Wage-setters sign annual nominal
contracts [Gray (1976), Fischer, (1977a)] at the beginning of each year,
before monetary policy is chosen for that year.
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Wage-setters know the domestic monetary regime, i.e. they know the
weight of inflation stabilization relative to employment stabilization in the
preferences of the central bank. They take this information into account in
forming their expectations. Finally, employment is determined by
competitive firms. We now move on to the supply side of the model.
II.2 Wage and Employment Determination
Consider the following supply block which is a closed-economy version of
Alogoskoufis (1994). Capital will be assumed fixed, and output is given by
a short-run production fimction of the following type
Yt-aet}~t OC,6G 1 (4.1)
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady state
values.4 Thus, y is the log of output, P the log of employment, and p. a
measure of productivity. ~3 is the exponent of labour and is less than unity.
Having described the level of output, it remains to specify how
productivity evolves over time. We use a stochastic trend specification
discussed in Stock and Watson (1988). This specification says that over the
long run productivity will grow at some average rate, labelled g. However,
shocks to productivity, vtt`, can cause productivity growth to deviate from
its mean. Moreover, these shocks are persistent with respect to the level of
productivity: once perturbed by an vtt` shock, ~t will show no tendency to
return to its trendline. Hence, the supply shocks are assumed to have
permanent effects on the economy's productive capacity.5 The
mathematical expression for the stochastic trend specification is a random
walk with drift
l~t - g} pt-1 t vtu (4.2)
where g is the average (or expected) rate of growth of productivity (the drift
of the k-process), and vt` is a normally distributed productivity shock with
zero mean and variance v2~. Without loss of generality we normalize Q~Z
at 1.
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of labour
to the real wage wi - pt. This yields the following employment function
-1
et - 1- a (wt - Pt - F~t)
(4.3)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p the log of the price level.
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The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each period and remains fixed
for one period. The objective of wage setters is to stabilize employment
around a target employment level I~s - P.Denoting the log of the labour
force by ls, we assume l~s G ls Thus we employ the insider-outsider
approach to the labour market [Blanchard and Swnmers (1986), Lindbeck
and Snower (1986)].6 Thus, wages in each period are set to minimize
Et-1 (Ft - P)2 (4.4)
where Et-t is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on
information available at the end of period t- 1. The minimization of (4.4)
is subject to the labour demand function (4.3).~
From the first-order conditions for a minimum of (4.4) subject to (4.3) the
nominal wage is given by
w- Et-l Pt } Et-1 l~t -(1 - R)e (4.5)
Substituting (4.5) in the labour demand function (4.3), and the resulting
equation in the production function, we get the following relation between
employment, output and unanticipated shocks
Pt - Y f 1 (Pt - Et-l Pt f vtt`)
yt - RP f p,t -f- 1 a~(pt - Et-1 Pt f vtt`)
(4.6)
(4.7)
An unanticipated rise in prices pt - Et-l Pt reduces the real wage, and causes
firms to employ more labour. Thus, both aggregate employment and output
exhibit a transitory deviation from their respective equilibrium or `natural'
rates é and Që f~t.g
On the other hand, an unanticipated shock to productivity increases the
marginal product of labour, and given the real wage causes firms to employ
more labour. Thus employment rises above P, and output rises on account
of both the higher employment (transitory effect) and the higher productivity
(permanent effect).
Subtracting (4.6) from the labour force PS, using the approximation that
the rate of unemployment u- es - P, and adding and subtracting pt-tl(1 -
a), we get the following expression for the short-run determination of
unemployment.
ut - u- 1 1 R(s,pt - Et-lOpt f vt~)
1-a
(4.8)
where u- es - F and ~ is the first diference operator. u can be thought of
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as the equilibrium of `natural' rate of unemployment in this model. Thus,
(4.8) is the well known expectations augmented `Phillips curve'.
Unemployment deviates from its equilibrium rate only to the extent that
there are unanticipated shocks to inflation or productivity. Anticipated
shocks to inflation and productivity are refelected in wages (equation (4.5))
and do not affect unemployment. We can now incorporate the Phillips curve
in a monetary policy game. This is the subject of the next section.
III A STATIC GAME BETWEEN WAGE-SETTERS AND
THE CENTRAL BANK
III.1 The Social Welfare versus the Political Approach to Central Bank
Behaviour
In order to investigate optimal monetary policy - in which the inflation rate
is treated as a directly controllable policy instrument9 - consider a central
bank that is concerned with both price stability and low unemployment. We
assume a quadratic loss function, that penalizes both inflation and
unemployment. More specificly we use
~ - ~ (ppi - Op ~ )~ t ~ (ut - u ` )~ (4.9)
where Ap~` and u~` are the inflation and unemployment targets of the central
bank. The parameter E measures the weight of unemployment stabilization
relative to inflation stabilization in the preferences of the central bank. The
central bank chooses ~p and wage-setters `choose' E~-t~pt.
As pointed out by Cukierman (1992, p. 27-28) the recent literature on
monetary policy games has given two competing interpretations to the loss
function of the monetary policymaker in equation (4.9). One part of the
literature [Havrilesky (1987) and Mayer (1990)] views the central bank as
a mediator between different interest groups that try to push monetary
policy in various directions. On this view, the loss function (4.9) reflects a
distributionally motivated political compromise mediated through the central
bank between the advocates of employment stimulation and the advocates
of price stability. The coefficient E then measures the relative political clout
of the two groups. The other part regards equation (4.9) as a social welfare
function and the central bank as a benevolent social planner (Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Rogoff (1985) and
Canzoneri (1985)].
Since one of the main purposes of this Chapter is to combine the Rogoff
(1985) model with union behaviour along the lines of Alogoskoufis (1994),
we follow Rogoff's analysis and choose the social welfare approach to
112 Ins~inuinns und Mnne~ury Policy
central bank behaviour.
As stated in Chapter 1 there is a world-wide tendency to establish more
independent central banks. Therefore now, following Rogoff (1985, pp.
1177-1180) we consider central bank independence as an institutional
response to the time-consistency problem. Rogoff demonstrates that society
can make itself better offby selecting an agent to head the central bank who
is known to place a greater weight on inFlation stabilization (relative to
unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function L.t.
He demonstrates that, in choosing among potential candidates, it is never
optimal to choose an individual who is known to care `too little' about
unemployment.
Suppose, for example that in period t-1 society selects an angent to head
the central bank in period t. The reputation of this indevidual is such that
it is known that if he is appointed to head the central bank, he will
minimize the following loss function
It -(1 ~d2) (Apt)2 }~
u~ 0 G d2 G oo (4.10)
When d2 is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater
relative weight on inflation stabilization then society dces. Hence we view
the ccefficient d2 as a measure of the political independence of the central
bank. The higher d2 the more independent the central bank.10 An
alternative approach is explicit modelling of the interaction of separate
monetary and fiscal authorities. See e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1987),
Cukierman (1992, pp. 351-355) and Debelle and Fischer (1994). Cukierman
identifies the degree of central bank independence with the central bank's
impact on the discount rate (q)tt of the policy maker. The higher the
central bank independence, the larger will be the impact of the central
bank's lower degree of time preference in actual policy.
Having a one shot game following Rogoff (1985) we define central bank
independence as the additional weight placed on inflation stabilization. Note
that if d2 - 0 equation (4.10) reduces to the social loss function (4.9) and
we obtain the results under the fully discretionary regime.
III.2 Time Consistent Inflation Policy
Following Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 204) we start with a cooperative game,
i.e. we assume that the natural rate of unemployment is efficient. In the
context of the model of Section II.1, this can be represented by the
assumption that 1, the target employment level of wage-setters is equal to
ls, the effective labour force. In the latter case the central bank has no
incentive to try and reduce unemployment below its equilibrium rate. As
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[here is no conflict between the unemployment targets of wage setters and
the central bank, the policy game can be seen as a cooperative one.t2
This state of affairs is summarized in the first column of Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Policy games and unemployment targets





u~` - 0 u~` - u u~ G u
Natural rate Efficient Inefficient
Polic ame Cooperative Non-cooperative
We now turn to the second column of Table 4.1, i.e. the situation where
the equilibrium unemployment rate is inefficiently high. In what follows we
show that then the equilibrium inflation rate becomes proportional to the
natural rate of unemployment. In this case discretionary monetary policy is
no longer a Pareto-equilibrium, due to the time-inconsistency of optimal
monetary policy. Assuming that 1 G 1S i.e. that u 7 0 the central bank has
incentives to systematically create inflation in order to reduce
unemployment below its natural rate.
Substituting the Phillips curve (4.8) in the loss function (4.10) yields
It -(1 t d2) ! 2(Opt)2 t~[u - 1 1 R Ap~ t 1 1~ Ec -1 OPt - 1~ a ~i~2 (4.11)
From the first order conditions for a minimum of (4.11), i.e. ahl c30pt - 0,
we obtain the central bank's reaction function to wage-setter's expectations
E(1 -a) U } E
OPt -
(1 td2)(1 -a)2 tE (1 td2)(1 -a)Z tE
Et-10Pt -
e ~~. l 3
t
(1 tdz)(1 -R)2 }E
(4.12)
Taking expectations conditional on information at t- 1 of (4.12) gives
Et-1 Opt - e u (4.13)(1 td2)(1 - R)
Equation (4.13) is the reaction function of wage-setters. Upon substituting
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(4.13) in (4.12) we get
~pt - (1 td2)(1 - a)
E u - E
(1 td2)(1 - a)Z } E
vt (4.14)
Figure 4.1 shows the central bank's reaction function if vt~` - 0, i.e. the
average inflation rate as a function of the expected inflation rate.l4
E dP
t-1 t
Figure 4.1 Actual and ezpected inflation with an
inefficient natural rate
The only point at which expectations are rational is at point N, which
represents the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Denoting the average inflation rate by Op~, from (4.14) it follows that
~pt - (1 td2)(1 - Q)
u (4.15)
Hence, at point N the inflation rate is above zero (the outcome in the
cooperative case).
Subtracting (4.13) from (4.14) we obtain the following expression for
unanticipated inflation
~pt - Et-I Op~ - - E vt (4.16)(1 ta2)(1 - a)Z t E
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Upon substituting (4.16) in (4.8) we get
(1 tdz)(1 -Q) (4.17)v~`
U` - u- cl td2)(1-a)2 t E t
Equations (4.15) and ( 4.17) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal
monetary policy. The monetary policy strategy of the central bank, i.e.
equation (4.12) is time-consistent in the sense that at each point in time the
inflation rate selected is best, given the current situation. However, as can
be seen from equations (4.15) and (4.17), the resulting policy is socially
sub-optimal. It is sub-optimal since it results in an excessive level of
inflation, i.e. it produces an inflationary bias with no gains in the form of
systematic lower unemployment. This completes the description of the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium.
III.3 Results for Inflation and its Variance
Following Cukierman (1992, pp. 351-355) in this section we investigate the
effects of central bank independence on the mean and variance of inflation.
Taking the first derivative of (4.15) with respect to d2, we get
80Pt - -EU G ~ (4.18)
8d2 (1 td2)2(1 -a)
From (4.18) we derive proposition (4.1).
PROPOSITION 4.1: The more independent the central bank (the higher
d2) the lower the average inflation rate.
Proposition 4.1 is analogous to Cukierman's (1992, p. 354) proposition
18.1.
Note that the greater ll(1-Q) (that is, the greater the reduction in
unemployment from unanticipated inflation in the expectations augmented
Phillips curve (4.8)), the larger the natural rate of unemployment and the
higher society's preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to
inflation stabilization, the greater the inflation benefits of appointing
independent central bankers.
We now consider inflation variability. Taking variances of (4.14), noting
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that a~2 - 1, we get
2
Vaz Opt - e (4.19)
[(1 td2)(1 -a)2 }E]2
Taking the first derivative of (4.19) with respect to d2, we get
8(Var ~pi) -
8d2
-2(1 - a)2E2 ~ o
[(1 t d2) (1 - a)z t El3
(4.20)
From (4.20) we derive propostion 4.2:
PROPOSITION 4.2: The more independent the central bank (the higher
dZ) the lower the variance of the inflation rate.
Proposition 4.2 is analogous to Ctikierman's (1992, p. 354) proposition
18.2.
It is well known that inflation and its variance display a strong cross
sectional positive relationship. This model proposes a causal theory in which
those two variables are linked because of their common link to central bank
independence.15
To give a numerical example, with (3 being about 0.7,16 e is 1 and d2
equal to 4 we get Var Opt - 0.48. If the central bank is completely
dependent (d2 - 0), then Var Op~ - 0.84. Thus the ratio of the variance
of inflation with an independent central bank to the ratio without an
independent central bank is 0.57. This example suggests that central bank
independence may be a significant factor in explaining cross country
differences in inflation variability.
By again differentiating (4.20) with respect to d2, we find that
a2 (VarOpt) - 6(1 - a)4 EZ ) 0
8d2 [(1 t d2)(1 -Q)Z } E]4
(4.21)
Using (4.20) and (4.21) we obtain Figure 4.2.





Figure 4.2 Central bank independence and the variance
of ïnflation
This completes the description of the results on the mean and variance of
inflation.
III.4 Results for Growth and its Variance
Cukierman's (1992, pp. 349-359) analysis does not contain any propositions
about the relationship between central bank independence and (the
variability of) output growth. This is not so in the present paper.
Adding and subtracting QI(1-Q)pt-t from (4.7) yields
Yt - a 1}~`t } 1~ a(Opc - Ec-t OPt } v~t)
(4.22)
If we employ yt as short-hand for ,Q2 f~t we get
Yt - Yt - 1 a R (~pt - Ec-t~Pi } vi )
(4.23)
Equation (4.23) is the famous Lucas surprise supply function which says
that unanticipated inflation andlor productivity shocks cause transitory
deviations of output from its equilibrium (mean) level y.
Upon substituting (4.16) in (4.23) we get
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v.-v.- vw
(1 td2)a(1-a)
(1 ~-d2)íl Q)2 t E
t (4.24)
Now we move from levels to growth rates, that is we now examine the
effects of central bank independence on the growth rate of output and its
variance.
Taking first differences of (4.24) we get
(1 tdz)Q(1 - R) ~,
Dyt - Dyt - ~ vt (4.25)
(1 t d2)(1 - R)2 } E
From (4.25) we derive proposition 4.3.
PROPOSITION 4.3: The mean or average rate of growth of output is
independent from the prevailing monetary regime (d2).
Of course, this result is just a corrollary of the natural rate property of the
Alogoskoufis (1994) supply block.t~
Taking variances of (4.25) we get~g
2(1 td2)ZRZ(1 -Q)2
Var(~yt - ~yt) -
[(1 }d2)(1 - a)~ t El~
Taking the first derivative of (4.26) with respect to d2 we get
BVar(Dyt-~y~) - 4(32(1 -~i)Z(1 td2)E , 0aaz -[(1 td2)(1 -a)~ t E]
Again differentiating (4.27) with respect to d2 we find that
a2 Var(~y~ - Ayt) 4,QZ(1 -,Q)Z s [e - 2(1 - a)z (1 } d2)l




By setting [e - 2(1-~3)2 (1 fd2)] equal to zero we find a point of inflection
at
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d2 -[(E - 2(1-~i)2]l2(1-a)2. Using (4.27) and ( 4.28) we obtain Figure 4.3.
var14y~ dy,l
2~:





Figure 4.3 Ce~ttral bank independence aud the varinnce
of output growth
From Figure 4.3 we derive proposition 4.4.
PROPOSITION 4.4 The more independent the central bank (the higher dZ)
the higher the variance of output growth around the natural rate of growth.
To give a numerical example with the same parameter values as before we
get Var(~y~ - ~yt) - 1.05. If the central bank is completely dependent (d2
- 0), then Var(~yt - ~y~) - 0.07. Thus the ratio of the variance of output
growth with an independent central bank to the ratio without an independent
central bank is 15. This example suggests that central bank independence
may be a significant factor in explaining cross country differences in the
variability of real output growth.
Finally, we summarize the main propositions from this section in Table 4.2.
In order to confront these propositions with some cross-country evidence
we can now move on to empirical testing. This the subject of the next
section.
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Table 4.2 Central bank independence, growth and inflntion
Inflation Growth
Mean Variance Mean Variance
é3~p~ BVarApt atlyt aVar(Dy~-~yt)C 0 C 0 - 0
1 0ad2 8d2 8d2 8dz
IV EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE
IV.1 Central Bank Independence and the Level of Inflation
According to Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1993) and
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) countries with an independent central
bank will have a lower rate of inflation than countries with a dependent
central bank. As stated in Section I, this well-known inverse relationship
between central bank independence and the level of inflation is particularly
sensitive to the numerical values of the various indices of central bank
independence.
Furthermore, the negative correlation between central bank independence
and inflation does not necessarily imply a causal relation from central bank
independence to inflation or the other way around. The correlation could be
explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and tradition of monetary
stability in a country, leading both to an independent central bank and a low
rate of inflation.19 As an example could be taken Germany, for which
country one could argue that the hyperinflation in the 1920s caused such a
culture and tradition of monetary stability.20
However, in our opinion the degree of central bank independence is the
ultimate cause of the level of inflation. For central bank independence is the
ability and willingness to conduct an autonomous monetary policy directed
at price stability as the single policy goal. If not seriously hampered by
other elements of economic policy, such as wage increases, budget deficits
and government debt, it will eventually lead to low sustainable inflation.
Therefore, our regression analysis (OLS method) assumes the various
indices of central bank independence to be the explanatory variables of the
average inflation (CPI) on an annual base in the twelve countries considered
(Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Switserland, the UK, the US and Sweden):
(-)
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average inflation - a~ ~ at: central bank independence f E~ (4.29)
We investigated empirically the policy independence index of Bade and
Parkin (BP), the index of Alesina (AL),21 the broad index of political
independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT), the LVAU index
of Cukierman (1992, p. 382) and a new index of policy independence,
which we call the Eijffinger - Schaling (ES) index.2'` The ES-index of
central bank independence is compared with previous indices (BP, AL, and
GMT) in Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a). This cross-section analysis of the
empirical relation between these indices of central bank independence and
the level of inflation should be interpreted carefully because of the limited
degrees of freedom.
The relationship between the varions indices and average annual inflation
is analysed for the whole post-Bretton-Woods period of twenty years (1972-
1991). During the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton-Woods countries
were fully committed to an exchange rate target and had no room to
conduct and autonomous domestic monetary policy. Thus, before 1972 the
empirical relation between central bank independence and inflation was
much less straightforward than after 1972.23
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Table 4.3 Average annual ii~ation and the various iiulices of central
bank independence.
Explanatory varia- 1972-1991 1972-1981 1982-1991
bles
Constant 11.55 15.03 8.07
(6.93) (6.58) (5.53)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -1.85 -2.25 -1.45
(-2.85)~~ (-2.53)~ (-2.55)~
Adj. R~ 0.39 0.33 0.33
Constant 11.78 15.36 8.20
(8.21) (7.69) (6.30)
Alesina (AL) -1.98 -2.43 -1.53
(-3.50)~~ (-3.09)~" (-2.98)~~
Adj. R2 0.51 0.44 0.42
Constant 8.82 12.48 5.16
(5.69) (6.32) (4.01)
Grilli et.al. (GMT) -0.40 -0.85 -0.24
(Political) (-1.38) (-1.68) (-0.74)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.16 -0.05
Constant 11.01 14.38 7.65
(10.00) (9.14) (7.60)
Eijffinger-Schaling -1.43 -1.75 -1.12
(ES) (-3.96)~~ (-3.38)~~ (-3.39)~~
Adj. RZ 0.57 0.49 0.49
Constant 10.30 14.23 6.37
(7.03) (7.98) (4.53)
Cukierman (CUK) -8.65 -12.47 -4.83
(-2.41)~ (-2.86)~~ (-1.40)
Adj. RZ 0.31 0.39 0.08
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the
coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95q confidence
level and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at
a 99q confidence level.
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Furthermore, the post-Bretton-Woods period is divided in two sub-periods
of ten years each (1972-1981 and 1982-1991 respectively) in order
todistinguish between the EMS countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and partly the UK) and non-EMS countries (Australia,
Canada, Japan, Switserland, the US and Sweden). Before 1982 the EMS
countries participated - some like France, Italy and the UK only partly - in
the snake arrangement and - except the UK - in the initial orientation phase
of the EMS
(1979-1982) which was characterized by frequent and large realisments of
central rates. After 1982 a period of consolidation (1982-1987) can be
discerned within the EMS. According to Ungever (1990), this period was
marked by
`a widespread consensus to follow stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence
in the development of costs, prices and monetary aggregates, and hy long periods
without realignments of central rates' (p. 338).'-4
Consequently, during the second sub-pe.riod (1982-1991) the negative
correlation between central bank independence and inflation is expected to
be less clear cut than during the first sttb-period (1972-1981) because of the
consolidation in the EMS countries towards exchange rate stability. From
1982 the domestic monetary policy in these countries - besides Germany as
the anchor country - could have become increasingly endogenous by
focussing on the exchange rate target.
Table 4.3 shows the estimation result of equation (4.29), which explains
average annual inflation by the fottr indices of central bank independence
for the whole period (1972-1991) and for both sub-periods (1972-1981 and
1982-1991) respectively. Except for the GMT index of political indepen-
dence, the inverse relationship between inflation and central bank
independence is very clear, although the Alesina and ES index proved to be
more significant ( higher t-value) than the BP and CUK indices.25 For
Alesina, ES, and BP central bank independence is less significant (lower t-
value) during both sub-periods than during the whole post-Bretton-Woods
period.
Except for the GMT and CUK measttres, the various indices have
approximately the same significance in both the first and second sub-period,
while that in the second sub-period was expected to be lower than in the
first as a consequence of the six EMS countries within the sample of
twelve. These outcomes could be the result of the practice that most EMS
countries used fully the bilateral band of ~ 2'~ q and, for Italy and since
October 1990 the UK, the band of t6 q. Only the Netherlands and, from
1986, also France had an explicit exchange rate target for their currency
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vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark.
What may be conluded from the cross-section analysis of these twelve
countries regarding the relationship between central bank independence and
the level of inflation and the quality of the four indices of central bank
independence in particular?
Firstly, the negative relation between central bank independence and
inflation proved to be very significant for all indices, except for the GMT
index of political independence.2ó Clearly, the more independent a central
bank is, the lower rate of inflation in the long run.
Figure 4.4 shows that the BP index of policy independence has a
significant, negative relation to average annual inflation despite some
positive outliers (Italy and the UK) and some negative (Belgium and the
Netherlands). The ranking by Bade and Parkin of the latter two countries
is evidently too low.
















I 2 BP 3
4
Average inflation - 11.546 - 1.850 ~` BP (R-square - 0.4482)
t-value (6.931) (2.850)
Furthermore, from Figure 4.5 it can be seen that the Alesina `index' has
a more significant, negative relation to inflation, merely by the ad hoc
adjusted ranking of Italy.
However, Figure 4.6 shows that the GMT index bears no clear (negative)
relation to inflation in most of the eleven countries considered. This could
be explained by the broadness of the GMT index comprising many features
(see Eijffinger and Schaling (1992)). This index, thereby, waters down the
essential features of policy independence, i.e. 1. the procedures for
appointing the central bank board, 2. the relationship between, the central
bank and government concerning the formulation of monetary policy, and
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Average inflation - 11.778 - 1.981 ~` AL ( R-square - 0.5507)
t-value (8.205) (3.501)
























Average inflation - 8.822 - 0.395 ~` GMT (R-square - 0.1746)
t-value (5.686) (1.380)
3. the policy goals of the central bank regarding monetary policy making.
Figure 4.7 shows that the ES index has an even more significant, negative
relation to inflation, although the positive outliers (Italy and the UK)
remain.This could, perhaps, be explained by the half-fledged position of
these countries with respect to the EMS. Nevertheless, the negative otltliers
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Average inflation - 11.014 - 1.433 ~` ES (R-square - 0.6100)
t-value (9.998) (3.955)
the more consistent ranking of both countries according to their central bank
laws within the context of monetary policy making.
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Finally, Figure 4.8 shows the CUK index and the level of inflation.
Consequently, empirical evidence on the various indices of central bank
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independence supports proposition 4.l (see Section III.3) that the more
inde~endent the central bank (the higher d2), the lower the average inflation
rate. ~
Of course, one should be well aware of the more or less subjective
character of the research on central bank independence, which combines
both legal-institutional and political-economic criteria and features in
constructing indices.
IV.2 Central Bank Independence and the Variability of Inflation
The variability of inflation reflects the degree of monetary and inflationary
uncertainty in the economy.
Inflationary uncertainty implies that investers are not sure about the
expected (ex ante) future level of inflation and, hence, about expected (ex
ante) real interest rates. Therefore, they are less willing to take risks and to
invest in either long-term financial assets or physical capital goods. As a
consequence lenders demand a higher risk premium on their funds.28
Thus, highcr inflationary uncertainty - measured by the variability of
realized inflation - will lead to higher expected real interest rates and to
lower levels of investment and output growth.
What is the empirical relationship between central bank independence and
the variability of inflation?
First of all, the variability of inflation is positively correlated with the
level of inflation and, thereby, with the independence of central banks.
Chowdhury (1991) investigated empirically the relation between the level
and variability of inflation in 66 countries for the period from 1955 to 1985.
He concluded that there is a significant, positive correlation between the
level and the variability of inflation during this period. De Haan and Sturm
(1992) also examined this relation in 18 industrial countries for the period
from 1961 to 1987. They found a clear, positive correlation between both
variablesforthepost-Bretton-Woodssub-periods 1970-1978and 1979-1987,
but not for the sub-period 1961-1969. Consequently, if a high degree of
central bank independence results in a low level of inflation, this should also
lead to a low variability of inflation. Nevertheless, the negative correlation
between independence and inflation variability does not necessarily imply
a causal relation from the first to the latter, but could be explained by a
third factor. However, our regression analysis assumes the various indices
of central bank independence (BP, AL, GMT, CUK and ES) to be the
explanatory variables of the variance of monthly inflation (CPI) on an
annual base in the twelve countries of our sample:
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(-)
variance inflation - bp f bt~ central bank independence f rlt (4.30)
Again, the relationship between the various indices and the variance of
monthly inflation is examined for the complete post-Bretton-Woods period
of twenty years (1972-1991) and its two sub-periods of ten years (1972-
1981 and 1982-1991). During the second sub-period the negative correlation
between central bank independence and inflation variability is also expected
to be less clear cu[ than during the first sub-period by the consolidation of
EMS countries to exchange rate stability.
Table 4.4 Variance monthl~ inflation and the various indices of centra!
bnnkindenendence.
Ex lanator variables 1972-1991 1972-1981 1982-1991
Constant 0.33 0.29 0.21
(1.34) (0.75) (2.45)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -0.01 0.03 -0.02
(-0.07) (0.23) (-0.68)
Ad'. RZ -0.10 -0.10 -0.05
Constant 0.33 0.30 0.21
(1.42) (0.81) (2.46)
Alesina (AL) -0.01 0.03 -0.02
(-0.09) (0.2 I ) (-0.61)
Ad'. R2 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06
Constant 0.58 0.77 0.22
('3.74) (3.00) (5.93)
Grilli et.al. (GMT) -0.08 -0.12 -0.02
~(Political) (-2.04)' (-1.80) (-2.48)
Ad'. R2 0.24 0.18 0.34
Constant 0.39 0.42 0.22
(2.07) (1.39) (3.24)
Eijffinger-Schaling -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(ES) (-0.47) (-0.18) (-0.98)
Ad'. R2 -0.08 -0.10 -0.00
Constant 0.63 0.82 0.26
(3.78) (2.96) (4.05)
Cukierman (CUK) -0.85 -1.20 -0.27
(-2.10)~ (-1.77) (-1.74)
Adj. R2 0.24 0.16 0.16
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Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the
coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95 qo confidence
level and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at
a 99 q confidence level.
Table 4.4 shows the outcomes of equation (4.30) explaining the variance of
monthly inflation by the four independence indices. The inverse relationship
between inflation variability and central bank independence is only
significant for the CUK and GMT indices, for the latter index especially for
the second sub-period (!).29 Generally, the indices do not support,
proposition 4.2 that the more independent the central bank (the higher d2),
the lower the variance of the inflation rate.
IV.3 Central Bank Independence and the Level of Output Growth
Given the inverse relationship between central bank independence and the
level of inflation - see Section IV.1 - one could argue that the expected (ex
ante) level of inflation influences expected (ex ante) real interest rates and,
thereby, the level of output growth according to the Mundell-Tobin effect.
A rise in expected inflation will lead - by Mundell (1963) - to substitution
of liquid assets by long-term financial assets and - according to Tobin
(1965) - to substitution of liquid assets by physical capital goods, lowering
the marginal efficiency of capital, and will result in a decrease of expected
real interest rates. Thus, more independent central banks will mitigate
inflationary expectations inducing higher expected real interest rates and
lower levels of investment and output growth.30
However, proposition 4.3 (in Section III.4) states that the mean or average
rate of growth of output is independent from [he prevailing monetary regime
(dz). Therefore, our regression analysis assumes the four indices of central
bank independence (BP, AL, GMT, CUK and ES) to be the explanatory
variables of average output growth (volume of GDP) on an annual base,
without postulating an expected sign for these variables:
average output growth - cOfct~ central bank independence f s9t (4.31)
Again, we examined the relationship between the various indices and level
of real output growth for the post-Bretton-Woods period ( 1972-1990) and
its two sub-periods (1972-1981 and 1982-1990).
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results of equation (4.31). The relationship
between real output growth and central bank independence proves to be
insignificant, except for the ES and CUK indices in the first sub-period. The
BP and AL index also have higher t-values for the first sub-period than for
130 ~nstitutron.r and Monetury Policy
the second.31
Table 4. S Average annual output growth and the various indices of
centra! bank independence.
Ex lanator variables 1972-1990 1972-1981 1982-1990
Constant 3.04 3.46 2.58
(4.56) (4.19) (4.43)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -0.16 -0.37 0.06
(-0.63) (-1.14) (0.27)
Ad'. R2 -0.06 0.03 -0.09
Constant 3.06 3.15 2.57
(4.84) (4.53) (4.63)
Alesina (AL) -0.18 -0.40 0.07
(-0.71) (-1.30) (0.30)
Ad'. R2 -0.05 0.06 -0.09
Constant 3.15 3.11 3.20
(6.65) (4.90) (8.05)
Grilli et.al. (GMT) -0.13 -0.14 -0.12
(Political) (-1.07) (-0.85) (-1.20)
Ad'. RZ 0.02 -0.03 0.04





(ES) (-1.42) (-2.00) (-0.36)
Adj. RZ 0.08 0.21 -0.09
Constant 3.38 3.60 3.14
(6.83) (5.76) (6.87)
Cukierman (CUK) -1.98 -2.77 -1.12
(-1.63) (-1.81)~ (-1.00)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.17 0.00
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the
coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95 qo confidence
level and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at
a 99q confidence level.
These outcomes could be explained by relatively more restrictive monetary
policies by independent central banks during the late 1970s - the hey-days
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of monetary targeting - which resulted in a lower level of economic growth.
In general, empirical evidence on the various indices dces support
proposition 4.3 stating that there is no relation between central bank
independence and average real output growth.32 In other words, although
a high degree of central bank independence is associated with a low level
of inflation in the long run, it has no large costs or benefits in terms of real
economic growth. Thus, in countries with an independent central bank no
trade off can be found between inflation on the one hand and economic
growth on the other hand in the long term.33
IV.4 Central Bank Independence and the Variability of Output Growth
What is the relationship between the degree of central bank independence
and the variability of real output growth? According to Rogoff (1985)
independent central banks purchase a lower level of inflation at the price of
a higher variability of real economic growth. By relying more on rules
rather than discretion in policy making they tolerate more cyclical
variability of economic growth. Consequently, Rogoff s conclusion
corresponds very well with our proposition 4.4 (see Section III.4) stating
that the more independent the central bank - the higher d2 - is, the higher
the variance of the growth rate of output around the natural rate.
Again, our regression analysis assumes the various independence indices
(BP, AL, GMT, CUK and ES) to be the explanatory variables of the
variance of monthly output growth (volume of GDP) on an annual base,
postulating a positive sign for these variables:
(f)
variance output growth - d~fdt,~ central bank independence f Kt(4.32)
The coefficient for the BP and AL index do not have the expected, positive
sign in any sample period. Besides, none of the coefficients appears to be
significantly different from zero. The t-values prove to be the highest for
the GMT index.34 These estirnation results imply, of course, that a higher
degree of central bank independence does not lead to more variability of
real economic growth, rejecting proposition 4.4 quite dearly.
Therefore, having an independent central bank does not result in more
variable inflation (see Section IV.2) nor in more variable economic growth
in the short term. So, inflation-averse central banks do not trigger off
recessions nor do politically sensitive central banks avoid recessions.
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Table 4.6 Variance monthly output growth and the various indices of
central bank independence.
Explanatory varia- 1972-1990 1972-1981 1982-1990
bles
Constant 1.81 2.90 0.98
(2.90) (2.04) (2.62)
Bade-Parkin (BP) -0.23 -0.42 -0.11
(-0.95) (-0.76) (-0.78)
Ad'. R2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
Constant 1.73 2.78 0.90
(2.88) (2.04) (2.47)
Alesina (AL) -0.20 -0.38 -0.08
(-0.85) (-0.70) (-0.56)
Ad'. R2 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07
Constant 0.78 0.89 0.41
(1.75) (0.84) (1.63)
Grilli et.al. (GMT) 0.11 0.27 0.07
(Political) (0.10) (0.98) (1.11)
Ad'. R2 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
Constant 1.20 1.38 0.84
(2.35) (1.21) (2.80)
Eijffinger-Schaling 0.02 0.19 -0.05
(ES) (0.10) (0.50) (-0.50)
Ad'. RZ -0.10 -0.07 -0.07
Constant 1.21 1.84 0.56
(2.26) (1.53) (1.79)
Cukierman (CUK) 0.12 0.13 0.39
(0.09) (0.04) (0.51)
Ad'. RZ -0.10 -0.10 -0.07
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the
ccefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95qo confidence
level and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at
a 99 qo confidence level.
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IV.S Conclusion
The main conclusions of this theoretical and empirical analysis of central
bank independence with respect to the level and variability of inflation and
economic growth are the following.
First of all, both our model and estimation results, give further support to
the well-known inverse relationship between the degree of central bank
independence and the level of inflation found by e.g. Alesina (1988, 1989)
and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). However, it should be
emphasized that these results are particularly sensitive to the numerical
values of indices. For example, the CUK and GMT index shows no clear
inverse relation to inflation, whereas the ES index proves to have a very
significant, negative relation.
Secondly, contrary to CUK, Alesina and Summers (1993) we find no
empirical evidence - except for the CUK and GMT indices - supporting our
proposition that the more independent the central bank is, the lower the
variability of inflation.
Thirdly, according to our proposition thak the level of economic growth
does not depend on the prevailing monetary regitne, no relationship can be
found between central bank independence and the level of real output
growth in the long run. Our interpretation of this outcome is that the
attainment and maintenance of low inflation by an independent central bank
is not accompanied by large costs or benefits in terms of sustainable
economic growth. The absence of a long-run trade off between inflation and
growth implies that the establishment of central bank independence in
countries, which did not use to have this, is a free lttnch.
Fourthly and finally, our estimation results reject clearly the proposition
of a positive relation between independence and the variability of real output
growth. An independent central bank does not lead to more variable
economic growth in the short run. In other words, inflation-averse central
banks do not bear the costs of triggering recessions nor do politically
sensitive central banks reap the benefits of avoiding recessions.
NOTES
I. For a survey of the 'state of the art' see Cukierman (1992).
2. This framework is summarized in Alesina and Grilli (1992).
3. For the terminology see Chapter 2, Section VIII.
4. For a variable X say,x- d P n)C
5. We discuss the impact of demand shocks in Section III.
6. The advantages of this approach will hecome clear in Section III?.
7. Alternatively, the loss-function could be assumacl quadratic in both the deviations of
employment and the real wa~e from certain tar~~et levels. For xn analysis along these lines
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see Funke (1994).
8. Actual output and employment will eyual their natural rates when all expectations are
fulfilled. Hence, the natural rate of employment equals Í and the na[ural rate of output is
Qe t W~-
9. Depending on operating procedures the policymaker sats the monay stock or the interest
rate. However, it is simpler to think of the central bank to choose inflation directly. For
a lucid exposition of monetary policy games with the money stock as policy instrument see
Canwneri and Henderson (1991).
10. Remember from Chapter 3 that centrxl banks in which the only or main policy goal (as
specified in the law) is price stability are classified as more independent than central banks
with a number of objectives in addition to price stability or banks in whose law price
stability is not mentioned as an objective at all.
1I. For models with reputational effacts see chapter 2 Sections VIL3 and VIII.
12. For a review of some important concepts of game theory see Blackbum and
Christensen (1989).
13. Demand shocks can be includad in the analysis by extending thz model with an
aggregate-demand curva. This would complicate the algehra without affecting our
results.
14. This figure is based on a similar one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 597).
15. See also Cukierman (1992), Chapter 18.
16. The value of ,Q is taken from Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 211).
17. For instance, introducin~ multiperiod wage contracts [Fischer (19776)], would imply policy
non-neutrality. In the latter case the decrea of central bank independence would show an
inverse relation with the level of output.
18. Stric~ly speaking we are oomputing Var (~yt - Dyt)!a'-oN where a'-o~ - Var Avt~ - a~2
t ó . With a'- - ó - 1 wz get (4.2G).
19. Accó~d~ng to thé CommSs~ion of the European Communities (1990 p. 98) the causal
relation implied by their regression analysis runs from inflation to central bank
independence. This is certainly incorrect.
20. See Bresciani-Turroni (1953).
21. In Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) we show that the Alesina (1988, 1989) synthetic
indicator of central bank independence is intemally inconsistent and does not qualify
as an index.
22. ln the case of the GMT indzx, therz is no rankino for Sweden and so the sample is only
made up of eleven countries.
23. Regression analysis by De Haan and Sturm (1992, pp.308-309) empirically supports this
view.
24. Ungerer (1990) makes a distinction hetween three phases of development of the EMS: the
ftrst phase (1979-1982) as a period of initial orientation, the second phase (1982-1987) as
a period of consolidation and the third phase (1987-present) as a period of re-examination,
in the light of uneasiness about the 'a,ymmatry' of the system.
25. De Haan and Sturm (1992) find different empirical results for a modified GMT index,
measuring both political and economic independence 'except for the entries which are
related to supervision of the bankin~ system. Whether or not a central bank has any
responsibility for bank supervision provides, in our view, no infortnation as to its
independence' (p. 323).
26. This is a conseyuence of thz 'broadness' of thz GMT-index. Because GMT use eight
criteria in determining the Jagree of political independence, the essential characteristics of
central bank independence are watered down. See Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, pp. 11-
12).
27. Cukierman (1993, p. 278) points out that no similer reletionship between inflation and legal
independence emarges in LDC's. However in LDC's there is a strong positive association
between inflation and the turn over ratz (inverse of tenure) of the central bank govemor.
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See Cukierman (1992) Chapter 19 and Cukizrman, Wzbb and Nzyapti (1992).
28. Empirical research with rzspzct to the intluzncz of monetary and intlationary uncertainty
on rzal interzst rates in thz Unitzd States is conductzd by Mascaro and Meltzer (1983).
They conclude that monetary unczrtainty - mzasured by thz variahility of money growth -
resulted in a risk premium for both thz money and capital market interzst ratz in thz
period from October 1979.
29. Our estimation rzsults for thz BP indzx are according with Badz and Pankin (1988).
However, they contradict the findings of Alzsina and Summars (1993) who avzragzd the
Alesina index and thz GMT index of politicxl and zconomic indepzndznce.
30. Nevzrthelzss, in thaory it could ha argued that a hi~her dzgrzz of czntral bank
indzpendence rzsults in lower inflationary uncertainty IeadinL to a decreasz of expzctzd real
intzrest rates and, thzreby, to an incrzasz of invzstment and output growth. Empirical
evidence in sub-section 4.2 rejects the first link of this transmission mzchanism.
31. These estimation results for thz AL and ES index correspond with Dz Haan and Sturm.
They are also in accordancz with Alzsíne and Summzrs (1993) and De Long and Summzrs
(1992) for their 'single overall indax' based on an averagz of the Alzsina and GMT
political and economic indepzndznce indzx. It should be noticed that Dz Long and Summers
(1992) find, howevzr, a positive rzlationship bztwrzn central bxnk indzpendznce and
economic growth, controlling for initial GDP pzr worku Izvzls (szz in this rzspect Ihzir
chart 6 on p. 16).
32. Cukierman (1993, p. 284) points out that sincz zquation (4.31) does not control for other
determinants of growth, this finding may reFlzct an omittzd variahlzs hias rather than a lack
of association betwezn growth and central hank indzpzndence.
33. Cukierman (1993, p. 284) reports that when similar expzriments arz repzatzd for LDC's,
again, no association is found bztwezn legnl indapendznce and growth. Using several
behavioural measures of central bank indzpendencz like the tumover rate and controllíng
for other determinants of growth Cukiennan, Kalaitzidakis, Summzrs, and Webb (1993)
find a cereris pnribus positive association be[wzzn growth and czntral bank indepzndencz.
34. Our empirical evidznce for thz AL and ES index is in accordancz with that of De Haan and
Sturm (1992). Alesina and Summzrs (1993) and Dz Long and Summers (1992) also find
for their averaged Alesina-GMT indzx no support with rzspect to the rzlation bztween
indepzndence and the variahility of output browth. The same holds for its relationship
regarding the averagz and variancz of unemployment ratzs.
5. Central Bank Independence, Mone-
tary Accommodation and Inflation
Persistence
I INTRODUCTION
According to Cukierman ( 1992) for a closed economy the inflationary
bias of discretionary monetary policy may be explained by two
arguments. The first argument, the employment motivate for monetary
expansion, is based on the assumption that political forces in democratic
societies may be tempted to trade price stability for temporary decreases
in unemployment. This motive underlies the model of Chapter 4. The
second argument, the revenue motive for monetary expansion, focuses on
the risk of the government exploiting the central bank's capacity to create
seigniorage to finance expenditure that the government is unwilling to
finance out of current or future taxation.
In a recen[ study Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini ( 1991) (GMT)
associate the employment and revenue motives for monetary expansion
with separate components of central bank independence.
They compare the monetary regimes of eighteen industrial countries
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) during the post-
war period by focusing on political and economic independence of the
central bank.
According to GMT, political independence is the capacity to choose
the final goals of monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of
economic activity. Hence this concept is associated with the subjective
tradeoffs of the central bank and of political authorities between price
stability and other goals such as high employment. t
On the other hand, GMT identify economic independence with the
nature of the monetary instruments imder the control of the central bank
(such as the discount rate or the ability to conduct open market operati-
ons) and with the influence of the government in determining how much
to borrow from the central bank. They point out that if the govermnent
can influence the quantity and the conditions at which it borrows from
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the central bank, it also inFluences the creation of the monetary base.
Hence, the greater the government influence on the monetary finan-
cing of the budget deficit, the smaller the economic independence of the
central bank.2
This latter aspect of the domestic monetary regime seems particularly
relevant for less developed countries with poorly developed financial
markets. For instance, in the 1980s monetary financing of budget deficits
was common practice in Southern-European countries like Italy, Gree-
ce, Portugal and Spain. This had much to do with the less-developed
financial markets in the `olive-belt'. See De Grauwe and Papademos
(1990) and Eijffinger and Gerards (1991). For an up to date survey on
the practice of central bank credit to the government see Cottarelli
(1993).
GMT establish an index of economic independence which is then
compared with the average inflation rate over the period 1950-1989.
For the period of the study e.g. West Germany, Switzerland, the U.S.
and Austria were associated with high economic independence whilst the
central banks of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain indeed had very little
economic independence. By and large, the greater the economic indepen-
dence of the central bank the lower the average inflation rate. Thus GMT
find empirical evidence that the domestic monetary regime matters for the
average inflation rate.
Moreover, as noted by Cukierman (1992, p. 273) inflation is usually a
fairly persistent process, i.e. if inflation becomes unusually high, it dces
not quickly revert to its earlier level, and the same is true if it becomes
abnormally low. Recent research by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and
by Alogoskoufis (1992) demonstrates that fixed exchange-rate regimes
like the international gold standard and the Bretton-Woods gold dollar
standard appear to be associated with negligible persistence of inflation,
while regimes of managed exchange rates are associated with very high
inflation persistence. They propose that the higher inflation persistence is
the result of the higher monetary and exchange-rate accommodation of
price changes in flexible exchange-rate regimes. Hence, Alogoskoufis
and Smith find empirical evidence that exchange-rate regimes matter for
the persistence of inflation.
In this Chapter we demonstrate that low inflation persistence may also
be achieved by setting up central banks that are independent from
government influence on monetary financing of budget deficits. Hence
we provide theoretical arguments that the domestic monetary regime
matters for the persistence of inflation. We use an expectations-augmen-
ted Phillips curve model with a government budget constraint to suggest
that the lower inflation persistence is the result of lower monetary
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accommodation of government budget deficits.
The Chapter is organized into four remaining sections, followed by an
appendix. In Section II we introduce the government budget constraint.
In Section III we incorporate this constraint into a simple IS-LM based
macromodel with a Lucas surprise supply function. By equating the
aggregate demand and supply schedules, in Section IV we derive a closed
form solution for expected inflation. From this solution we derive an
inverse relationship between the degree of economic independence and
the persistence of inflation. That is, an increase in the degree of econo-
mic independence of the central bank will result in a decrease in the
degree of persistence of inflation. A summary and questions for further
research can be found in Section V. The appendix provides the intuition
behind the stability properties of the model.
II THE DYNAMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUD-
GET CONSTRAINT
In this section we introduce the government budget constraint that links
monetary and fiscal policy. We show that the fraction of the budget
deficit financed by money is identical to the degree of fiscal dominance,
i.e. the extent to which the burden of satisfying the government's budget
constraint falls on the central bank. Conversely, it is shown that the
degree of monetary dominance, i.e the extent to which the burden of
satisfying the government budget constraint falls on the treasury, may be
interpreted as the economic independence of the central bank.
II.1 Monetary versus Bond Financing
In order to simplify the algebra at a later stage of the analysis we abs-
tract from interest payments on government bonds.3 Under these as-
sump[ions the consolidated government-central bank period-by-period
(flow) budget constraint is
OMi t ( OB)t - G` (5.1)
This difference equation asserts that the primary nominal budget
deficit G must be financed either by creating money ~M, or by selling
bonds to the private sector.
B is the number of outstandinQ bonds which have infinite lives (perpetui-
ties) paying one-unit coupon.a Hence the market value of the stock of
bonds will be (Bli)~, where i is the interest rate.
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Note that the bond term on the lefthandside of the government budget
constraint is the change in the market value of the stock of bonds inclu-
ding capital gains or losses on pre-existing bonds. As shown by e.g.
Stevenson et al. (1988, pp. 7-8) such interest rate valuation effects on the
bond stock can be argued to have a certain macroeconomic significance.
However, in this paper such valuation effects have no critical role to play
and for the remainder of the analysis, we shall assume, for simplicity,
that the value of the bond stock is unaffected by interest rate changes,
and can be measured by
B~
-, that is, the number of bonds evaluated at a constant interest rate.
io
Taking account of these considerations we can rewrite the government
budget constraint as
oM~ t oB` - G~ (5.2)
~0
Equation (5.2) is similar to Turnovsky's (1977, p. 70) treatment of the
early theory of the government budget constraint. This theory was
pioneered by Christ (1967, 1968) and subsequently developed by e.g.
Blinder and Solow (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Buiter
(1988).5
Introducing F for nominal financial wealth and normalizing i0 at unity,
(5.2) can be rewritten as the system6
oF~ - G~ (5.3)
Fi - Mi f B~ (5.4)
Log-linearizing (5.3) and (5.4) around a path of steady growth yields
~ f~ - 1' (gc t Pc) (5.5)
fi -(1 -~o)m~ f~ob~ 0 G~~ G 1 (5.6)
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady
growth values,~ ry is the steady growth rate (of all variables) on the




Thus f is nominal financial wealth, g the real primary deficit (net of
interest payments), p the price level, m the nominal money stock, and b
the nominal stock of private bonds (all measured as logarithmic deviati-
ons from steady grow[h values). 0 is the quasi first difference operator
[(1 f y) - L] and L is the backward shift (lag) operator.g
Upon substituting (5.6) in (5.5) and some rearrangement we get the
log-linear version of the government budget flow constraint (i.e. equation
(5.2))
`~0 5.70m~ - ypc - 1 y~ gt - 1 - ~p (~b~ - ypc)
( )
0 0
According to (5.7) given the price level (p), the authorities (i.e. the
treasury and the central bank) have three policy variables private bond
sales (0b), monetary policy (~m) and fiscal policy (g). Any two of these
policy variables can be chosen independently. Thus, given the price level
and bond sales to the public, pm and g are interdependent. The extent to
which (5.7) binds pm given g or vice versa, depends on the way fiscal
and monetary policies are coordinated.
In order to make this more transparent we introduce the concept of
monetary seigniorage (e.g. Klein and Neumann 1990, p. 211).
S - oM~ (5.8)c P
c
This concept is widely used in empirical research and measures the
wealth transfer which the private sector has to make in order to receive
base money from the central bank.9
Likewise log-linearizing (5.8) yields
si - I 0 mi - pi (5.9)
ti
Substituting (5.9) in the government budget constraint (5.7) we end up
with
st - 1 1~o gt - 1~o~o (~,~bc - pi) (5.10)
Equation (5.10) emphasizes the interdependence of seigniorage revenues
(s) and the fiscal deficit (g) given real private bond sales.
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IL2 Coordination of i~lonetary and Fiscal Policy
Following Sargent and Wallace (1984, p. 16)~~ we consider two forms
of monetary and fiscal policy coordination. On the one hand, imagine
that monetary policy dominates fiscal policy. Under this coordination
scheme, at time t say, the central bank sets monetary policy by choosing
mt. By doing this - given the predetermined money supply at t- 1 and
the price level at time t- the central bank determines the amount of
revenue it will supply the treasury through monetary seignoirage st.
Hence if monetary policy dominates fiscal policy, the central bank
determines the left hand side of equation (5.10). The treasury then faces
the constraints imposed by the private sector demand for bonds bt, since
it must set its deficit g~ so that it can be financed by a combination of the
seigniorage determined by the central bank and bond sales to the pu-
blic. l t
On the other hand, imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary
policy. The treasury sets its deficit gt. Under this second coordination
scheme the central bank faces the constraints imposed by the private
sector demand for government bonds for it must finance with seigniorage
any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the treasury and the
amount of bonds bt that can be sold to the public. Sargent and Wallace
point out that although a centra] bank might still be able to control
inflation permanently, it is less powerfull than a central bank under the
first coordination scheme. For if the treasury's deficit cannot be financed
solely by new private bond sales, then the central bank is forced towards
monetary accommodation of the government budget deficit. That is, the
central bank has to absorb the excess supply of treasury bills in exchange
for high-powered money.
Suppose that private bond sales are governed by
oB~ - d3 Gt 0 ~ d3 ~ 1 (5.11)
Equation (5.11) asserts that a fraction d3 of the nominal budget deficit is
financed by private bond sales, and that the remaining (1 - d3) is finan-
ced by `printing' money.t2
Likewise log-linearizing (5.11) yields
~b~ - d3~ (g~ ~ P~) (5.12)~o
Substitution of (5.12) into (5.7) yields
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1 d( - 3)y
Om~ - 1 ~ (gc t Pc)
0
(5.13)
Equation (5.13) consists of the lagged money supply, and an accom-
modation ccefficient (1 - d3) describing the extent to which the money
supply accommodates changes in nominal budget deficits. This equation
is analogous to Alogoskoufis' (1992, p. 463) parametrization of the
international reserve regime.l3
Hence, the greater the economic independence of the central bank the
lower the degree of monetary accommodation (1 - d3). Conversely, d3
may be interpreted as an institutional parameter reflecting the degree of
monetary dominance, i.e. the extent to which the burden of satisfying the
government's budget constraint falls on the fiscal authorities [see Tabelli-
ni (1988a), Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988)].
From equation (5.13) it can be seen that if the central bank is comple-
tely dependent (if d3 - 0) money growth is completely determined by
the nominal deficit. Hence, fiscal policy completely dominates monetary
policy. On the other hand, if the central bank is completely independent
(if d3 - 1) money growth is equal to zero. Hence, monetary policy
completely dominates fiscal policy.
To summarize, in equation (5.11) the fraction of the budget deficit that
is financed by private bond sales d3 is identical to the degree of monetary
dominance, which in turn reflects GMT's concept of the economic
independence of the central bank.14 The greater d3, the greater the
economic independence of the central bank. This concludes the section
on the governement buget constraint. We turn next to the description of
the macromodel.
III A SIMPLE MACROECONOMIC MODEL
In this Section we introduce the government budget constraint (GBC) into
a simple IS-LM based macromodel.
IIL1 The Demand Side
The IS and LM schedules are given by (5.14) and (5.15)
Y~ - S~ - ai(i~ - E~P~.1 t P~) a~ 7 0 (5.14)
tnr - p~ - y~ - az i~ az 1 0 (5.15)
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Equation (5.14) is the savings-investment balance condition. y is the
log of aggregate demand, i is the nominal interest rate and E(.) is the
operator of rational expectations. Equation (5.15) is the money market
equilibrium condition (LM curve).15 a2 is the interest rate semi-elasti-
city of money demand.
The IS-LM model is essentially a two-asset portfoliomodel comprising
money and bonds. From Walras' law the bonds market equilibrium
condition is redundant. However, by substituting equation (5.15) in the
definition of financial wealth, i.e. equation (5.6), and after some rearran-
gement we obtain the following expression for the real private sector
demand for bonds. t6
bt - Pt - aZ(1 ~o) it - 1-~o Yt } 1(fc-pc) 0 G~~ G 1 (5.16)
s~o ~0 ~o
Hence, the real private sector demand for bonds depends positively on
the nominal interest rate and on real financial wealth and negatively on
aggregate demand. Note that by vitue of the derivation of the demand for
bonds equation, the elasticities of the asset demand system (5.15) -
(5.16) satisfy the familiar adding-up constraints.
Elimination of the nominal interest rate from (5.14) and (5.15) and
setting E~~p~~ t- 0 givesl~
y~ - al(mt - p~) } aZ gr where al - a~ and o2 - aZ (5.17)alta, a~ta2
From (5.18) it can be seen that the relative effectiveness of monetary
and fiscal policy depends on the ratio
Ql al 18
az - a2
Combining the GBC, i.e. equation (5.13) with (5.16) yields the aggre-
gate demand schedule:
1 d a0yt -( i 3 1 ry(g~ t Pc) t Q2 Ogc - ~~ ~P~ (5.18)
- wo
This is a first order difference equation. Hence if we compare equati-
ons (5.18) and (5.17) it becomes immediately clear that the GBC imposes
a dynamic structure on the static IS-LM framework. This completes the
description of the demand side of the model.
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IIL2 The Supply Side
So far the price level was assumed to be exogenous. Now we introduce a
simple supply block. Output is being explained by a Lucas surprise
supply function. Since we employ one-period wage contracts policy
invariance holds; i.e. output and unemployment never systematically
deviate from their natural rates.
Alternatively, we could adopt a staggered contracts specification
[Fischer (1977b), Calvo ( 1983)]. However a short-run Phillips curve
trade-off - i.e. destruction of the Sargent and Wallace (1975) policy
invariance result - is not a necessary condition for the results of this
paper. Therefore we abstract from overlapping wage contracts. Again,
this has the additional advantage of simplifying expectational dynamics in
a later stage of the analysis. t9
Denoting the average output level by y, we assume
Yt - Y f 1 a a(Pt - Et-tpc)20 0 G(3 G 1 (5.19)
Equation (5.19) is the famous Lucas (1973) surprise supply function.
Unanticipated rises in inflation causes output to exhibit transitory deviati-
ons from its equilibrium or natural rate y. Q is the production elasticity
of labour.21 This completes the description of the model.
IV CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLA-
TION PERSISTENCE
In this section by equating the aggregate demand and supply schedules
we derive a closed form solution for expected inflation. Frotn this
solution we derive an inverse relationship between the degree of econo-
mic independence and the persistence of inflation. That is, an increase in
the degree of economic independence of the central bank reduces inflati-
on persistence.
IV.1 A Closed Form Solution for Expected Inflation
In order to derive an expression for the price level we eliminate yt
from equations (5.18) and (5.19) By usinQ the lag operator (L) on (5.19)
and noting that L Et-1 pt - pc-1 `ve get~
Yt-1 - Y (5 .20)
Substituting (5.19) and (5.20) in (5.18) yields
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Pt - a2 pc-1 -1- a3 Et- t Pc } aa zC
(5.21)
where the reduced form parameters aZ, a3 and a4 obtained from the
structural parameters are defined as
a2-[(1 - Q)(1 - ~PO)a~y t]aa
a3 - LQ(1 -rPp)(1 t y)1' t]a4
aa - ~a(1 - ~PO)(1 t y)Y t t (1 - a)Qt{(1 - ~Pp)(1 } y)Y ~ - (1 - d3)}J-1
and
Zi - (1 - Q)[at(1 - dg)gc t (1 - ~p) {aZy ~~gt - Y}~
The latter expression only consist of exogenous variables and shocks.
Equation (5.21) is a first-order expectational difference equation which
can be solved rather easily. Taking expectations conditional on informati-
on at the end of t- 1 of (5.21) we get
Ec-tP~ - 1 a2a Pt-1 t 1 aaa Ec-lzc- 3 - 3
Using ~ as short-hand for a2l(1 - a3), using the definition
taking first differences equation (5.22) can be rewritten as
~y Ec-10z~Ei-t ~Pt -), ~pi-t -(1 - R) (1 - wo) al
In order to obtain a closed form solution for expected inflation we
need to make assumptions about the exogenous components that make up
z.
Following Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991, p.1266) we assume that this
component, i.e. the budget deficit g, is a random walk with drift
gc-gtgc-t tv~
vta .~. N(p, ag2) (5.24)
where g is the average (or expected) rate of growth of the real deficit,
and vig is a white-noise shock.
From equation (5.24) it follows that
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Ogc - g t vg (5.25)
and
~gc-1 - g } vcg-1
Using (5.25) and (5.26) and noting that ~'y - 0 expectations of
changes in z are given by
Ec-i~zc - ( 1 - a)[{at(1 -d3) t ( 1 -~po) oz}g - y- 1(1 -~PO)a2 vg tl (5.27)
Substituting (5.27) in (5.23) we obtain the following closed form
solution for expected inflation
~
Fc-1~Pc -~` ~pt-1 t Q(z t~zc-1)
1
where Z- y [~1(1 - d3) }(1 -~o)a~] g is the drift of the composite z
process, and 1 - ~o
~Z -- a2 vtg is the white-noise process driving it.
One can see that the persistence of inflation )`, is equal to the root of
difference equation (5.22).
IV.2 Monetary Accommodation and The Lucas Critique
(5.26)
(5.28)
By using the definitions of the reduced form parameters a2 and a3 (see
equation (5.21)), the root can be expressed in terms of the structural
parameters
a- (5.29)
(1 - ~0)(1 f ti) - y(1 - a3)
From this expression it can be seen that if d3 ~~~ the root is less than
unity, and the difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation
(5.22) - is sadd(epath stable. ln the appendix we provide the intuition
behind this condition.
Taking the first derivative of ~ with respect to the degree of economic
independence d3 we find that it is given by
a~ - ~o - 1 ~ 0 (5.30)aá3 ti[(1 - ~0)(1 } y)v-t - (1 - d3)]2
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From (5.30) we derive proposition 5.1.
PROPOSITION 5.1: The greater the economic independence of the
central bank (the higher d3) the lower the persistence of inflation.
The intuition behind this proposition may be explained as follows.
Consider an exogenous increase in the real deficit. This is an aggregate
demand shock that raises the price level. Because of both the higher real
deficit and the higher price level, the nominal budget deficit goes up.
Under the assumptions of the paper (see equation (5.13)) the higher
nominal deficit raises the money supply, thereby giving another inflatio-
nary impulse. The additional inflationary impulse raises the nominal
deficit even further, thereby triggering additional monetary accommodati-
on. Hence inflation persists.
Consider now the role of the central bank. The greater the economic
independence of the central bank d3 , the lower the degree of monetary
accommodation (1 - dg) of nominal budget deficits. Since our model
features rational expectations, the rule for the evolution of the money
supply, i.e. equation (5.13), is known. Thus, wage setters form their
expectations of the price level at time t by taking into account equation
(5.13). Suppose the central bank gains more economic independence, i.e.
d3 increases. Wage setters realize that monetary policy becomes less
accommodative. With rational wage-setters anticipating lower monetary
accommodation of government budget deficits expected inflation will be
lower. Since future prices are expected to be lower than in the case of
high accommodation, wage contracts will reflect these expectations, and
wages will be set lower than otherwise. The lower wages are reflected
through the path of prices, with the net outcome being lower inflation
persistence.
Note that this result is an example of the Lucas (1976) critique of
econometric policy evaluation. Given that the structure of an econometric
model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that
optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure
of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in
policy (i.e. a shift in the d3 parameter) will systematically alter [he
structure of the econometric model (i.e. the persistence of inflation ~).
By again differentiating (5.30) with respect to d3 we find that
a~~ ~ ~ 1 - ~o) ~ o (5 .31)
ad3 - y~(1 - ~Pp)~l } ti)ti-t - (i - d3)]3
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Since 2y-t(1 -~) ~ 0 we have no points of inflection. Using (5.30)






Figure 5.1 Cerural bank irulependence and inflation
persistence
From the left hand side of the horizontal axis it can be seen that if the
degree of economic independence of the central bank ( d3), is equal to the
initial share of bonds in financial wealth (~~, inflation has a unit root.
If the central bank enjoys full economic independence - i.e. if d3 -
1- the persistence of inflation ~ is at its minimum level ll(1 f y).
This level is solely determined by the monetary growth rate on the
reference path.
In the intermediate case (~p G d3 C 1); Figure 5.1 pictures an
inverse relationship between the degree of economic independence and
the persistence of inflation. An increase in the degree of economic
independence will result in a decrease of the persistence of inflation. This
result is an example of the famous Lucas critique of econometric policy
evaluation.
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V SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RE-
SEARCH
Using an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model with a govern-
ment budget constraint we demonstrate that greater economic indepen-
dence of the central bank reduces inflation persistence.
The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. The
economic independence of the central bank is identical to the degree of
monetary dominance, which in turn reflects the fraction of the nominal
budget deficit financed by private bond sales. The greater this fraction
the lower the implied monetary accommodation of government budget
deficits. With rational wage-setters anticipating lower monetary accom-
modation, expected inflation will be lower. The lower expected inflation
results in lower wages and prices, with the net outcome being lower
inflation persistence.
Thus lower inflation persistence may not only be caused by the
exchange-rate regime as shown by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and
Alogoskoufis (1992), but also by the way monetary and fiscal policies
are coordinated, i.e. by the domestic monetary regime. Also our result
can be viewed as a dynamic extension of the inverse relationship between
economic independence and the level of inflation found by Grilli, Masci-
andaro and Tabellini (1991).
We ignored the fact that interest paid on bonds is an expense item in
the government's budgetary accounts. Hence, an important extension of
the model would be to allow for this effect. In the presence of interest
payments the total budget deficit equals the sum of the primary deficit
and the interest paid on bonds. According to the government's budget
constraint this total deficit then needs to be financed by a combination of
seigniorage and private bond sales.
Using the same parametrization of central bank independence - i.e.
bond financing of the primary budget deficit - it can be shown that due
to the inclusion of interest payments equation (5.21) becomes a second-
order rather than a first-order expectational difference equation.23 This
means that it would have two backward roots instead of one. This
complicates the analytical tractability of persistence. Assuming that the
relevant stability conditions are met this leaves a wide variety of possible
time paths for inflation i.e. monotonic convergence, fluctuations or
oscillations. It is interesting to note that in the latter case we get a`new
political economy' theory of inflation cyclicality in the tradition of
Cukierman (1992, pp. 290-295). However we leave a formal proof for
further research.
Finally we sidestepped issues concerning the optimal size of the public
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sector and the optimal revenue mix for treasuries and central banks. This
is discussed in De Jong and Van der Ploeg (1991) and Van der Ploeg
(1991). The conclusion of the latter paper is that in order to assess the
case for an independent central bank one should trade-off the welfare
gains associated with enhanced monetary discipline and lower inflation
against the welfare losses associated with a sub-optimal government
revenue mix.
APPENDIX AS SADDLEPATH STABILITY OF EX-
PECTED INFLATION
In Section IV.2 it was shown that if
d3 ~ ~~ (A5.1)
the difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation (4.9) - is
saddlepath stable. In this appendix we provide the intuition behind this
condition.24 We show that expected ïnflation converges if the wealth
elasticity of the private sector demand for bonds is greater than unity.
In Section II private bond sales were assumed to be governed by
~Bi - d3Gi 0 5 d3 ~ 1 (5.11)
Equation (5.11) asserts that a fraction d3 of the nominal budget deficit
is financed by private bond sales.
By using
~F~ - Gi
and rearranging (5.11) we obtain
dg - 0 Bi
0 Fi








for the initial share of bonds in
0B (A5.3)
~p - F 0
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Hence the difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation
(5.28) - is saddlepath stable if the wealth elasticity of the private sector
demand for bonds is greater than unity.
NOTES
1. For an in-depth discussion of political independence and the various associated indices
of central bank independence see Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) and De Haan and
Sturm (1992).
2. In Sectíon V we explain how the inclusion of interest payments bears on the substance
of our results.
3. In Section V we explain how the inclusion of interest payments bears on the
substance of our results.
4. The government (the treasury) finances its deficit by bond sales. The difference between
total bonds sold and private bond sales consists of bonds sold to the central bank. The
central bank pays for its bonds purchases by creating money which ends up in the
private sector. For a lucid exposition see Miller (1983).
5. For an excellent study on the dynamics of growth and government debt including
mticism of Blinder and Solow (1973) see van Ewijk (1991).
6. This paper does not deal with rational intertemporal consumer behaviour in the sense
put forward by Barro (1974). Hence government bonds are viewed as net wealth and
the 'Ricnrdian docrrine' does not hold.
7. On the reference path of steady growth for a variable X say,OXr,tJX~-y and x~
d Pn X.
8. The quasi first difference operator reduces to the ordinary first difference operator (~
ri 1- L) if the growth rate (y) is zero.
-~Bt
9. For instance, using (5.4) it can be shown that Si - P , i.e. for a given stock of real
t
financial wealth increases in real hase money require the private sector to sell its
govemment securities to the central bank.
10. Of course the original paper is Sargent and Wallace (1981), we cite the 1984 reprint
because itis more easy to obtain.
11. The real private sector demand for bonds depends on the nominal interest rate, on real
output, and on real financial wealth. An explicit expression will be derived in Section
III.
12. In the Sargent and Wallace (1984) analysis because of real interest payments on
bonds large deficits eventually requíre monetary accommodation. Hence - using
the notation of this paper - the parameter d3 would be equipped endogenously,
i.e. in dependence of the level of the puhlic debt.
153
13. Using the notation of this paper Alogoskoufis' equation is rq -(1 - d3) pr t~ where
~- N(0, a'-~). Alogoskoufis characterizes the classical gold standard, and the gold
exchange standards of the interwar period and of Bretton-Woods as low monetary
accomodation regimes, and the rest as high accomodation regimes.
14. The fraction d3 in i[self does not say very much about [he na[ure of Ihe monetary
instruments under the control of the central bank. However, abstracting from
open market policy (i.e. exogenous changes in b), in the context of the model
this fraction retlects the public finance aspect of GMT's concept of economic
independence.
15. Note that nominal money demand does not depend on expected inFlation. Hence, unlike
Sargent and Wallace (1981), we do not require the Cagan (1956) money demand
function to obtain our results.
16. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.
17. Abstracting from a wedge betwzzn the real and the nominal interest rate has the
advantage of simplifying the dynamics of expected inFlation in a latter stage of the
analysis. More specific, taking account of this effect implies that equation (5.21) would
be a second-order rather than a first-order exputational difference equation. Meaning
that it would have one backward and one forward root.
18. For recent evidence on the associated Monetarist-Keynesian debate of the 1960's and
early 1970's featuring amongst others Friedman and Meiselman (1963), Ando and
Modigliani (1965), Anderson and ]ordan (1968) and Blinder and Solow (1974) see
Kretzmer (1992).
19. Taking account of overlapping wage contracts implies that equation (5.21) would be a
second-order rather than a first-order expectational difference equation. Meaning that it
would have two backward roots instead of one. The latter phenomenon complicates
analytical tractability of persistence.
20. For simplicity in this model we abstract from stochastic productivity shocks.
21. In Schaling (1993) we derive (5.19) from the insider-outsider approach to the
labour market.
22. For a lucid exposition on the solution of expectational difference equations (inclu-
ding technical details on lag and forward operators in rational expectations
models) see Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp. 261-266).
23. Bond financing of the total budget deficit (including interest payments) obviously
leads to instability in the moclel.
24. This intuition was suggested to us by L.ans Bovenberg.
6. Inflation, Growth and the Optimal
Degree of Central Bank Indepen-
dence
I INTRODUCTION
It is a widely held belief that low or zero inflation is an essential or at
least a very important condition for high and sustained growth, and that
its attainment should be a main aim of government economic policy. For
instance, in a recent paper, Andrew Crockett, at the time Executive
Director of the Bank of England, states that `it is generally accepted that
price stability not only contributes to social equity, but is central to the
goal of improving resource allocation and strengthening the basis of
economic growth.'t
A similar view is held by the former Vice Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, David Mullins Jr: 'The elimination of inflation should
minimize real interest rates across the maturity spectrum by minimizing
risk or uncertainty premia. And, low real interest rates and low effec[ive
tax rates encourage investment-producing growth in productiviry [empha-
sis mine]'2 Thus policymakers typically believe that infla[ion has impor-
tant adverse effec[s on long-run economic performance.
There is now a considerable and mounting body of empirical evidence
supporting the hypothesis that inflation reduces an economy's rate of
growth [Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989),
Fischer (1991), Grimes (1991) and Smyth (1994)] and that the effect is
substantial .
This Chapter integrates inflationary foundations for the natural rate of
output growth into the literature on central bank independence [Rogoff
(1985), Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), Eijffinger and
Schaling (1993a, 1993b)]. It parametrizes Mullins' view by combining an
inflation sensitive growth rate in productivity with the model of Chapter
4.
Following the latter model we define central bank independence as the
degree of conservativeness rather than as the political cost of overriding
the central bank [Lohmann (1992)]. Using a graphical method we
develop a new way of determining the optimal degree of conservative-
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ness. As in Lohmann, this degree depends on the balance between
credibiliry and flexibility. However, unlike Lohmann and Rogoff (1985),
we are able to express the upper and lower bounds of the interval
containing the optimal degree of independence in terms of the structural
parameters of the model.
We find that due to the supply side effect of inflation the extent of
macrceconomic instability, measured by the variances of output and
inflation, is increased. Also, we show that society's preferred monetary
regime need not coincide with central bank independence. If it dces
however, we show that a higher supply side effect of inflation lowers the
optimal degree of central bank independence. Thus this paper provides
theoretical rationale for Goodhart's (1993, p. 5) claim that:
`The case in favour of [a more autonomous Central Bank] is a highty fashionable
argument, very much the flavour of the month. Some even regard it as a painless
panacea, the obvious way to restore price stability in our countries, without any
offsetting loss to growth or output over the medium term'
The Chapter is organized into six remaining Sections, followed by an
appendix. Section II briefly outlines the empirical evidence supporting a
negative relationship between inflation and output. Section III extends the
Alogoskoufis (1994) version of the Rogoff (1985) model to allow for an
inflation sensitive growth rate in productivity. Section IV deals with
discretionary policy whilst in Section V and VI central bank independen-
ce is discussed. Our conclusions are given in Section VII. The appendix
provides the derivation of equation (6.26), of macrceconomic outcomes
under any arbitrary monetary regime and of the properties of the function
F(d2) in equation (6.45).
II EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE SUPPLY SIDE
EFFECTS OF INFLATION
Previous work provides support for a significant and substantial negative
relationship between inflation or the change in the rate of inflation or
both on output growth. The studies can be classified into two types,
cross-country analyses and time series analyses for individual coun[ries.
Using post-war data from forty-seven countries Kormendi and Meguire
(1985) examined the cross-sectional relationship between output growth
and a number of variab[es. They found a strong negative effect of change
between the rate of inflation and output growth.
Kormendi and Meguire's work was extended by Grier and Tullock
(1989) who used pooled cross-section and five-year average time series
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data for 113 countries, the Summers and Heston data set. Three inflation
variables were used in the analysis, the rate of inflation, its first differen-
ce and the standard deviation of inflation. Grier and Tullock reported
results for a number of country classifications and found that in some,
but not all, of the cases there was a negative relationship between one or
more of the inflation variables and economic growth.
In addition to these published studies there are some unpublished
analyses. Shigerhara (1992, p. 37) reports that
`a preliminary empirical study by OECD staff that found a 10-percentage-point
increase in inflation is associated with ahout a one-percentage-point slowing of
productivity growth for a sample of 18 OECD countries over three periods (1960--
73, 1973-79 and 1980-90). These estimated effects are larger than those found in
studies, such as Fischer (1992) and Corbo and Rojas (1992), that include developing
countries.'
For criticism on cross-section studies see Levine and Renelt (1992) who
argue that the growth equation is sensitive to regressor set specification.
All mentioned cross-country studies include a number of variables
other than the inflation variables. This is not so in Stanners (1993).
Using mainly graphical analysis, Stanners compared growth rates and
inflation across a variety of groupings for 14 countries for the period
1980 to 1988 and found no connection between growth rates and inflati-
on. He reached the same conclusion with time series data for individual
countries. However, Stanners' study is fatally flawed because no explana-
tory variables, other than inflation, are included in either his cross-
section or his time series analyses.
In an early time series study Jarrett and Selody (1982) used a causality
approach to Canadian data and found that a permanent one percentage
rate increase in inflation reduced productivity by more than three-tenths
of a percentage point.
Grimes (1991) applied regression analysis to data for 21 countries and
concluded that `the costs of even a low inflation rate are estimated to be
large given that it is the growth rate, not just the level of output, which
is affected by inflation.' (Grimes 1991, p.641). Surprisingly, Fischer
(1993), shows in linear equations that the statistical significance of the
negative association between inflation and growth is stronger for inflation
below 15 percent than for higher inflation rates.
A series of time series analyses for the United States strongly support a
negative relationship between inflation and output growth. Smyth (1992)
embedded an inflation sensitive natoral rate of output in an expectations
augmented Phillips curve relationship. He found that each one percentage
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point increase in inflation reduced output growth by 0.22 percentage
points. Estimates of similar rnagnitudes are obtained using two alternative
production function models in Smyth (1993, 1994b). Smyth (1994a)
found that inflation significantly and substantially reduced the rate of
multifactor productivity growth for the United States; Smyth (1994c)
obtained a similar result for German GDP. McMillin and Smyth (forth-
coming) found a negative relationship between inflation and growth in
VAR model of the U.S. economy. Finally, Rudebusch and Wilcox
(1994) using United States data found that an increase in inflation of 1
percent is associated with a 0.35 percent decline in productivity growth,
an even bigger coefficient than in the Canadian case. In summary, there
is a strong and suggestive negatieve relation between longer-term growth
and inflation and produc[ivity growth and inflation.
In the next section we assume that there exists an inverse relationship
between inflation and productivity growth and combine this relationship
with the Rogoff (1985) model.
III A SIMPLE CLOSED ECONOMY MODEL
The main purpose of this Section is to combine the Alogoskoufis (1994)
version of the Rogoff (1985) model with supply side effects of inflation
along the lines of Schaling and Smyth (1994). We assume that there are
two types of agents, wage-setters (the union) and the central bank. Wage-
setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage every time period, and the
central bank controls monetary policy. The timing of events is as fol-
lows. Wage-setters sign annual nominal contracts before monetary policy
is choosen for that year. Finally, employment is determined by competiti-
ve firms. We now move on to the supply side of the model.
Consider the following supply block which is an extension of Chapter
4. Capital will be assumed fixed, and output is given by a short-run
production function of the following type
Yt-~Pt}~t Oc(3c 1 (6.1)
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations frorn steady state
values. Thus, y is the log of output, P the log of employment, and ~ a
measure of productivity. a is the exponent of labour and is less than
unity. Having described the level of output, it remains to specify how
productivity evolves over time. We assume that the growth rate of
productivity, A~t, is governed by
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~~ - g- at~pt f vt~ 0 G at c 1 (6.2)
The inflation term results from the supply side effect of inflation. The
higher the rate of inflation, the slower the rate of growth of productivity.
The variable vtt` is a random variable. It has mean zero, is serially
uncorrelated, and has finite variance o~2. Without loss of generality we
normalize v 2 at 1. Note that if at - 0 for the level of productivity we
have a simple stochastic trend specification discussed in Chapter 4. This
specification says that over the long run productivity will grow at some
average rate, labelled g. However, shocks to productivity, vtt`, can cause
productivity growth to deviate from its mean. Moreover, these shocks
are persistent with respect to the level of productivity: once perturbed by
a vtt` shock, ~ will show no tendency to return to its trendline. Hence,
the supply shocks are assumed to have permanent effects on the econo-
my's productivity capacity.
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of
labour to the real wage wt - pt. This yields the following employment
function.
P~ - - 1~a (wt - Pt - ~~) (6.3)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p the log of the price level.
The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each time period and re-
mains fixed for one period. The objective of wage setters is to stabilize
employment around a target employment level ~- p. Denoting the log
of the labour force by Ps, we assume P~s C P. Thus we employ the
insider-outsider approach to the labour market [Blanchard and Summers
(1986), Lindbeck and Snower (1986)].
Thus wages in each period are set to minimize
Et-1 (Pt - P)2 (6.4)
where Et-t is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on infor-
mation available at the end of period t- 1. The minimization of (2.4) is
subject to the labour demand function (6.3).3 From the first-order
conditions for a minimum of (6.4) subject to (6.3) the nominal wage is
given by
`"'t - Et-tpt t Et-1F~t - (1 -,Q) 2 (6.5)
Substituting (6.5) in the labour demand function (6.3), and the resulting
160 Ins~ilu~ions und Mone~ury Policy
equation in the production function, we get the following relation be-
tween employment, output and unanticipated shocks
Pt - P} 1 la [(1 -al)(Pt-Et-lpc) t v~] (6.6)
Yt - aP f N~ t 1 Qa I(1 -at)(pc -Ec-lpt) t vt~ (6.7)
An unanticipated rise in prices pt - E~-lp~ reduces the real wage, and
causes firms to employ more labour. Thus, both aggregate employment
and output exhibit a transitory deviation from their respective equilibrium
or `natural' rates P and ~3P t~i.4 On the other hand, an unanticipated
shock to productivity vtt` increases the marginal product of labour, and
given the real wage causes firms to employ more labour. Thus employ-
ment rises above Q, and output rises on account of both the higher
employment (transitory effect) and the higher productivity (permanent
effect).
Subtracting (6.6) from the labour force Ps, using the approximation that
the rate of unemployment u - Ps - P, and adding and subtracting
(1 -al)I(1 -(3)Pt-1, we get the following expression for the short-run
determination of unemployment.
ut - u- 1 lR [(1 -al)(s,pi-Et-1~Pt) } vÍl (6.8)
where u- PS - P can be thought of as the equilibrium or `natural' rate
of unemployment in this model. Thus, (6.8) is the well known expectati-
ons augmented `Phillips curve'. Unemployment deviates from its equili-
brium rate only to the extent that there are unanticipated shocks to
inflation or productivity.
Note that the reduction in unemployment from unanticipated inflation is
smaller than in the case without the supply side effect of inflation (1 -
al)I(1 - Q) C ll(1 -(~). The reason is that if at ~ 0 an unanticipated
rise in inflation on the one hand reduces the real wage, and causes firms
to employ more labour ll(1 -~i), however it also reduces productivity
and this causes firms to employ less labour.
Which of the two effects dominates depends on whether al c 1. In
the extreme case that at - 1 both effects cancel out and unanticipated
inflation has no effect on unemployment. However, with plausible
parameter values (at G 1) the positive effect will dominate. To give a
numerical example, with (3 being about 0.7 and al equal to 0.25 we get
(1 - at)I(1 -~i) - 2.67. If there is no supply side effect of inflation
(at - 0) then the gain from unanticipated inflation is 3.34.
Of course, anticipated shocks to inflation and productivity are reflected
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in wages (equation (6.5)) and do not affect unemployment. We can now
incorporate the Phillips curve in a monetary policy game. This is the
subject of the next Section.
IV A STATIC GAME BETWEEN WAGE-SETTERS
AND THE CENTRAL BANK
IV.1 The Social Welfare versus the Political Approach to Cen-
tral Bank Behaviour
In order to investigate optimal monetary policy consider a central bank
that is concerned with both price stability and unemployment. More
specificly we use
~ - ~(ppt - pp ' ) t ~(ut - u ~ )2 (6.9)
where o G e G oo and ~p~ and u~ are the inflation and unemployment
targets of the central bank. The parameter e measures the weight of
unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the
preferences of the central bank. Normalizing Op~ and u~ at zero we get
~ - ~ ppi t 2 ui (6.10)
As pointed out in Chapter 4 the recent literature on monetary policy
games has given two competing interpretations to the loss function of the
monetary policymaker in equation (6.10). One part of the literature
[Havrilesky ( 1987), Mayer ( 1990) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b)]
views the central bank as a mediator between different interest groups
that try to steer monetary policy in various directions. On this view, the
loss function ( 6.10) reflects a distributionally motivated political compro-
mise mediated through the central bank between the advocates of em-
ployment stimulation and the advocates of price stability. The coefficient
e then measures the relative political clout of the two groups. The other
part regards equation ( 6.10) as a social welfare function and the central
bank as a benevolent social planner. [Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro
and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Rogoff ( 1985) and Canzoneri (1985)]. Since
one of the main purposes of this Chapter is to combine the Rogoff (1985)
model with supply side effects of inílation along the lines of Schaling and
Smyth (1994) we follow Rogoff's analysis and choose the sociat welfare
approach to central bank behaviour.
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IV.2 Time Consistent Equilibrium under Fully Discretionary
Monetary Policy
Following Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 204) we start with a cooperative game,
that is we assume that the natural rate of unemployment is efficient. In
the context of the model of Section III this can be represented by the
assumption that F, the target employment level of wage-setters is equal
to es the effective labour force.
In the latter case the central bank has no incentive to try and reduce
unemployment below its equilibrium rate. As there is no conflict between
the unemployment targets of wage setters and the central bank, the policy
game can be seen as a cooperative one.ó
We now turn to the case relevant for this Chapter, i.e. the situation
where the equilibrium unemployment rate is inefficiently high due to the
presence of insiders. In what follows we show that then the equilibrium
inflation rate becomes proportional to the natural rate of unemployment.
In this case discretionary monetary policy is no longer a Pareto-equilibri-
um, due to the time-inconsistency of optimal monetary policy.
Assuming that Q c QS i.e. that u 1 0 the central bank has incentives
to systematically create inflation in order to reduce unemployment below
its natural rate.
Substituting the Phillips curve (6.8) in the loss function (6.10) yields
Lt -1~2(Ap~)Z t E [u -
(1 -at) Qpt } (1 - at)
Ec-10Pt - 1 vi~2 (6.11)2 1 -~3 1 -Q 1 -a
From the first-order conditions for a minimum of (6.11), i.e. BL~Ic3~pt
- 0, we obtain the central bank's reaction function to wage-setters
expectations
Q D e(1 -Q)(1 -at) "} E(1 -at)2
E 0 D
pt -(1 -(3)2 t e(1 -al)z (1 -a)2 t e(1 -at)2
t 1 Pt -
e(1 -at)
vt (6.12)
(1 -~3)Z t E(1 -at)Z
where superscript D stands for `fully discretionary regime'. Taking
expectations conditional on information at t-1 of (6.12) gives
p E(1 -at)
Et-10Pt - 1 a u (6.13)
Equation (6.13) is the reaction function of wage-setters. Substituting
(6.13) in (6.12) we get
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D e(1 -at) E(1 -at) ~
~pi - 1 -~i
u -
(1 -,Q)Z } E(1 -at)Zvt
(6.14)
Figure 6.1 shows the central bank's reaction function if vtt` - 0, that is
the (average) time consistent inflation rate as a function of the expected
inflation rate.7 The dotted line gives this relation for the case that there
is no supply side effect of inflation (at - 0).
E dP
t-1 t
Figure 6.1 Actual and expected inflation with the
supply side effect of inflation
The only point at which expectations are rational is at point N, which
represents the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Denoting the average inflation rate by ~p~, from (6.14) it follows that
E(1 -at) -
Opt - 1 -,Q u
(6.15)
Hence, at point N the inflation rate is above zero (the outcome in the
cooperative case). However it is below EI(1-Q)u (the outcome in the non-
cooperative case when there is no supply side effect of inflation, denoted
by N').g
Subtracting (6.13) from (6.14) we obtain the following expression for
unanticipated inflation
D D -E(1 -at) ~
~pt - Et-t~pt - vt (6.16)
(1 -,Q)Z t e(1 -at)2
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Substituting (6.16) in (6.17) we get
uD - U - (1 -Q) vu
t [(1 -a)2 t e(1 -at)2] ~
(6.17)
Equations (6.16) and (6.17) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal
monetary policy. The monetary policy strategy of the central bank, i.e.
equation (6.12) is time-consistent in the sense that at each point in time
the inflation rate selected is best, given the current situation. However,
as can be seen from equations (6.15) and (6.17), the resulting policy is
socially sub-optimal. It is sub-optimal since it results in an excessive
level of inflation, i.e. it produces an inflationary bias with no gains in the
form of systematic lower unemployment. This completes the description
of the non-coopera[ive Nash equilibrium.
IV.3 Results for Intlation and its Variance
Following Schaling and Smyth (1994, pp. 13-16) in this Section we
investigate the consequences of the supply side effect of inflation for the
mean and variance of inflation.
Taking the first derivative of (6.15) with respect to at, we get
DaoP~ - - E~ G o
aat 1 -a
From (6.18) we derive proposition (6.1)
(6.18)
PROPOSITION 6.1: The higher the supply side effect of inflation (the
higher at) the lower the average inflation rate.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In the case of supply side
effects of inflation the gains from unexpected inflation are lower than if
at - 0. The reason is that in addition to decreasing the real wage,
unanticipated inflation harms productivity growth and hence employment.
Since the central bank cares about both inflation and unemployment it
will take this additional effect into account in its policymaking. The
result is that the inflationary bias is lower that in the case without supply
side effects that is,
e(1 -at) E
0 G 1-a u G 1 au
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We now consider inflation variability. Taking variances of (6.14) we
get
E(1 -at) 2Var Opt - [ l
(1 -(i)Z t E(1 -al)2
Taking the first derivative of (6.19) with respect to at we get
BVarOpt -2e2(1 -at)[(1 -,6)2 - e(1 -at)2]
8at [(1 -a)2 t E(1 -at)z]3
By again differentiating (6.20) with respect to ai, we find that
c32VarOpt 2E2[(1 -at)4 t (1 -Q)4 - l0e(1 -at)Z(1 -a)2]
8ai [(1 -(~)Z } E(1 - at)2]4
Using (6.20) and (6.21) we obtain Figure 6.29
var(~Pt)
1-(1-R) 1 1 t(1-R) al
~ ~





From Figure 6.2 we derive proposition 6.2.
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PROPOSITION 6.2: If the supply side effect of inflation is not too large
(if 0 G at c 1- (I -R) ) then the higher at the higher the variance of
the inflation rate. ~
To give a numerical example, with the same parameter values as
before and e being equal to 1, we get Var ~pt - 1.20. If there is no
supply side effect (at - 0), then Var ~p~ - 0.84. Thus the ratio of the
variance with the supply side effect to the ratio without the supply side
effect is 1.43. This example suggests that, the supply síde effect of
inflation adds considerably to the magnitude of inflationary fluctuations.
This completes the description of the results on the mean and variance of
inflation.
IV.4 Results for Growth and its Variance
In this section we examine the effects of the supply side effect of inflati-
on on the mean and variance of output growth. Consider
Yt - aP } ~t
Taking first differences and substituting (6.2) we get
(6.22)
Dyt - g- a t~pt t v~ (6.23)
Equation (6.23) is identical to the specification used in Schaling and
Smyth (1994, p. 3). The higher the rate of inflation, the slower the rate
of growth in the natural level of output. Again if at - 0 for the level of
the natural rate of output we have the simple stochastic trend specificati-
on used in Chapter 4.
At this stage, the inflation rate has already been determined by the
optimizing behaviour of the central bank. Hence the inflation rate in
equation (6.23) is the time-consistent inflation rate under discretion ~ptD
given by equation (6.14).
Hence we have
Dyt - g- at~pD(a~) f v~ (6.24)
where the dependence of the inflation rate under discretion on at is
stressed by writing Op~~ as a function of at.
We now consider the effect of changes in at on the natural rate of








where the first term between brackets is the discretionary inflation rate
(which is given by equation (6.14)), and the second term includes the
supply side effect of inflation on inflation under discretion.
Since both terms contain the innovation to productivity growth vt~li
the supply side effect of inflation on the natural rate of growth is stochas-
tiC.
Denoting the left hand side of (6.25) by M, in appendix A we show
that
8~yt s(2a 1 -1)u 2
aa -
M M-[ 1 R , aM]
1
2 a2[(1 -a)Z(1 -2a~) t(1 -at)2E]2
where vM -
[(1 -(3)2 f e(1 - at)2]4
(6.26)
To give a numerical example with the same parameter values as before,
Et-1M --2u and QMZ - 17.0. From (6.26) we derive proposition
(6.3).
PROPOSITION 6.3: If at G 0.5, the higher the supply side effect of
inflation (on average) the lower the natural rate of growth.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. In appendix A
we show that
aDyt D aOpD
Et-1 aa - -Opt - al 8a1 1
(A6.4)
where the first term on the right hand side of (A6.4) is negative, (becau-
se average inflation under discretion is positive) and the second term is
positive (because according to proposition 6.1, the supply side effect of
inflation on inflation is negative).
Which of the two effects dominates depends on the value of a~. Howe-
ver, empirical research [Grimes (1991), Smyth (1994a)] suggests that al
is close to 0.2 and thus smaller than 0.5. Hence it is plausible that the
negative effect dominates.
We now turn [o the variability of output growth. Taking first diffe-
rences of (6.7) and substituting (6.16) in the resulting equation yields
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oyt - oYt } a(1- a) o~t
(1 -~3)2 t e(1 -a,)2
Taking variances of this expression yields
Var(Dyt -~yt) - 2[ a(1 -a) ]2
t2
(1 -~i)2 f E(1 -al)2
Taking the first derivative of (6.28) with respect to a, we get
(6.27)
(6.28)
BVar(Dyt-~yt) 8e(1 -a,)a2(1 -a)2 ) 0 (6.29)
dal - [(1 -~3)2 t E(1 -a,)2]3
By again differentiatíng (6.29) with respect to a,, we find that
ó2Var(~y~-Dyt) 8a~32(I -a)2 [(I -~i)2 - Se (1 -al)2]
8ai [(1 -~3)2 t 8(1 -a,)2]4
(6.30)
By setting (1-(3)2 - Se(1 - a,)2 equal to zero we find two points of
inflection at a, - 1 f(1
-~3) 20E Using (6.29) and (6.30) we obtain
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Figure 6.3 The supply side effect of inflation and the
variance of output growth
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From Figure 6.3 we derive proposition 6.4.
PROPOSITION 6.4: If at C 1 the higher the supply side effect of
inflation (the higher at) the higher the variance of the growth rate of
output around its mean or average rate of growth.
To give a numerical example, with the same parameter values as
before, we get Var(~yt - Dy~) - 0.16 . If there is no supply side effect,
then Var(~yt-~yt) - 0.08. Thus the ratio of the variance with the
supply side effect to the ratio without the supply side effect is 2. This
example suggests that, the supply side effect of inflation adds considera-
bly to the magnitude of fluctuations in economic growth. Finally we
summarise the main propositions from this section in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Inflation, growth and fluctuations
Inflation Growth
Mean Variance Mean Variance
BApt 8Vaz Apt c3~yt a[Var(~yt-~yt)]` 0 ) E ~ 0
c t
)
áal óal óa~ óat
V CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Having analyzed the effects of inflation on growth and fluctuations under
discretionary policy, we now turn to a discussion of the supply side
effect of inflation under a regime in which society has responded to the
time consistency problem by setting up an independent central bank.
V.1 Monetary Policy under a`Conservative' Central Banker
As stated in Chapter 1 there is a world-wide tendency to establish more
independent central banks. Therefore now, following Rogoff (1985, pp.
1177-1180) we consider central bank independence as an institutional
response to the time-consistency problem. Rogoff demonstrates that
society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the central
bank who is known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization
(relative to unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social
loss function Lt. He demonstrates that, in choosing among potential
candidates, it is never optimal to choose an individual who is known to
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care `too little' about unemployment.
Suppose, for example that in period t-1 society selects an agent to
head the central bank in period t. The reputation of this individual is
such that it is known that if he is appointed [o head the central bank, he
will maximize the following objective function
t
It -(1 2 2) ~p~ t 2 u~ 0 G d2 G oo (6.31)
When d2 is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater
relative weigth on inflation stabilization than society does. Note that if d2
- 0 equation ( 6.31) reduces to the social loss function (6.10) and we
obtain the results under the fully discretionary regime of Section IV.2.
Similarly, the case where d2 -~ ~ is formally equivalent to full commit-
ment to a simple zero inflation. Hence, the case of central bank indepen-
dence can be viewed as intermediate - as a`balance' - between rules
and discretion. The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibri-
um is exactly the same as in Section IV.2. Equations (6.32) and (6.33)
are the `I' regime counterparts of equations (6.14) and (6.17) respective-
ly:
Q I E(1 -at) U e(1 -at)
v~ (6.32)
pt - (1 -R)(1 td2) (1 td2)(1 -,6)z } e(1 -at)2
c
1}d 1-
u1 - u - ( ~)( ~) vt` (6.33)
t [(1 td2)(1 -,Q)z t e(1 - al)2] t
where superscript I denotes the independent central bank regime. A
comparison of (6.14) and (6.32) shows that inflation under a fully
discretionary regime and under an independent central bank are only only
identical if d2 - 0.
Since ex hypothesi d2 ~ 0, ~}iD ) ~p~, i.e. average inflation will be
higher under the discretionary regime than under an independent central
bank. This result confirms our intuition that credibly increasing the
central banker's commitment to inflation stabilization reduces the discre-
tionary rate of inflation. This completes the description of the results
under an independent central bank. We now move on to compare the
expected values of the loss functions of society under the two alternative
monetary regimes.
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V.2 Evaluation of Central Bank Independence
In this section we evaluate central bank independence as an institutional
device to overcome the time-consistency problem. We calculate the
expected values of the loss function of society under discretion and under
an independent central bank. We show that for society the optimal
framework for monetary stability depends on the balance between
credibility and flezibiliry.
To facilitate expositions in later sections, following Rogoff (1985, pp.
1175-1176), we shall first develop a notation for evaluating the expec-
ted value of society's loss function under any arbitrage policy regime
~A'~ Et-1LtA.
Et-1LA - 2[eu2] t IIA t rA
13 (6.34)
where IIA - l l2(OpA)2 and OpA is the mean inflation rate in period
t.
rA ~ lEt-i {E(
vi } (1 -at) (OpA - Et-10PA)]22 1-a 1-a
} (APA -Ft-10pA)2}
The first component of Et-tLtA, l l2 (e6Z] is nonstochastic and invari-
ant across monetary regimes. It represents the deadweight loss due to the
labour market distortion (u 1 0 see Section IV.2). This loss cannot be
reduced through monetary policy in a time-consistent rational expecta-
tions equilibrium.
The second term depends on the mean inflation rate. This term is also
nonstochastic but does depend on the choice of monetary policy regime.
The final term, I'A, represents the `stabilization' component of the loss
function. It measures how succesfully the central bank offsets desturban-
ces to stabilize unemployment and inflation around their mean values.
By substituting the relevant results [(6.14) and (6.17), (6.32) and
(6.33)] into society's loss function (6.10) and taking expectations we
obtain the D and I regime counterparts of expression (6.34). Abstracting
from the (common) deadweight loss, one gets
)ZD t rD -
e2(1 -al)2 U2 } E2(1 -at)Z t E(1 -~i)2
(6.35)
2(1 -~i)Z 2[(1 -~3)2 f E(1 -at)2]Z
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nitr'- e2(1 - at)2 U2} EZ(1 -al)2tE[(1 td2)(1 -a)]2 (6.36)
2[(1 -Q)(1 fd2)lZ 2[(1 fd2)(1 -a)2 te(1 -at)2]2
As long as the natural rate of unemployment is efficient
(u - 0) IIA - 0, the choice of regime only depends on the stabilization
component of the loss function. It can then be shown that
rD ~ rI (6.37)
Hence the fully discretionary regime outperforms the independent central
bank regime in stabilizing supply shocks.
However, if the natural rate of unemployment is inefficiently high
(u ~ 0) results differ significantly. In the absence of shocks society
would prefer an independent central bank to the discretionary regime,
because
IIIGIID (6.38)
From (6.37) it can be seen that the central bank's response to unantici-
pated supply shocks is best with discretion. This means that discretion
gives the central bank the option of reacting optimally to domestic real
shocks.
On the other hand from (6.38) it can be seen that an independent
central bank out-performs the fully discretionary regime in bringing
down the time-consistent rate of wage inflation.
By setting up an independent central bank society reduces its credibiliry
problem vis-á-vis the union but loses the option of reacting optimally to
domestic real shocks, i.e. it loses flexibility. As shown by Lohmann
(1992) and Alogoskoufis (1994), which of the two forces dominates
depends on the relative strength of the two distortions, namely the
inefficiency of the high natural rate of unemployment which produces the
high inflation problem, and the inefficiency arising from pre-set nominal
contracts that cannot take account of real shocks.
Subtracting (6.36) from ( 6.35) the per-period difference in welfare
losses between the fully discretionary regime and the independent central
bank regime is given by
E- LD - LI - h
dzEZ(1 -at)Z(2 td2) u2 -
tt[t c] ~ [ (1-a)z(1 }d2)2
dZe2(1 -at)2(1 -(3)Z
[íl-(3)2E(1-al)Z][(1 td2)(1 -~3)Z t e(1 -at)2]2
] (6.39)
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An independent central bank would dominate a fully discretionary regime
if
u ~
(I -Q)2(1 td2) d2
(6.40)
(2 }d2) [(1 fd2)(1 -(3)2 te(1 -al)2] [(1 -(3)2 te(1 -at)Zl
To give a numerical example, with the same parameter values as
before and d2 - 4,14 if there is no supply side effect of inflation (a~ -
0) the inefficiency in the natural rate of unemployment must exceed
about 24.5 percentage points. However, with the supply side effect of
inflation (at - 0.2) in order for an independent central bank regime to
dominate the discretionary regime u must exceed 39.5 percentage points.
This example suggests that the supply side effect of inflation - ceteris
paribus - weakens the case for central bank independence. This conclu-
des the comparison of monetary regimes. We now move on to an
investigation of the factors influencing the optimal degree of central bank
independence. This is the subject of Section VI.
VI THE OPTIMAL DEGREE OF CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE
In this Section we show that the optimal degree of central bank indepen-
dence is contingent on the supply side effect of inflation. More specific
we show that the higher the supply side effect of inflation the lower the
optimal degree of central bank independence.
VI.1 The Rogoff Theorem
First we reproduce Rogoff's (1985) proof that for society it is optimal to
select an agent to head the independent central bank who places a large,
but finite weight on inflation. The optimal degree of central bank inde-
pendence d2~ is defined as the value of d2 that minimizes the expected
value of the loss function of society Et-tLtI. Abstracting from the (regi-
me-invariant) deadweight loss the expected value of the social loss
function under regime `I' is
ni f ri -
e2(1 -at)Z uZ } EZ(I -at)2 tE[(1 td2)(1 -Q)]2 (6.36)
2[(1 -Q)(1 td2)lz 2[(1 td2)(1 -(~)2 te(1 - at)Z]Z
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To solve for the value of d2 that minimizes Et-tLt',
(6.36) with respect to dz
IaEt-,Lt arI' ar'-- t-ad2 adZ ad2
ar e2(1 -~i)2(1 - at)Zd2
ád2 - [(1 td2)(1 -~i)2 }e(1 -at)2]3
aIII -e2(1 -at)2 u2
ód2 - (1 -~3)2(1 td2)3
We are now ready to prove:





Proof: note that d2 ~-1 by assumption. Thus by inspection of (6.43)
aIIIlad2 is strictly negative.
Note also, by inspection of (6.42), that 8r'lad2 is strictly negative for
-[e(1 - at)2 }(1 -Q)Z] G d2 G 0 zero when d2 - 0 and positive for
(1 -~)2
d2 ~ 0. Therefore, aEt-tLt'ladz is strictly negative for d2 5 0.
aEt-t Ltllad2 must change from negative to positive at some sufficiently
large value of d2, since as d2 approaches positive infinity, arIlad2
converges to zero at rate
d22, whereas aIIIlad2 converges to zero at rate d2-3. Therefore d2~ G
aots Q.E.D.
VI.2 The Supply Side Effect of Inflation and the Optimal Degree
of Central Bank Independence
Proposition 6.5 is Rogoff s theorem extended for the case of supply side
effects of inflation. Hence, we have shown that his theorem also holds in
the presence of supply side effects of inflation.
In this Section we show that the higher the supply side effect of
inflation the lower the optimal degree of central bank independence. First
using a graphical method we develop an alternative way of determining
the optimal degree of central bank independence. Next, we show how
this result is conditioned on the supply side effect of inflation.
By setting (6.41) equal to zero we obtain the first-order condition for a
minimum of Et-tl-It
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I 1
o - aá } aá2 2





(1 -~i)z(1 td2)3 [(1 td2)(1 -~i)2tE(1 -at)Z]3
Equation (6.45) determines d2 as an implicit function of e, al, u and Q.
A solution for d 2 always exists and is unique.
To see this we adapt a graphical method used by Cukierman (1992, pp.
170-172) in the context of a dynamic game.
Rewrite (6.45) as
d ((1 tdz)(1 - S)2 te(1 -at)2]3u2
- F(d )2 - 2
(1 -~3)a(1 td2)3
(6.46)
Note that the function F(d2) on the right-hand side of equation (6.46) is
monotonically decreasing in d2 that
F(0) - [(1 -~i)2 te(1 -at)2]3u2
lim F(d2) - (1 -Q)2~2 and(1-a)4 a'-~~
2 2 [(1 -Q)2 te(1 - at)z]3u2(1 -Q) u G F(d2) C
(1 -a)a
(These statements are demonstrated in appendix C to this chapter).
We are now ready to prove:
PROPOSITION 6.6: For 0 c at G 1
[(1 -Q)2 tE(1 -at)z]3u2
(1-(3)2 u2 C d2 G
(1 -a)a
Proof: the left-hand side of (6.46) is a 45-degree straight line through the
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origin. Since F(0) - ~(1
-Q)ZfE(1 - a~)2]3~2
and aF G 0, these two(1- a)4 aa2
functions must intersect at one and only on point. Moreover, since u2
(1-(3)2 G F(d2) G~(1 a)2
te(1 4t)Z]3u2,
the intersection occurs at a
(1 -Q)




Figure 6.4 illustrates the argument graphically. Clearly a solution for d2
exists and is unique.
Figure 6.4 The supply side effect of inflation and the
optimal degree of central bank independence
We are now ready to prove:
PROPOSITION 6.7: The higher the supply side effect of inflation (the
higher al) the lower the optimal degree of central bank independence.
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Proof: from appendix C, BFlaat G 0, this implies that when al gces
up, the curve F(d2) in Figure 6.4 shifts downward. As a consequence the
equilibrium value of d2 decreases.
Q.E.D.
The intuition underlying this proposition is as follows. A higher supply
side effect of inflation implies a lower time consistent rate of inflation
(see proposition 6.1) and consequently a lower III component of the
social loss function. This means that society's credibility problem is
reduced. Hence, with an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation
versus unemployment stabilization the monetary authorities' commitment
to fighting inflation is now too high. This establishes the intuition with
respect to proposition 6.7.
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS
Central bankers typicially believe that inflation has adverse effects on
output growth. This paper has investigated the ïnterdependence of the
choice of domestic monetary regime and the supply side effects of
inflation.
Unlike in papers by Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Rogoff (1985)
and Lohmann (1992), the rate of growth of productivity here depends on
the inflation rate. The main implication of this is that the slope of the
Phillips curve, that is the benefits of unanticipated inflation, depend on
the supply side effect of inflation. The implication of this mechanism are
two-fold.
First, as shown in Section VI society's optimal framework for moneta-
ry stability - being contingent on the slope of the Phillips curve - also
depends on the supply side effect of inflation. Loosely speaking as
inflation becomes more harmful for output growth society moves away
from the independent central bank regime ( which is first best in terms of
credibiliry) towards discretion ( which is first best in terms of flexibiliry).
This means that in general it need not be optimal for society to have an
independent central bank. Secondly, as shown in proposition 6.7, if
society's optimal framework for monetary stability does coincide with
central bank independence, a higher supply side effect of inflation lowers
the optimal degree of central bank independence. This means that
society's optimal cen[ral banking institution is contingent on the supply
side effect of inflation.
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APPENDIX A6 THE DERIVATION OF
EQUATION (6.26)
In this appendix we derive equation (6.26) from
Daoyt D aoPt
8at - -Apt al 8a1
The discretionary rate of inflation can be decomposed as
~ptD - ~ptD f (OptD-Et-1~pcD)
where OptD is the average inflation rate.
Substituting (A6.1) in (6.25) we get
aoYt -D D D
aal
- -Opt - (Opt - Et -10P~ )
D D D
80pt a(~pi -Et-t~Pt )
- at[ aal } aat
]
where the second term on the right hand side is given by
D D -E(1 -a1) ~
~Pt - Et-10Pt -(1 -~3)2 t e(1 -at)2 vt
Taking the first derivative of (6.16) with respect to at yields
a(OP~-Et-10P~) Evi [(1 -a)~-e(1 - at)~))






Since both (6.16) and (A6.3) contain the innovation to productivity
growth vtt`, the response of growth with respect to inflation, 80yt18a1 as
expressed by the right hand side of (A6.2) is stochastic. Taking expecta-
tions conditional on information at the end of t-1 of (A6.2) yields
D
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where the first term on the right hand side is given by
D e(1 -al)u
Api - 1 -,Q
and the second term is
Daop~ -Eu
aal - 1 -Q
Substituting (6.15) and (6.18) in (A6.4) we get
aDyi e(2a1 -1)u
Et-1 aal - 1 -Q





1 aAy~ - Ec-10pD-OpD
al a(APD-Ec-1oPD) (A6.6)
aa~ aal aa~
The definition of the variance of aDytlaal is
aoy~ aoyt aoYt 2Var aa - Et-1[ aa - E t-1 aa ~1 1 1
(A6.7)
Substituting (6.16) and (A6.3) into (A6.6) and the resulting expression in
(A6.7) noting that a~2 - 1 yields
Var
a~yt s2[(1 -a)2(1 -2a2) t (1 -a~)2E~2
aal [(1 -Q)2 t e(1 -at)2]4
(A6.8)
Denoting aDytlaal by M we obtain equation ( 6.26) of the text.
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APPENDIX B6 THE DERIVATION OF THE EXCEP-
TED VALUE OF SOCIETY'S LOSS FUNCTION UN-
DER ANY ARBITRARY MONETARY POLICY REGI-
ME
In this Appendix following Rogoff (1985, pp. 1175-1176) we develop a
notation for evaluating the expected value of society's loss function under
any arbitrary monetary policy regime "A", Et-iLtA (equation 6.34) of
the text. Unemployment under regime A is given by
1 -a )
uA - u -
(1 -(3 (ApA -Et-t ~PA)
- 1 1 Rvt (B6.1)
Squaring and taking expectations yields
w
Et-1(uA)Z - u2 t Et-I~ vt
~ 1-at (OpA - Et-1 OpA)]2 (B6.2)1 -(i 1 -~
The inflation rate under regime A can be expanded as
OpA - OpA t(~pA - Et-1 ~PA) (B6.3)
where ~pA is the mean (expected) inElation rate in period t. Squaring
and taking expectations in turn yields
Et-1(~pA)Z - (OPA)2 t Et-1 (OPA - Et-tOpc)2
The expected value of society's loss function under regime A is
(B6.4)
Et-1LA - 2 Et-1 (APA)2 } 2 Et-1(uc)2 (B6.5)
Substituting (B6.2) and (B6.4) into (B6.5) one obtains equation (6.34) of
the text.
APPENDIX C6 DERIVATION OF THE PROPERTIES
OF THE FUNCTION F(d2) IN EQUATION (6.45)
1 Demonstration that aF G 0
8d2
The first derivative of F with respect to d2 is given by
aF - -3u2E(1 -at)z~(1 td2)(1 -(3)Z fe(1 -at)2]2 (C6.1)
ád2 (1 -a)4(1 }d2)a
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(C6.1)is negative since at G 1
2
2 Demonstration that aF 1 0
ad2
The second derivative of F with respect to d2 is given by
a2F 6u2E(1 - al)2I'[I'-E(1 -aj)J
8d2 (1 -a)4í1 td2)5
(C6.2)
where I' -(1 fd2)(1-(3)2 t 2E(1-at)2 (C.6.2) is positive since at G 1
3 Demonstration that F(0) -[(1
-,Q)2 tE(1 -a~)2]3u2
(1 -Q)4
This can be shown by direct examination of the right-hand side of (6.46)
at d2 - 0.
4 Demonstration that u2(1 -f~)Z G F(d2) G[(1
~i)2 tE(1 - at)2]3u2
(1-a)4
[(1 -(3)2tE(1 -aj)l3uZSince F(0) -
(1 -~3)4
dm~ F(d2) - u2(1-a)2 and ~d2 G 0, F(d2)
must be bounded between u2(1-Q2) and F(0).
5 Demonstration that aF G 0
aat
The first derivative of F with respect to al is given by
aF -6E(1 -at)u2[(1 td2)(1 -,Q)2 tE(1 -a~)2]Z
8a1 - (1 -,6)4(1 td2)3
(C6.3)
(C6.3) is negative since a1 G 1.
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NOTES
1. See Crockett (1994), p. 167.
2. See Mullins (1994), p. 6.
3. Altematively, the loss function could be assumed quadratic in both the deviations of
employment and the real wage from certain target values. For an analysis along these
lines see Chapter 7.
4. Actual output and employment will equal their natural rates when all expectations are
fulfilled. Hence, the natural rate of employment equals P and the natural rate of output
is Qf t ~.
5. For at we have used the estimate in Smyth (1994a). The value of (3 is taken from
Alogoskoufis (1994, p. 211).
6. For more details see Chapter 4, Section IIi.2.
7. T'his figure is based on a similar one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 597). It is
drawn assuming that 0 G at G e-(1-(3)Zle.
8. For a comparison see also Figure 4.1 for the case that d, - 0.
9. Since the nominator of (4.13) is a fourth-order equation in at we are unable to locate
points of inflection.
10. (6.24) is an equation of the form y - a.x(a). Hence the first derivative is dylda - x(a)
t a.(dxlda).
11. We derive an expression for 8~pi~laa~ in appendix A.
12. Strictly speaking we are computing Var(~yiA"qt)I tT~~ where ~0~ - Var Ovt~ - a~Z
~
f a~ t. With a~2 - a~~ t we get (6.30).
13. We derive equation (6.34) in the appendix.
14. The value of d~ is the same as in Chapter 4.
15. As pointed out by Rogoff (1985, p. I178) it is extremely difficult to write down a closed
form solution for d,'.
7. Wage Formation, Monetary Targe-
ting, and the Optimal Degree of
Central Bank Independence
I INTRODUCTION
In Chapters 3 and 4 we have focused on the quantification of central bank
independence using a number of attributes from central bank laws.
These Chapters investigate the positive issue of the relation between
monetary regimes and economic performance. Broadly speaking, the
conclusion is that the more independent the central bank, the lower the
inflation rate, while the rate of output growth is unaffected.
However, these Chapters do not explain the observed differences in central
bank independence. For instance, no explanation is offered for the very high
independence of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It has often been pointed out
that that this independence may be explained by Germany's underlying
aversion to inflation associated with its experience of hyper-inflation in the
1920s.1 This brings us to an important issue in the political economy of
central banking; the relation between institutional design and individual and
collective beliefs, preferences and strategies. Here the question to de dealt
with is the normative issue of how independent a central bank should be;
i.e. the optimal degree of central bank independence. Recent work in this
area is Cukierman (1994) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1995). In addition
to these sutdies in Chapter 6 we develop a theory that predicts that optimal
central bank independence will be lower, the more harmful inflation is for
economic growth (the higher the supply side effect of inflation).
In this Chapter we combine the model of Chapter 4 with labour union
behaviour along the lines of New-Keynesian bargaining theories of
unemployment. Building on the work of Funke (1994) we characterize wage
setting in a totally unionized economy under a constant money supply rule,
GNP targeting, full commitment to a simple zero inflation rule (`inflation
targeting') a discretionary regime and an independent central bank.2 The
wage formation strategy of the union can be either cooperative or
aggressive. Following Chapters 4 and 6 we define central bank
independence as the degree of conservativeness rather than as the political
cost of overriding the central bank [Lohmann (1992)]. Using the graphical
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method of Chapter 6 we show that the optimal degree of central bank
independence depends on the balance between credibiliry and flezibiliry
Unlike Lohmann (1992) and Rogoff (1985), we are able to express the
upper and lower bounds of the interval containing the degree of
independence in terms of the structural parameters of the model. We find
that society's preferred monetary regime need not coincide wi[h central
bank independence. If it dces however, we show that the more aggressive
the union the higher the optimal degree of central bank independence. This
means that society's optimal central banking institution is contingent on the
labour market regime.
The Chapter is organized into six remaining sections, followed by two
appendices. Section II extends Chapter 4 to allow for cooperative and
aggressive wage formation strategies. Section III deals with discretionary
policy whilst in Section IV inflation targeting, money supply targeting, GNP
targeting and central bank independence is discussed. Sections V and VI
extend Funke's analysis to allow for an independent central bank. Our
conclusions are given in Section VII. The appendices provide the derivation
of macroeconomic outcomes under any arbitrary monetary regime, of the
expected loss of the union and of the properties of the function F(d~ in
equation (7.68).
II A SIMPLE CLOSED ECONOMY MACROMODEL
II.1 The Model
The main purpose of this section is to combine the Alogoskoufis (1994)
model of wage and employment determination with union behaviour along
the lines of Funke (1994), to allow for cooperative and aggressive wage
formation strategies. We assume that there are two types of agents, wage-
setters (the union) and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose the
nominal wage every time period, and the central bank controls monetary
policy.
The timing of events is as follows. In the first stage wage setters sign
annual nominal contracts [Gray (1976), Fischer (1977a)]. Wage setters
know the domestic monetary regime, that is they know whether the central
bank follows a constant money supply rule, a nominal income rule, a price
level rule, a discretionary regime or whether it is an independent agent.
They take this information into account in forming their expectations. In the
second stage stochastic shocks to productivity and velocity of money
demand realize. These shocks are random and cannot be observed at the
time wage contracts are signed. In the third stage the central bank observes
the values of the shocks and - contingent on the chosen regime - reacts
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to the shocks accordingly. In the four[h and final stage employmen[ is
determined by competitive firms. This timing of events can be summarized
as follows.
1 2 3 4
i i i i
Nominal wage Shocks Central bank Employment
contracts signed realize sets monetary determined
policy
Figure 7.1 The timing of events
We now move to the supply side of the model.
II.2 Wage and Employment Determination
Consider the following supply block which is an extension of Chapter 4.
Capital will be assumed fixed, and output is given by a short-run Cobb-
Douglas production function
yt-aQt}~t o ~ ,a ~ 1 (~.1)
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady state
values. Thus, y is the log of output, P the log of employment, and pt a
measure of productivity. (3 is the exponent of labour and is less than unity.
Having described the level of output, it remains to specify how producti-
vity evolves over time. For simplicity we assume that shocks to productivity
are normally distributed with zero mean and finite variance
wt - vt`t v~t ' N (~, ~~) (7.2)
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of labour
to the real wage wt - pt. This yields the following employment function
et -- 1 1 a (wt - pt - fct) (7.3)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p the log of the price level.
The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each period and remains fixed
for one period. The objective of wage setters is to stabilize real wages and
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employment around their target levels. Thus wages in each period are set
to minimize
Wt - Et-1 [2q (`wt-pt-T)z t ~ (P-P')2l (7.4)
where Et-t is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on infor-
mation at the end of period t- 1. T and P are the real wage and employ-
ment targets of the union. dq is the weight assigned to real wage stabili-
zation relative to employment stabilization in the preferences of the union.
We assume that P~` - P~s where P~ is the number of insiders. Denoting the
log of the labour force by PS, we assume P~5 G P`. Thus we employ a
variant of [he insider-outsider approach to the labour market [Blanchard
and Summers (1986), Lindbeck and Snower (1986)J. In the special case that
dq - 0 equation (7.4) reduces to the simple insider-outsider specification
used in Chapter 4. The minimization of (7.4) is subject to the labour
demand function (7.3).3
From the first-order conditions for a minimum of (7.4) subject to (7.3) the
nominal wage is given by




Substituting (7.5) in the labour demand
dq(1 -a)~ t 1
function (7.3), and the resulting equation in the production function, we get
the following relation between employment, output and unanticipated shocks
1 (
Pt - P t 1-(3 (Pt
- Et-1Pt t pt) 7.6)
Yt - Y t 1aQ (Pt - Et-tPt) t l~ta (7.7)
where y - a Q .
An unanticipated rise in prices p~ - Et-tpt reduces the real wage, and
causes firms to employ more labour. Thus, both aggregate employment and
output exhibit a transitory deviation from their respective equilibrium or
`natural' rates P and a P.q
Subtracting (7.6) from the labour force Ps, using the approximation that
the rate of unemployment u- PS - P, we get the following expression for
the short-run determination of unemployment
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1
ut - u - 1 -a (Pt - Et-tpt t ~t) (7.8)
where u- PS - é. u can be thought of as the equilibrium or `natural' rate
of unemployment in this model. Thus, (7.8) is the well known expectations
augmented `Phillips curve'. Unemployment deviates from its equilibrium
rate only to the extent that there are unanticipated shocks to inflation or
productivity. Anticipated shocks to inflation and productivity are reflected
in wages (equation (7.5)) and do not affec[ unemployment. We now turn to
the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment.
II.3 The Natural Rate of Unemployment
In this section we investigate the factors affecting the natural rate of
unemployment. In equa[ion (7.5) the permanen[ or equilibrium level of
employment was shown to be equal to
P " - d4(1 -Q)TP -
d4(1-a)2 t 1
Substituting this expression into the definition of the natural rate of
unemployment, u- Ps - P and normalizing PS at zero we get
a4(1-a)T - e ~u -
d4(1 -Q)Z t 1
(7.9)
Hence the higher the targe~t value of the real wage (T) or the smaller the
target employment level (P ) the higher the natural rate of unemployment.
Next consider the relationship between the weight assigned to real wage
stabilization relative to employment stabilization in the preferences of the
union - i.e. the wage negotiation parameter - and the natural rate of
unemployment.
Taking the first derivative of (7.9) with respect to d4, we get
8u - (1 -(3) [T } (1 -Q) P ~` l ~ 0
ada [dq(1 -(3)z t 1~2
(7.10)
From (7.10) we derive lemma (7.1)
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LEMMA 7.1: The greater the weight of real wage stabilization versus
employment stabilization in the preferences of the union (the higher d~ the
higher the natural rate of unemployment.
The intuition behind this lemma is the following. The higher the wage
nego[ia[ion parameter d4 the higher real wages will be. Higher real wages
drive down labour demand (see equation (7.3)) and hence increase
unemployment.
By again differentiating (7.10) with respect to d4 we find that
82u -2(1 -Q)3 [r f (1 -a)P `] G 0 (7.11)
ad4 - [d4(1 -a)2 t 1]3





Figure 7.2 Wage negotiation behaviour a~ul the natural
rate of unemployment
From Figure 7.2 we derive lemma 7.2.
LEI~A 7.2: If the weight of real wage stabilization versus employment
stabilization in the preferences of the union (d~ equals P~ [(1 -(3)r] -t,
the natural rate of unemployment is zero.
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This follows directly from the nominator of (7.9). In investigating the
relationship between dq and u in the remainder of this paper we restrict
attention to the case where dq e[F~ [(1 -~3)T] -t; ~~, i.e. to situations
where u ? 0.
This completes the desciption of the factors affecting the natural rate of
unemployment. We can now incorporate the Phillips curve in a monetary
policy game. This is the subject of the next section.
III A STATIC GAME BETWEEN A UNION AND THE
CENTRAL BANK
III.1 The Social Welfare versus the Political Approach to Central Bank
Behaviour
In order to investigate optimal monetary policy consider a central bank that
is concerned with both price stability and unemployment.
More specificly we use
Lt - Z (Apt - Ap ~` ) t 2 (u~ - u ~` )2 (7.12)
where 0 G e C~ and Op~ and u~ are the inflation and unemployment
targets of the central bank. The parameter E measures the weight of
unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the
preferences of the central bank. Normalizing ~p~, u~ and Pt-1 at zero we
get 5
~- 1 pÍ t E u~ (7.13)
2 2
As pointed out in Chapters 4 and 6, the recent literature on monetary policy
games has given two competing interpretations to the loss function of the
monetary policymaker in equation (7.13).
One part of the literature [Havrilesky (1987), Mayer (1990) and Eijffinger
and Schaling (1993b)] views the central bank as a mediator between
different interest groups that try to push monetary policy in various
directions. On this view, the loss function (7.13) reflects a distributionally
motivated political compromise mediated through the central bank between
the advocates of employment stimulation and the advocates of price
s[ability. The ccefficient e then measures the relative political clout of the
two groups. The other part regards equation (7.13) as a social welfare
function and the central bank as a benevolent social planner [Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon ( 1983a, 1983b), Rogoff (1985) and
Canzoneri (1985)].
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Since one of the main purposes of this Chapter is to combine the Rogoff
(1985) model with union behaviour along the lines of Funke (1994), we
follow Rogoff's analysis and choose the social welfare approach to central
bank behaviour.
IIL2 Union Behaviour and the Natural Rate of Unemployment
Following the analysis in Chapter 4 we start with a cooperative game, i.e.
we assume that the natural rate of unemployment is efficient. In the context
of the model of sub-section (fI.2), this can be represented by the assumption
that u the natural rate of unemployment is equal to zero. In the latter case
the central bank has no incentive to try and reduce unemployment below its
equilibrium rate. As there is no conflict between the unemployment targets
of the union and the central bank, the policy game can be seen as a
cooperative one.ó By using lemma 7.2 it can be seen that the achievement
of the central bank's final targets, full em~loyment and price stability, is not
jeopardized if d4 - dq where d4 - P ~(1 - a)r] -t.~
Hence, for given level~ of r and P~ (T, P 1 0), a union is considered as
cooperative if dq - d4 . This state of affairs is summarized in the first
column of Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Union óehaviour and the natural rate of unemployment






u-0 u`-u u~ G u
Natural rate Efficient Inefficient
Union Cooperative Aggressive
We now turn to the third column of Table 7.1, i.e. the situation where the
equilibrium unemployment rate is inefficiently high. In the latter case
discretionary monetary policy is no longer a Pareto-equilibrium, due to the
time-inconsistency of optimal monetary policy. From Figure 7.2 it can be
seen that u~ 0 if dq ~ d4 . Hence, using~ the te~minology of Funke
(1994, p. 328), for given levels of T and P (r, P ) 0), a union is
considered as aggressive if dq ~ dq~.
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III.3 Time-Consistent Equilibrium Under Fully Discretionary Monetary
Policy
Assuming that the union is aggressive i.e. that dq ~ d4~ the central bank
has incentives to systematically create inflation in order to reduce unem-
ployment below its natural rate.
Substituting the Phillips curve (7.8) in the loss function (7.13) yields
L,t - 2 pi } 2[u - 1 1 a Pt } 1 1 a Et-1 Pt - 1la pi]2 (7.14)
From the first order conditions for a minimum of (7.14), i.e. 8L~18p~ - 0,
we obtain the central bank's reaction function to the union's inflationary
expectations
pD -(lE-~)2 a) E ~
t(1 a)Z t E
Et-1 pD -(1 -~3)z t E~`t
(7.15)
where superscript D stands for `fully discretionary regime'.
Taking expectations conditional on information at t- 1 of (7.15) gives
Et - t PD- 1 E a u (7.16)
Equation (7.16) is the reaction function of the union. Upon substituting
(7.16) in (7.5) and noting that F--u g we get the union's nominal wage
demands under the discretionary regime
wD-[ E 1(1 ~)Z l u ( 7.17 )
The more aggressive unions are ( see lemma 7.1), or the more concerned the
central bank is about unemployment stabilization (larger E), the higher
nominal wage settings.
The resulting price level, real wage and unemployment rate are
D E E
pt - cl -a) ~ - cl - a)z -~t} E
(7.18)
D D E
wt - pt - (1 - a) u } ~t(1-a)~ } E
uD - u - (1 -a) F~[
(1 -R)2 t E
(7.19)
(7.20)
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The result indicates that under the fully discretionary regime the central
bank's targets, full employment and price stability, can only be reached as
long as the union is fully cooperative (u - 0, i.e. dq - dq ) and there are
no shocks (~ - 0). Under these circumstances both the union's and the
central bank's loss function are minimized (Wr~ I~- 0).
However, if the union is aggressive (dq ~ dq ) the central bank can no
longer reach its targets. In the absence of shocks, inflation (the price level)
is higher than socially desired and unemployment below its socially optimal
rate. This outcome, however reflects the preferences of the union exacily.
If society dces not care about employment (E - 0), the central bank (as
a social planner) is only concerned about inflation. Hence, setting e- 0 in
equations (7.18) -(7.20) yields the results associated with inflation
targeting. (See Section IV.3).
IV MONETARY TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE
As stated by Rogoff (1985, p. 1180) the adoption of intermediate monetary
targeting andlor central bank independence may be viewed as an
institutional response to the tirne-consistency problem.
Suppose, for example that through a system of rewards and punishments
the central bank's incentives are altered so that it places some direct weight
on achieving a low rate of growth for a nominal variable such as the price
level, nominal GNP, or the money supply.
Although these alternative targets have different stabilization proportions,
Rogoff argues that credibly increasing the central bank's commitment to
achieving any of them would reduce the discretionary rate of inflation.
Next, Rogoff considers central bank independence. Rogoff demonstrates
that society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the
central bank who is known to place a greater weight on inflation
stabilization (relative to unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the
social loss function Lt.
In this section we characierize the wage setting behaviour under a constant
money supply rule, a nominal income rule, inflation targeting and central
bank independence. Again, the wage formation strategy of the union can be
either aggressive or cooperative.
IV.1 Constant Money Supply Rule
For more than two decades target growth rates for one or another measure
of money have often played a key role in the formulation and
implementation of monetary policy. European central banks, including in
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particular the Bundesbank have been especially prominent in this regard.9
Thus monetary stability may be achieved by maintaining steady growth or
even a steady level of money. It is the latter regime that is parametrized in
this section.
The central bank announces that it will follow a constant money supply
rule. Although it is no easy task to impose an external mechanism that
effectively ties the hands of the policy-maker, it is assumed that this
precommitment is credible and irrevocable.
Under a constant money rule the aggregate demand equation may be
described by
yt - ol (mt - pt) t vt (7.21)
where v is a transitory demand shock, v- N(0, Q~2), which e.g. may be
interpreted as a disturbance in the public's demand for money. The
disturbances v and ~ are asstimed to be independent and serially uncorre-
lated .
The union sets the wage so as to minimize its expected loss from (7.4)
under the condition that the central bank follows a constant money rule
(4.1) with mt - 0. Since Et-I~t - Et-tvt - 0 wage demands are not
influenced by shocks. Therefore the expected loss of the union is minimized
if the wage is negotiated att0
w~M - ~ u (7.22)at
where superscript M denotes the money supply targeting regime and
l~ - Q t at (1-R).
The more aggressive unions are (see lemma 7.1), or the smaller the
absolute value of the price elasticity of aggregate demandtt (ot) the
higher nominal wage settings.
The intuition behind this effect is the following. The nominal wage
depends on both real and monetary components. This is shown in equation
(7.5).
wt - Et-1Pt - (1 -a)P (7.5)
As can be seen from the first term on the right hand side, the monetary
component is identical with the expected price level. Under a constant
money supply rule the expected price level is higher the lower ot (this can
be seen from equation (A7.2) from appendix A). Hence, the lower ot the
higher nominal wage settings. The resulting price level, real wage and
unemployement rate are
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PM - ~ u } ~ [(1 -a)v~ - l~~]
wM - PM - (1 -Q)~ - ~ [(1 -Q)v~ - N~cl
(7.23)
(7.24)
uM - ~ - ~ ~cl -a)~~ - ~~~ (7.2s)
A comparison of (7.17) and (7.22) shows that nominal wage claims under
the fully discretionary regime and under a money supply targeting regime
are only identical if al - a(1-(3)le.
Hence, if at 1(i(1-a)IE nominal wage demands will be higher under the
discretionary regime than under a constant money supply rule. The intuition
behind this result is the following. Again using equation (7.s) and noting
that the real component of wage setting -(1-~i)f, is the same under all
monetary regimes, differences in nominal wage claims reflect differences
in expected inflation. From equation (7.16) it can be seen that the more
concerned the central bank is with unemployment stabilization (the higher
e) the higher expected inflation. Also from equation (A7.2) we know that
the higher ot the lower expected inflation under a constant money supply
rule. Hence if at is relatively high (as determined by the inequality above),
nominal wage demands will be higher under the discretionary regime than
under a constant money supply rule. It is the latter case which is assumed
to hold throughout the paper, that is we assume that committing to a
constant money supply rule reduces the rate of inflation.12
IV.2 Nominal Income Rule
In the eighties economists like Tobin (1983), Bean (1983), and Taylor
(198s) discussed nominal GNP as an intermediate target for monetary
policy. Therefore now we will analyze the case where the central bank
follows a nominal income rule and is supposed to be able to target nominal
income accurately, which implies thatt3
Yt}Pt-c (7.26)
where c denotes the policy determined level of nominal income.
Assuming that the central bank wants to keep nominal income at its
equilibrium level c- 0, the union sets the wage under the condition
Nwt - u (7.27)
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where superscript N stands for nominal income rule.
A comparison of (7.22) and (7.27) shows that nominal wage claims under
a money supply rule and under a nominal income rule are only identical if
ot - 1. As pointed out by Funke (1994), p. 7 this reflects that the slope of
both aggregate demand curves (see (7.21) and (7.26)) are identical if vt -
1. However, empirical results suggest that under a money supply rule the
absolute value of the price elasticity of aggregate demand is in the short run
smaller than 1(vt G 1). This implies that nominal wage demands will be
higher under a money supply rule than under a nominal income rule. We
already know that nominal wage demands are highest under the
discretionary regime. Thus, we have wtD ) wtM ) wtN.









As is known, a nominal income rule fully absorbs all demand shocks.
Furthermore, in the absence of shocks the inflation rate under a nominal
income rule (7.28) is lower than under a money supply rule (7.23) under
the assumption that ot G 1. However, the real wage increase and the
unemployment loss are identical in both regimes.
IV.3 Intlation Targeting
Now, the above results will be compared to the case where the central bank
targets the inflation rate directly. This case is relevant since in some Anglo-
Saxon countries, e.q. Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
monetary authorities are trying to achieve monetary stability by an inflation
target. Again, it is assumed that the central bank can target the inflation rate
accurately, which in fact, implies that money supply changes transmit
quickly and foreseeably into price level changes.14
Since pt-t is known at the time the central bank commits itself to achie-
ving a target for pt - pt-1 (the inflation rate), price-level targeting and
inflation-rate targeting are equivalent in this paper. Therefore from now on
we will use the phrases `price level rule' and `inflation targeting' to denote
the same regime.15 As stated by Fischer (1994a, pp. 33-34), once
monetary control errors are taken into account it becomes important to
make the distinction between azero inflation targetand a target ofprice stabiliry.
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We assume the target inflation rate ~p~ to be zero. By setting pt - 0 in
equation (7.21) and rearranging, we obtain the implied evoluation of the
money supply.16 An alternative way of deriving the results in this subsec-
tion is to set e- 0 in equations (7.18) -(7.20).
If the central bank follows a strict price level rule, the nominal wage
which minimizes the expected loss from (7.3) is given by:
wtP - (1 - a) U (7.31)
where superscript P denotes price level targeting. Obviously, nominal wage
demands are lower under a price level rule than under nominal income
tar~eting, a constant money supply rule or the discretionary regime. Hence,
wt 1 wtM 1 wtN ) wtP. Since the central bank adjusts the money
supply so as to keep the price level constant
ptP-O
wtP - ptP - (1 - ,6) u





Independent of the size of shocks the union can reach its (ex ante) preferred
real wage (see (7.4)). However, a supply shock is fully transmitted to
unemployment. t7
IV.4 Central Bank Independence
As stated by Eijffinger (1994, p. 309) in Western Europe there is a clear
tendency to establish (more) independent central banks and to foster,
thereby, monetary stability. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the
independent European Central Bank is fiilly committed to the goal of price
stability in the final stage of EMU by 1997 or later. France and Spain
reformed their central bank laws in order to make the Banque de France
and the Banco de Espana more independent of government. Furthermore,
in some Anglo-Saxon countries, e.g. Canada, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, monetary authorities are trying to achieve monetary stability by
an inflation target.tg Finally, countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech republic, and in Latin America,
Argentina, Chile and Mexico, are looking for a way to strengthen the
position of their central bank in order to realize some degree of price
stability.
Therefore now, following Rogoff (1985, pp. 1177-1180) we consider
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central bank independence as an institutional response to the time-consis-
tency problem. Rogoff demonstrates that society can make itself better off
by selecting an agent to head the central bank who is known to place a
greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to unemployment
stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function Li. He also
demonstrates that, in choosing among potential candidates, it is never
optimal to choose an individual who is known to care `too little' about
unemployment.
Suppose, for example that in period t- 1 society selects an agent to head
the central bank in period t. The reputation of this individual is such that it
is known that if he is appointed to head the central bank, he will maximize
the following objective function
It -(1 2 2) Pt t 2 ut 0 G d2 c oo (7.35)
When d2 is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater
relative weight on inflation stabilization then society does. Hence following
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b, p. 5) we view the coefficient d2 as a
measure of the political independence of the central bank. The higher d2 the
more independent the central bank. Note that if d2 - 0 equation (7.35)
reduces to the social loss function (7.13) and we obtain the results under the
fully discretionary regime of Section III.3.
Similarly, the case where d2 -~ ~ is formally equivalent to the inflation
targeting regime. More specific, setting d2 -~ in equations (7.35) -
(7.41) yields the results of Section IV.3. Hence, the case of central bank
independence can be viewed as intermediate - as a`balance' - between
rules and discretion.
The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium is exactly the
same as in Section III.3.
Equations (7.36), (7.37) and (7.38) are the `I' regime counterparts of
equations (7.15), (7.16) and (7.17) respectievely:
I E(1 -(3) s I
Pt - 2 u} 2 Et-1 P~ -
(1 td2)(1 -a) tE (1 td2)(1 -a) t e
E
Pt
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where superscript I denotes the independent central bank regime. The more
aggressive unions are (see lemma 7.1), the more concerned society is about
unemployment stabilization (larger e) and the less `conservative' the agent
(smaller d2), the higher nominal wage settings.
The resulting prive level, real wage and unemployment rate are
I E
pt - (1 td2)(1 -a)
u - E ~ (7.39)t
(1 td2)(1 -a)Z t E
w~ - pÍ -(1 - Q) u t E {~t
(1 td2)(1 -Q)2 } E
1 (1 td2)(1 -Q)
ut - u - ut
(1 td2)(1 -R)2 t E
(7.40)
(7.41)
A comparison of (7.17) and (7.38) shows that nominal wage claims under
a fully discretionary regime and under an independent central bank regime
are only identical if d2 - 0. Since ex hypothesi d2 1 0, wtD 1 wti, i.e.
nominal wage demands will be higher under the discretionary regime than
under an independent central bank. This result confirms our intuition that
credibly increasing the central banker's commitment to inflation stabilization
reduces the discretionary rate of ( wage) inflation.
Comparing (7.31) and (7.38) shows that nominal wage claims under a
price level rule and under an independent central bank are identical if d2 -~
~. Since ex hypothesi, d2 G oo, wii ~ wtP, i.e. nominal wage demands
under an independent central bank will typically exceed wage demands
under an inflation targeting regime.
Now we turn to a comparison of intermediate monetary targeting and
central bank independence as institutional devices to overcome the time-
consistency problem. A comparison of (7.27) and (7.38) shows that nominal
wage claims under a nominal income nile and under an independent central
bank are only equal if d2 -[e - Q(1-~3)]l~3(1-~3), hence wNt ~ wi~, i.e.
nominal wage demands will be higher under a nominal income rule than
under an independent central bank. We already know that wtD , N,tM ,
w N19
t
Combining all information we have
wiP G wtI G wtN G wtM G w~D for E-(1 -~) G dz G oo (7.42)acl -a)
In appendix A to this paper we show that wage setting depends on both real
and monetary components:
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wA - (1 -R)u t Et-tpc (A7.3)
where superscript A stands for an arbitrary monetary regime. The first
component of (A7.3) is invariant across monetary regimes. Note that
equation (A7.3) is a slightly more general version of equation (7.5). From
lemma (7.1) it can be seen that this component is associated with the
aggressiveness of the union.
The second term of (A7.3) does depend or the choice of monetary regime.
From this component it can be seen that the lower the expected inflation
rate the lower ceteris paribus nominal wage demands.
Combining (A7.3) with (7.42) we get
Et-lptp G Et-tpct G Et-tptN G Ec-tptM G Ec-1pcD for
E-acl -a) G d2 G oo (7.43)acl -a)
Hence, if the weight on ïnflation stabilization relative to unemployment
stabilization in the preferences of the agent who heads the central bank
passes a lower boundary value the independent central bank regime
outperforms intermediate monetary targeting regimes (nominal income rule,
money supply rule) in tying down inflationary expectations. Note however,
that this need not be the typical case. With a different value of d2 it may
well be the other way around.20
This completes the description of the results under an independent central
bank. We now move on to compare the expected values of the loss
functions of the union and society under the five alternative monetary
regimes.
V EVALUATION OF MONETARY REGIMES
In this section we calculate the expected values of the loss functions of
society under the five alternative monetary regimes. We show that society's
optimal framework for monetary stability need not necessarily coincide with
central bank independence. First, we evaluate monetary targeting and
compare the performance of a money stock rule, a nominal income rule, a
price level rule and the fully discretionary regime. Next we evaluate central
bank independence. In examining social welfare we focus on supply shocks.
The reason is that supply shocks are common to all regimes. A demand
(velocity) shock influences social welfare only under a constant money
supply rule.
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V.1 Monetary Targeting
We are now prepared to evaluate monetary targeting regimes from the
perspective of society. But to facilitate exposition in later sections, following
Rogoff (1985), p.p.1175-1176, we shall first develop a notation for
evaluating the expected value of the central bank's loss function under any
arbitrary monetary policy regime `A', Ei-tLtA:
Et-1LA -~(e u2] t fÍA t rA21 (7.44)
where [-iP` - ll2 (pA)Z and -pA is the mean price level in period t.
rA - 2 Et-1 {E [ l~ta f(pA - Et-ipi ) ~(1 -a)l2 t(PA - Et-1PA)2}
Again, the first component of Et-t LA, 'h [e u2] is nonstochastic and
invariant across monetary regimes. It represents the deadweight loss due to
the labour market distortion ( u 1 0 due to dq ~ dq~, see lemma 7.1).
This loss cannot be reduced through monetary policy in a time-consistent
rational expectations equilibrium. The second term, IIA, depends on the
mean inflation rate. This term is also nonstochastic but does depend on the
choice of monetary policy regime.
The final term, rA, represents the `stabilization' component of the loss
function. It measures how succesfully the central bank offsets disturbances
to stabilize unemployment and inflation around their mean values.
By substituting the results relevant for the central bank [(7.18) and (7.20),
(7.23) and (7.25), (7.28) and (7.30), (7.32) and ( 7.34)] into society's loss
function (7.13) and taking expectations we obtain the M, N, P and D and
regime counterparts of expression (7.44). Abstracting from the (common)
deadweight loss, one gets
f1M t rM - a2 u2 t
lfe(vt-1)2 Q2 }[e}(1-a)2l Q~ (7.45)
2ai 2~2
w 2~2
where ~i - ~i t ol(1 -~3)
2
f1N t rN -~ u2 t 2 0~ (7.46)
np t rP - E ~2
2(1 -~i)2 w
2
Í1D t rD - E u2 } E Q2
2(1 -~3)2 2(cl -a)2 tE] "
(7.47)
(7.48)
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As long as the union is cooperative (dq - dq~ and consequently u- 0) f1A
- 0, the choice of regime only depends on the stabilization component of
the loss function.
It can then be shown that
rD~rN~rMGrP for
E ~ (1-a)2 Q2 - o(1-a)~2~, -1~ t a ~ ~ (7.49)
Hence the fully discretionary regime outperforms all intermediate targeting
regimes in stabilizing supply shocks. .
However, if the union becomes aggressive (dq 7 dq~ and "u ) 0) results
differ significanly. In the absence of shocks society would prefer a price
level rule to a nominal income rule, a money supply rule or the fully
discretionary regime, because
ÍÍp G Í1N G ÍÍM G ÍiD for a(1-a) G ot G 122 (7.50)
E
As in Funke (1994, p. 336) the reason is, that under a price level rule the
central bank varies the money supply in such a way that a strong union
reaches its real wage target with zero price inflation, thereby avoiding the
inflationary effect of higher nominal wage demands under a nominal
income, a money supply rule or the fully discretionary regime.
From (7.49) and (7.50) it can be seen that a nominal income rule outper-
forms a constant money supply rule both in offsetting supply shocks (rN G
rM) and in reducing the social loss associated with a high average inflation
rate (f1N G f1M). Hence, obviously the central bank will never view a
constant money supply rule as an optimal monetary arrangement.
From (7.49) it can be seen that the central bank's response to unanticipated
supply shocks is best with discretion. This means that discretion gives the
central bank the option of reacting optimally to domestic real shocks. On
the other hand from (7.50) it can be seen that a nominal income rule
outperforms the fully discretionary regime in bringing down the time-
consistent average rate of wage inflation.
By choosing a nominal income rule the central bank reduces its credibiliry
problem vis-a-vis the union but loses the option of reacting optimally to
domestic real shocks, i.e. it loses flexibiliry. As shown by Lohmann (1992)
and Alogoskoufis (1994), which of the two forces dominates depends on the
relative strength of the two distortions, namely the inefficiency of the high
natural rate of unemployment which produces the high inflation problem,
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and the inefficiency arising from pre-set nominal contacts that cannot take
account of real shocks.
Subtracting (7.46) from (7.48) the per-period difference in welfare losses
between the fully discretionary regime and a nominal income rule is given
by,
Et-1~LD-LN] -
1 ~E2-~iz(1 -~3)Zu2 - (1 -a)z azl (7.51)2 ( l -,a)z (, - a)2 , E ~




To give a numerical example, with Q being about 0.7, e- 1 and a standard
deviation in productivity of the order of 0.02 - which according to Alogos-
koufis (1994, p. 211) is not atypical - the inefficiency in the natural rate
of unemployment must exceed about 0.18 percentage points to make
implementing a nominal income rule worthwhile.23
The choice between a nominal income rule and price level (inflation rate)
targeting also depends on the level of the natural rate of unemployment.
Subtracting (7.47) from (7.46) the per-period difference in welfare losses
between a nominal income rule and a price level rule is given by
Et-1~LN -LP] - 1 [~2i12 f (1 -(3)2 -e Q2]
2 (1 -a)~ ~
Hence a price level rule dominates a nominal income rule if
(7.53)
U i
~E -(I -Q)2]Oh (7.54)
íl -R)Q
Using the same parameter values u must exceed about 9.1 percentage points
to make adoption of a price level rule worthwhile.
For intermediate values of u (0.18 c u G 9.1) it can be shown that a
nominal income rule outperforms both the fully discretionary regime and a
price level rule.
Et-1 LtD 1 Et-1 LtN G Ei-1 LiP for
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(1 -a)2at` G u G
[e -(1 -Q)2] Q~ (7.55)
cl -a)2 }E~ [E2 -a2(1-a)2] cl-a)a
From (7.52), (7.54) and (7.55) it can be seen that the optimal monetary
regime from the perspective of the central bank (being concerned with
social welfare) depends upon the level of the natural rate of unemployment.
By using lemma 7.1 we can state the following. Loosely speaking as the
union becomes more aggressive the central bank moves from the fully
discretionary regime to a nominal income rule. With an even higher weight
placed on the real wage target, a nominal income rule in turn, is dominated
by an inflation targeting regime.
V.2 Central Bank Independence
In this section we evaluate central bank independence as an institutional
device to overcome the time-consistency problem.
The expected loss for society at the end of t- 1 for period t[Et-t LtI]
under central bank independence is calculated by substituting the results
under the I-regime (7.49) and (7.50) into society's loss function and taking
expectations. Abstracting from the (regime-invariant) deadweight loss, one
gets
- - ~2 . r.f(1 td..l2 (1 -[il2 t Fl ~
2[(1 td2)(1 -R)]L
2[(1 }d2) (1-a)2 } E]2 u
Comparing (7.56) with the expected losses for society under the M, N, P
and D-regimes (7.45) -(7.48) reveals the following. Again as long as the
union is cooperative ( d4 - d4~ and consequently u- 0) IIA is 0, the
choice of regime only depends on the stabilization component of the loss
function. It can then be shown that
I'D G I'N G I'I G I'M G I'p for
E ~ cl -a)zcl -a) [2~, -1] t a,
E}(1 - a)2 G dz G r2, QvZ - 024
E - (1 -a)2
o` (7.56)
(7.57)
Hence the independent central bank regime is intermediate between a
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nominal income rule and a money stock rule in stabilizing supply shocks.
Again, if the union becomes aggressive (d4 1 d4~ and u~ 0) results
differ significantly. In the absence of shocks society would prefer an
independent central bank to a nominal income or a money stock rule,
because
IIp G III G IIN G II M G IID for
a(1 -Q) c o C 1 and d~ E - a(' -a) (7.58)E ' Z acl -a)
From (7.57) it can be seen that the central bank's response to unanticipated
supply shocks is better with a nominal income rule than when it is an
independent agent. On the other hand from (7.58) it can be seen that the
independent central bank regime outperforms a nominal income rule in
bringing down the time-consistent average rate of wage inflation. By
selecting an agent to head the central bank that is more inflation averse than
society, society reduces its credibility problem vis-a-vis the union but loses
the option of a better reaction to domestic real shocks, i.e. it loses
flexibiliry.
As stated before, which of the two forces dominates depends on the
relative strength of the two distortions. Subtracting (7.56) form (7.46) the
per period difference in welfare losses between a nominal income rule and
the independent central bank regime is given by,
Et-1 [LtN - LtI] - 'h
[~2[(1 td2)(1 -Q)]2-EZu2
[(1 td2)(1 -a)]2




The independent central bank regime would dominate a nominal income rule
if
u
~ (I }dz)3~z (1 -a)~ [E(1 tdz)-2e-(1 tdz)(1 -R)~]
v~ (7.60)
[(1 fd2)(1 -a)Z tE] aZ[(1 fd2)(1 -a)]2-e2
To give a numerical example, with d2 being about 4 and the same
parameter values as before, u must exceed about 6.9 percentage points to
make setting up an independent central bank worthwhile.
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The choice between an independent central bank and price level (inflation
rate) targeting also depends on the level of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Subtracting (7.47) from (7.56) the per-period difference in welfare




EZ [ 1 uz -[2c1 td2)cl -Q)Z t E- cl -Q)2] v2] (7.61)~ [(1 tdz)(1-a)]~ (1-a)~[(~ taz)(1-a)~ tE]~ ~
Hence a price level rule dominates the independent central bank regime if
u 1 [(1
td2)(1 -a)] J2(1 }d2)(1 -a)2 te-(1 -a)2]
cl -a)[cl }a2)cl -a)2 }E]
(7.62)
Using the same parameters values u must exceed about 9.3 percentage
points to make adoption of a price level rule worthwhile.
For intermediate values of u(6.9 G u G 9.3) it can be shown that the
independent central bank regime outperforms both a nominal income rule
and a price level rule.
E[-1 L[N ~ E[-1 L[I G E[- l L[p for
(1 td2)3l2(1 -~i)2 [E(1 fdz) - 2e - (1 td2)(1 -a)2]
[(1 fd2)(1 -Q)2 } E] a2[(1 td2)(1 -a)]2 - EZ
[(1 tdZ)(1 -a)] [2(1 ta2)cl -Q)ztE-(1 -a)2]
(1 -Q)[(1 fd2)(1 -a)2 tE]
Qu G u G
a~ (7.63)
Combining (7.63) with (7.52), (7.54) and (7.55) we obtain Table 7.2
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Table 7.2 Society's optimal monetary regime.
u 0 G u G ui ut G u G u uz G u G u3 u3 G u
Optimal
Regime




~cl -a~2 }E~ ~E2 -a2 cl -a~2~
~1 td2~3i2c1 -,Q)2 [ecl fd2)-2E-c1 td2)cl -a)2]ow
~cl td2~c1-a~2 } E~ a2~c1 td2~c1-a~~2 -Ez
~cl td2~c1-a~~ ~2c1 td2~c1-a~2 t E-cl -a~2~ a~
cl -a~~cl td2~c1-a~2 } E~
From this table it can be seen that society's optimal framework for
monetary stability need not necessarily coincide with central bank
independence. By using lemma 7.1 we can state the following. Loosely
speaking as the union becomes more aggressive society moves from the
fully discretionary regime to a nominal income rule. With a higher weight
on the real wage target a nominal income rule is dominated by the
independent central bank regime. With an even higher weight placed on the
real wage target, the independent central bank regime in turn, is dominated
by an inflation targeting regime.
This concludes the comparison of monetary regimes. We now move on to
an investigation of the factors influencing the optimal degree of central bank
independence. This is the subject of Section VI.
VI THE OPTIMAL DEGREE OF CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE
In this section we show that the optimal degree of central bank indepen-
dence is contingent on the labour market regime. More specific we show
that the more aggressive the union the higher the optimal degree of central
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VI.1 The Rogoff Theorem
First we reproduce Rogoff s(1985) proof that for society it is optimal to
select an agent to head the independent central bank who places a large, but
finite weight on inflation. The optimal degree of central bank independence
d2~ is defined as that value of d~ that minimizes the expected value of the
loss function of society Et- t Lt ~
Abstracting from the (regime-invariant) deadweight loss the expected value
of the social loss function under regime `I' is
To solve for the value of d2









ad2 [(1 tdz)(I -R)2 t E~3
an' -E2 U2
aá2 - (I td2)3(I -a)2
(7.66)
We are now ready to prove:
PROPOSITION 7.1: For u 1 0, 0 G dz G oo .
Proof: note that d2 ~-1 by assumption. Thus by inspection of (7.66),
aII'ladz is strictly negative. Note also, by inspection of (7.65), that ar'ladz
is strictly negative for
} 2
-[E (I -a) ~ G d2 G 0, zero when dz - 0 and positive for d2 1 0.
(1-R)Z
Therefore, aEt-t Lt'Iad2 is strictly negative for d2 ~ 0. aEt-1 Lt'ladZ
must change from negative to positive at some sufficienlty large value of d2,
since as d2 approaches positive infinity, arl~adZ converges to zero at rate
E2 u2 } E[(1 td2)2(1 -a)2 } El
Q2 (7.56)
2~(1 td2)cl -a)~2 2[(1 td2)(1 -a)2 t E~z ~
that minimizes Et-t LtI, differentiate (7.56)
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d2-2, whereas aIIllad2 converges to zero at rate dz-3. Therefore, d2~ G
0025 Q.E.D.
VI.2 Wage Formation and the Optimal Degree of Central Bank Inde-
pendence
Proposition (7.1) is Rogoff's theorem. In his analysis the labour market
distortion is exogenous. In the present analysis this is no longer the case.
Hence, the following can be seen as an extension of the Rogoff theorem.
First using a graphical method we develop an alternative way of
determining the optimal degree of central bank independence. Next, we
show how this result is conditioned on the supply side effect of inflation.
By setting (7.1) equal to zero we obtain the first-order condition for a
minimum of Et-I LIt
I Io - an } ar
ad2 ad2
Substituting (7.65) and (7.66) into (7.67) yields
-e2u2 E2(1 -R)2d2aw - 0
(1 -a)2(1 td2)3 } [(1 fd2)(1 -a)2}E]3
(7.67)
(7.68)
Equation (7.68) determines d2~ as an implicit function of e, u, v~2 and a.
A solution for d2 always exists and is unique.
To see this we adapt a graphical method used by Cukierman (1992, pp.






Note that the function F(d2) on the right-hand side of equation (7.69) is
monotonically decreasing in dz that
F(0) - ~(1 a)z tE]3u2 lim F(d2) -(1 a)2u2 and
02(1 -R)4 d,~~
o~
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(1 -Q)2"Z c F(d2) G [(1 -Q)z }E13~2
o~ o~ (1 - (3)4
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(These statements are demonstrated in appendix D to this chapter).
We are now ready to prove:
PROPOSITION 7.2: (1 -(3)2
u2 C d2 G[(1 -(3)2 } e]3u2
o? v~(1 -(3)4
Proof: the left-hand side of (7.69) is a 45-degree straight line through the
2t~3 2
origin. Since F(0) -~(1 -a) ]~~ and aF G 0 these two functions
a?(1 -a)4 ad2
must intersect at one and only on point. Moreover, since
u2(1 -(3)2 G F(d2) G ~(1 -(
3)2 t e]3u2 ,
the intersection occurs at a
Q~ Q~(1-a)4
value of d2 that is bounded between (1 -a)Zu2 and ~(1 -a)2 }E]3u2
a~ a~(1 -,6)4
Q.E.D.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the argument graphically. Clearly a solution for d2
exists and is unique.
F
Figure 7.3 The optimal degree of central bank
independence
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We are now ready to prove:
PROPOSITION 7.3: The more aggressive the union (the higher dq) the
higher the optimal degree of central bank independence.
Proot from Appendix D, ~á ~ 0, this implies that when dq gces up,
4
the curve F(d2) in Figure 7.3 shifts upward. As a consequence the
equilibrium value of d2 increases.
The intuition behind this result is the following. If the union becomes more
aggressive ceteris paribus nominal wage settlements go up.26 The higher
nominal wage settlements tend to have inflationary consequences. However,
if society wants maximum social welfare it will choose an agent to head the
central banking institution who will not accommodate these demands. This
means that by putting the `monetary screws' upon wage pressures inflation
is stopped before it can emerge. This completes the section on the optimal
degree of central bank independence.
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS
In many European countries large unions figure prominently in the wage
formation process. This paper has investigated the interdependence of the
choice of domestic monetary regime and the wage formation process.27
Unlike in papers by Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Canzoneri (1985)
and Lohmann (1992), the private sector here has an active strategic role.
The main implication of this is that the labour market distortion, which is
assumed exogenous in the existing literature in this paper, depends on the
aggressiveness of the union. As shown in lemma 7.1, if the trade union
becomes more aggressive the natural rate of unemployment is pushed
upwards. The implications of this mechanism are twofold.
First, as shown in Section V society's optimal framework for monetary
stability - being contingent on the level of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment - also depends on the aggressiveness of the union. Loosely speaking
as the union becomes more aggressive society moves from the fully
discretionary regime (which is first best in terms of flexibiliry) via GNP
targeting and the independent central bank regime towards inflation
targeting (which is first best in terms of credibiliry).
This means that in general it need not be optimal for society to have an
independent central bank. Secondly, as shown in proposition 7.3, if
society's optimal framework for monetary stability does coincide with
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central bank independence, the more aggressive the union the higher the
optimal degree of central bank independence. This means that society's
optimal central banking institution is contingent on the labour market
regime.
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APPENDIX A7 MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES UN-
DER ANY ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE MONETARY
TARGETING REGIME
In this appendix we develop a notation for deriving the macrceconomic
results i.e. the nominal wage, the price level, the real wage and the
unemployment rate under an arbitrary intermediate monetary target. The
results in Section IV can then be viewed as special cases of the more
general results derived below.
A7.1 Macroeconomic Results
By equating the aggregate supply curve (7.7) and the aggregate demand
curve (7.21) we get the following equation in the price level.
PA - ~ [aEc-1PA } 01(1 -a)mA t a(1 -~3)u f (1 -~3)v~ - ~c~](A7.1)
where ~- ~3 t Qt(1 -a) and superscript A stands for an azbitrary
monetary targeting regime, A- M, N, P. Taking expectations conditional
on information at the end of t- 1 of (A7.1) yields
Et-1PA - a ~ } Et-1mA (A7.2)at
In Section III.2 we showed that p- - u . Substituting the latter in (7.5)
and adding superscripts we get
wA - (1 - ~) u t Et-1PA (A7.3)
It is interesting to see that wage setting has both real and monetary
components. The first component is invariant across monetary targeting
regimes. From lemma 7.1 it can be seen that this component is associated
with the aggressiveness of the union.
The second term dces depend on the choice of monetary targeting regime.
From this component it can be seen that the lower the expected inflation -
i.e. the more credible the monetary target - the lower ceteris paribus
nominal wage demands.
Subtracting (A7.2) from ( A7.1) we obtain the following expression for
unanticipated inflation.
ptA - Et-1PtA - ~ [al(1-R)(rn~A-Et-1mtA) } (1-(3) vtF~t] (A7.4)
Substituting the latter expression into (7.8) yields the solution for unem-
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ployment
1 a(pA - Et-1Pc t pt) (A7.5)
Now we turn to the determination of the real wage. Subtracting ptA from
both sides of (A7.3) yields
wtA - ptA - (1 - a) u - (PtA - Et-1PtA) (A7.6)
Finally, subtracting (A7.6) from (A7.3) we get an expression for the price
level
ptA - wtA - (wtA - PtA) (A7.7)
where the first term on the right hand side is known from (A7.3), whilst the
second term follows from (A7.6).
A7.2 Money Stock Rule and Nominal Income Rule (A - M, N)
In case of a money stock rule mtM - Et-1mtM - 0. It is then straightfor-
ward to derive the results of Section IV.1. First, compute unanticipated
inflation from (A7.4) and then proceed along the lines suggested above.
Targeting nominal income (yt f pt) at c, where c- 0 implies the
following rule for the evolution of the money supply28
mtN - d3 ptN - 1 vt (A7.8)
al
a 1 - 1
where d3 -
1
Hence, under a nominal income rule the central bank accommodates
changes in the price level. It can be easily seen that ~a3 - 2) 0.
t at
Hence, the greater the price elasticity of aggregate demand (or equivalently
the more effective monetary policy relative to fiscal policy)29 the higher
the degree of monetary accommodation. Taking expectations of (A7.8)
yields
Et-1mtN - d3 Et-1PtN (A7.9)
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Subtracting (A7.9) from (A7.8), substituting the result in (A7.4) and
rearranging we obtain an expression for unanticipated inflation. The results
of Section IV.2 can then easily be derived.
A7.3 Price Level ( Inflation Rate) Targeting (A - P)
The case of price level targeting is analytically the simplest. Ex hypothesi
the central bank credibly commits to a zero inflation rate. Hence ptP -
Et-1PtP - 0. By using (A7.3), (A7.5) and (A7.6) the results for the
nominal wage, the real wage and the unemployment rate as presented in
Section IV.3 can then be obtained without difficulty.
APPENDIX B7 EXPECTED LOSS OF THE UNION
UNDER ALTERNATIVE MONETARY REGIMES
In this appendix we calculate the expected values of the loss functions of the
union under the five alternative regimes i.e. the fully discretionary regime,
a constant money supply rule, a nominal income rule, a price level rule,
and central bank independence.
In examining union welfare we focus on supply shocks. The reason is that
supply shocks are common to all regimes. A demand (velocity) shock
influences social welfare only under a constant money supply rule.
We show that the choice of the optimal regime depends upon the aggres-
siveness of the union.
The expected loss of the union at the end of t-1 for period t[Et-1 WtA]
under the four alternative regimes is calculated by substituting the results
under each regime, [(7.8) and (7.9), (7.24) and (7.25), (7.29) and (7.30),
(7.33) and (7.34), (7.40) and (7.41)] into the union's loss function (2.4) and
taking expectations. One obtains:
E- WM - Ht





Et-1WtN - H t ~ Qu
Et-1WtP - H t 1 Q2
2(1 -~3)2
~
E- W D- H t
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~ (1 td2)z (1 -(3)2 t dq e2 2
Et-1 Wt - H} 2 2 a~
(B7.5)
2[(1 td2) (1 -R) t El
d 1- Z}1
where H- 1[d ~ t f~` 2] t u[( g( a) )
2 2
The first component of Et-[WtA, i.e. H, is non-stochastic and invariant
across monetary regime~. It represents the deadweight loss due to the
union's preferen~es (r, ?) and due to the labour market distortion (u 1 0
due to dq 1 dq , see lemma 7.1). This loss cannot be reduced through
monetary policy in a time-consistent rational expectations equilibrium.
The stochastic terms depend on the choice of monetary policy regime and
represent the `stabilization' component of the loss function. They measure
how succesfully employment and real wages are stabilized around their
mean values.
(B7.1) describes the expected loss of the union under a constant money
rule, (B7.2) the expected loss of the union under a nominal income rule,
(B7.3) the expected loss of the union under a price level rule, (B7.4) the
expected loss of the union under the fully discretionary regime and (B7.5)
under central bank independence.
Comparing (B7.1), (B7.2), (B7.3) (B7.4) and (B7.5), reveals that - as in
Funke (1994, p.335) -30 the preferred regime on part of the union
depends only on the size of the shocks. In the absence of shocks (v~2 - 0~2
- 0), the loss of the union is identical under all five regimes. When
demand shocks are large, a nominal income rule or a price rule is
preferable to the union.
In the case of supply shocks, subtracting (B7.2) from (B7.4) the per-period
difference in welfare losses between the fully discretionary regime and a
nominal income rule is given by,
Et-1[WD - WN] - (1
-Q)Z [ 1 -dq(1 -Q)Z-2dqE]a2 (B7.6)2 [(1 -a)2 } E]2 w
- q u t P' - dqr(1 -(3)]
The fully discretionary regime would dominate a nominal income rule if,
d 1 1 (B7.7)
q (1 -a)Z t2e
To give a numerical example, with (3 being about 0.7 and e- 1 the
weight assigned to real wage stabilization relative to employment stabili-
zation in the preferences of the union must exceed about 0.5 to make
216 Instiiutions and Moncrury Pnlicy
abandoning a nominal income rule worthwhile.
The choice between the discretionary regime and prive level (inflation rate)
targeting also depends on how much weight dq is placed on the real wage
target.
Subtracting (B7.3) from (B7.4) the per-period difference in welfare losses
between discretion and an inflation target is given by
D P E dq(1 -Q)2E - 2(1 -(3)2 - E
Et-1[Wt - Wt l - -[ ] ~2 (B7.8)2 (1-a)2[cl -a)2 t E]2 ~
Hence a price level rule dominates the fully discretionary regime if
dq ) 2(1 -~i)2 e i t 1 (B7.9)
(1 -Q)Z
Using the same parameter values dq must exceed about 13.2 to make
adoption of a price level rule worthwhile. For intermediate values of dq (0.5
G dq G 13.2) it can be shown that the discretionary regime outperforms
both a nominal income rule and a price level rule.
Et-1WtN ~ Et-1WtD G Et-lE WtP for
1 G d G
1 t2e-i(1 -Q)Z (B7.10)4
(1 -Q)Z t 2e (1 -(3)2
Subtracting (B7.5) from (B7.4) the per-period difference in welfare losses
between the fully discretionary regime and the independent central bank
regime is given by,
D I Ed2(1 -a)Z
Et-i[Wt -Wt] - 2
[(dqE-1) [2(1 -~i)2 f d2(1 -a)2 t 2E] - Ed2] ~2
(B7.11)
[cl -a)2 }E]2 [cl tdZ) cl -a)2 tE~z ~
an independent central bank dominates the fully discretionary regime if,
d ~ 1 tE-icl -a)Z (B7.12)4 (1-,a)2 t2E(2 tdZ)-I
To give a numerical exarnple, with the same parameter values as before
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(~3 being about 0.7 and e- 1) the weight assigned to real wage stabilization
relative to employment stabilization in the preferences of the union must
exceed about 2.6 to make abandoning the discretionary regime worthwhile.
The choice between an independent central bank and prive level (inflation)
targeting also depends on how much weight is placed on the real wage
target.
Subtracting (B7.3) from (B7.5) the per-period difference in welfare losses
between the independent central bank regime and an inflation target is given
by
I p 1 e[dqe(1 -~3)2-2(1 td2)(1 -~i)z-e] 2
Et-t ~t - Wt ] - - [ ] Q (B7.13)
2 (1 -a)2[(1 td2)(1 -a)2 te]2
w
Hence a price level rule dominates an independent central bank if
dq 1
1 }2(1 }dZ)E-1(1 -a)Z
(1 -a)2
(B7.14)
Using the same parameter values dq must exceed about 21.1 to make
adoption of a price level rule worthwhile. For intermediate values ofdq (2.6
G dq G 21.1) it can be shown that having an independent central bank
outperforms both the fully discretionary regime and a price level rule.
Et-1 WtD ~ Et-1 WtI G Et-1 WtP for
1 tE-1(1 -Q)z
4
(1 -a)2 t2e(2 td2)-1 (1 -Q)2
(B7.15)
From (B7.7), (B7.9), (B7.10), (B7.12), (B7.14) and (B7.15) it can be seen
that the optimal monetary regime from the perspective of the union depends
upon how much weight is placed on the real wage target.
Loosely speaking as the union becomes more aggressive it moves from a
nominal income rule to the fully discretionary regime. With a higher weight
placed on the real wage target, the discretionary regime in turn is dominated
by having an independent central bank. However, the latter regime becomes
inferior to an inflation targeting regime if aggressiveness increases even
further. This state of affairs is summarized in Table B7.1.
~ a ~ 1
t2(1 tdZ)E-~(1-p)2
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Table B7.1 The union's optimnl monetary regime.
dq dq G dq t dq t G dq G d42 d42 G dq G dq3 dq 7 d43
Optimal
Regime
N D I P
where
dql - ~ dq2 -
1 te-I(1 -Q)2 and
(1 -~i)2 t2e (1 -Q)2 t2E(2 td2)-1
I }2(1 ~d2)E-t(1 -~i)2
dd, -
(1 -a)2
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If the union becomes
more aggressive it is more interested in purchasing power stabilization than
in employment stabilization. Thus as the union becomes more aggressive it
also becomes more inflation averse. The latter preferences are reflected in
the choice of its optimal monetary regime.
APPENDIX C7 THE DERIVATION OF THE EXPECTED
VALUE OF SOCIETY'S LOSS FUNCTION UNDER ANY
ARBITRARY MONETARY POLICY REGIME
In this appendix following Rogoff (1985), pp. 1175-1176 we develop a
notation for evaluating the expected value of society's loss function under
any arbitrary monetary policy regime `A', Et-t LtA (equation (7.44) of the
text). Unemployment under regime A is given by
uA - u- l la (PA-Et-1PA } N~) (C7.1)
Squaring and taking expectations yields
Et-t(u~)~ - u~tEt-t~1~~Q } 11~(P~-E~-tP~)]~
The price level under regime A can be expanded as
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where pA is the mean (expected) price level in period t. Squaring and
taking expectations in turn yields
Et-1(PA)2 - (PA)2 t Et-1(PA-Et-IPA)2 (C7.4)
The expected value of society's loss function under regime A is
A 1 A2 E AZ
Et-1Lt - 2 Et-1(Pt )} 2 Et-t(ut ) (C7.5)
Substituting (C7.2) and (C7.4) into (C7.5) one obtains equation (7.44) of
the text.
APPENDIX D7 DERIVATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF
THE FUNCTION F(d2) IN EQUATION (7.68)
1 Demonstration that aF G 0
adz
The first derivative of F with respect to d2 is given by
aF -3uZE[(1 td2)(-Q)ZtElz
adZ Q?(1 -a)a(1 }d2)a
which is negative.
2
2 Demonstration that aF ~ 0
aa2
The second derivative fo F with respect to dz is given by
82F 6~zEr[r-E~
ad2 - (1 -a)4(1 }d2)Sv~
where r-(1-I-dZ)(1-a)z f 2E, (D7.2) is positive.
2tE3 2




This can be shown by direct examination of the right-hand side of (7.69) at
d2 - 0.
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4 Demonstration that uZ(I 2a)z c F(d2) c~(I zr3)2
}E~3U2
Q~ Q~(1 -a)4
Since F(0) - ~(I -Q)Z
~E~3u2
a~(1 -~i)4
lim F(d2) - 02( ~2 Q)2 and ~d~ C 0, F(dz) must be bounded between
d.,-~oo
W
u2(1 -a)2 and F(0).
2o~
5 Demonstration that ~á ] 0
4
We can expand this derivative as aF , au The first term is given by
8u 8dq
8F 2[(1 td2)(I -~i)~ f E]3
au - Q~(I -a)a(I td2)3
u
whilst the second term is known from Section II.3.
au - (I -~)[T}(1-a)e' ~
aá4 - ~d4(1-a)z t 1~2








1. For instance see Issing (1993).
2. Funke shows that the optimal framework for monetary stability depends on the wage
negotiation behaviour of the union, and, vice versa, that the wage formation process is
influencecl by the choice of the nominal anchor. However, Funke's modelling of the labour
market is rudimentary using real output as a proxy for employment. Moreover, his ranking
of monetary regimes is correct only under the assumption that supply shocks are zero.
3. In Chapter 4 we only address deviations of unemployment, i.e. wa analyze the more simple
case where dq - 0.
4. Actual output and employment will equal their natural rates when all expectations are
fulfilled. Hence, the natural rate of employment equals f and the natural rate of output is
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5. Price-level targeting and inflation-rate targeting are equivalent hera, since pt. t is known at
the time the central bank commits itself to achieving a target for pi - pi-t. Once monetary
control errors are taken into account it becomes important to make the distinction between
a Zero irflatiort tnrget and a tnrget of price srability. See Fischer (1994a, pp. 33-34).
6. For a review of some important concepts of game theory see Blackburn and Christensen
(1989).
7. Following the terminology of Tinbergen ( 1966, p. 40) and Theil ( 1968, pp. 97-98) at this
point the preferences of the union and the central bank are coiuistent. As emphasized by
Englander (1990, pp. 20-21) the existence of inconsisrent preferences is a necessary condition
for the emergence of an inflationary bias. This will be shown in Section lll.3.
8. u ~ fb - P . Upon normalizing FS at zero we get ti ~-P .
9. According to Friedman (1994, p. 104) in the United States the Federal Reserve System first
began to incorporate explicit money growth targets in its policymaking process in 1970, and
since 1975 the Fed has been reyuired under law to set such targets and to report regularly
to Congress on its success or failure in meeting lhem. Since then the practical importance
of money growth targets in U.S. monetary policy making has varied over time. As is well
known the targets were especially important during the period of disinflationary monetary
policy in 1979-1982.
10. For the derivation of the macro-economic results under any arbitrary monetary targeting





12. With Q being about 0.7 and e- l. ot must exceed 0.21 for this incyuality to be satisfied.
13. According to Issing (1994, p. 138) the main objections against GNP targeting - particularly
from those implementing monetary policy - are the following. Movements in GNP are
subject to a variety of influences. This means that at best central banks can only try and
control such a variable over a period far in excess of a year. Consequently, it is likewise
impossible to set targets for a manageable period and to use these to illustrate one's
commitment to price stability. Another drawback of GNP targeting is that data about GNP
are available only with a long lag.
14. As pointed out by Mullins ( 1994, p. I1) because of the long time lags between monetary
policy actions and the impact on inFlation, one has to be wary of policy induced amplification
of cycles from inflation rate targeting. For empirical evidence on this danger see Judd and
Motley (1991).
15. In Chapter 2 inflation targeting is parametrized within an optimal contract framework.
16. The rule is rr~ - liQt (y~vt) where yt is determined by equation (7.7).
17. This result sheds some doubt on Freedman's ( 1994, p. 26) claim that inflation targets allow
for a form of partial stabiliiation of output fluctuations.
18. For a recent discussion about the independence of the Bank of England and the associated
inflation targeting framework see CEPR ( 1993).
19. See section IV.2.
otC-Q(1-Q) N I M20. For instance if G d, G oo we get Ei. t ptP t Er. t pt G E~- t p~ G Ei, t pt
Q(1 -Q)
c Et-tpcD.
21. We derive equation (7.44) in appendix C7.
22. at ~ Q(1 -Q) if e 7 Q(1 - Q) . Since Q(I -Q) ~ (1 -Q)? the inequality of
e ot at (1-R)[2at-l] t Q
(7.49) also holds.
23. Remember from Table 7.1 that the natural rate of unemployment is considered to be
Qé
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inefficiently high ifu~ u'. Whua u' is the cantral bank's unemployment target. Hence the
extent of the inefficiency can be exprassecl in percentaga points as u- u'. Having normalized
u' at zero this inefficiency simplifies to u.
24. rZ is the larger (positive) root of the polynomial (e - 2A(1 - Q)'-]d,'- f 2[s - 2A(1 -(3)'- -
2Ac]d, t[e - 2A{(1 -(ï)` t 2e} -(2A - l) ( l- Q)"'- c'-] which arises from the comparison
1 te(at - 1)'
of I'1 and I'M. The reduced form parameter A- . Using the same parameter2~,
values as before (Q -.7, o~ -.5, s- 1) r, - 6.44.
25. As pointed out by Rogoff (1985, p. 1178) it is extremely difficult to write down a closed
form solution for d,'.
26. See equation (A7.3).
27. See also Carter and Maddock (1987), Tabellini (19886) and Akhand (1992).
28. It is obtained by adding pt on both sides of (7.21), setting (yt t pt) - 0 and rearranging
terms.
29. For a discusion in which at is a reduced form parameter from an explicit IS - LM model,
see Chapter 5.
30. Funke does not include central bank independence in his analysis.
8. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The proper conduct of macroeconomic stabilization policy poses a
number of interesting questions. An important and time-honoured issue,
particularly relevant for monetary policy, is the rules versus discretion
debate. This debate has continued to echo through the history of central
banking. In particular, it underlies the theoretical rationale for central
bankindependence.
Chapter 2 of this book surveys the rules versus discretion debate both
from historical and analytical perspectives. We show that there are two
major theoretical issues in the controversy. That is, those who favour
rules have employed two kinds of arguments in order to demonstrate the
undesirability of discretion in monetary policy.
The first argument, originating in the writings of Friedman, is that
policymakers not bound by a rule would be tempted into excess activism,
destabilizing rather than stabilizing the economy.
The second argument dates back to the introduction to the notion of
dynamic inconsistency which importantly changed the debate. In game-
theoretic models the inflationary bias of monetary policy made the case
for a monetary rule. Alternatively the dynamic inconsistency problem
may be overcome by setting up independent central banks. Granting
more or less independence to the central bank is a way to organize
institutions that decide on, and implement monetary policy.
The question that is addressed in Part I of the book (Chapters 3, 4,
and 5) is whether the structure of these institutions matters for the choice
of policy and economic performance.
In Chapter 3 we quantify central bank independence using a number of
legal attributes from central bank laws. Twelve industrial countries are
examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Gennany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and
Switzerland. First we compare the measures (indices) of central bank
independence as presented in the literature. After a critical examination
of the existing indices we construct a new index of central bank indepen-
dence, called the Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) index. According to this index,
for example, central banks in which the only or main objective of
monetary policy (as specified in the law) is price stability are classified
as being more independent than central banks with a number of
objectives in addition to price stability, or banks in whose law price
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stability is not mentioned as an objective at all.
According to the ES index the Deutsche Bundesbank, De Neder-
landsche Bank and the Schweizerische Nationalbank turn out to be the
most independent central banks. Intermediate institutions are the central
banks of Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Sweden. The Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of
Canada are the least independent central banks.
In Chapter 3 central banks in which the only policy goal (as specified
in the law) is price stability are classified as being more independent than
central banks with a number of objectives in addition to price stability.
Therefore in Chapter 4 following Kenneth Rogoff we define central bank
independence as the strength of the `conservative bias' of the central
bank as embodied in the law. Hence we follow the legislative approach
to price stability.
In this Chapter on the basis of a slightly modified version of the
Rogoff model, we derive several propositions concerning the relationship
between central bank independence and (the variance of) inflation and
output growth. These propositions are tested for the same set of countries
for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1991). In testing the model we
use the indices of central bank independence discussed in Chapter 3.
The main conclusions of this Chapter are the following. First of all,
both our model and estimation results, give further support to the well-
known inverse relationship between the degree of central bank indepen-
dence and the level of inflation found in the literature. However, it
should be emphasized that these results are particularly sensitive to the
numerical values of indices. Secondly, we find no empirical evidence that
the more independent the central bank is, the lower the variability of
inflation. Thirdly, no relationship can be found between central bank
independence and the level of real output growth. Our interpretation of
this outcome is that the attainment and maintenance of low inflation by
an independent central bank is not accompanied by large costs or benefits
in terms of sustainable economic growth. The absence of a long-run trade
off between inflation and growth implies that the establishment of central
bank independence is a free lunch. Fourthly and finally, our estimation
results reject clearly a positive relation between independence and the
variability of real output growth. An independent central bank dces not
lead to more variable economic growth in the short run. In other words,
inflation-averse central banks do not bear the costs of triggering
recessions nor do politically sensitive central banks reap the benefits of
avoiding them.
For a closed economy the inflationary bias of governments may be
explained by two arguments. The first argument, the employment motive
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for monetary expansion, is based on the assumption that political forces
in democratic societies may be tempted to trade price stability for
temporary decreases in unemployment. This argument underlies the
models of Chapters 4, 6, and 7.
The second argument, the revenue motive for monetary expansion,
focuses on the risk of the government exploiting the central bank's
capacity to create seigniorage to finance expenditure that the goverment
is unwilling to finance out of current or future taxation. Hence
constraints on the amount of credit that the govermnent can receive from
the central bank have traditionally been considered an essential
component of independence.
Chapter 5 analyses central bank independence in the coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies. We show that greater economic independen-
ce of the central bank - i.e. lower monetary accommodation of govern-
ment budget deficits - reduces inflation persistence. Thus lower inflation
persistence may not only be caused by the exchange-rate regime - as
shown by recent empirical research - but also by the way monetary and
fiscal policy are coordinated, i.e. by the domestic monetary regime. Also
our result can be viewed as a dynamic extension of the inverse
relationship between central bank independence and the level of inflation.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the dynamic inconsistency literature does
not dispute the possibility of stabilizing activist feedback policy. The
model of Chapter 4, being a slightly modified version of the Rogoff
model, is a fine example of a model in which - dynamic inconsistency
issues notwithstanding - there is an important role for activist stabilizati-
on policy. Rogoff demonstrates that society can make itself better off by
selecting an agent to head the central bank who is known to place a
greater weight on inflation stabilization (has a stronger `conservative
bias') than is embodied in the social loss function. However, because the
central bank has private information about productivity shocks, it also
pays for society to have the central bank partly accommodate these
shocks before they pass on to inflation and unemployment. Hence,
determining the optimal degree of central bank independence involves
trading off the credibility gains associated with lower average inflation
versus loss of flexibiliry due to a distorted response to output shocks.
In par[ II of the book (Chapters 6 and 7) we investigate how central
banks and monetary regimes themselves change and develop in response
to individual and collective beliefs, preferences and strategies. Both
chapters are extensions of Chapter 4; the central or workhorse model of
the book. In this part using a graphical method we develop a new way of
determining the optimal degree of central bank independence. Unlike the
existing literature, we are able to express the upper and lower bounds of
228 Summary and Concluding Remarks
the interval containing this degree in terms of the structural parameters of
the model. Also we show how the optimal degree of central bank
independence is conditioned on the extensions investigated in these
chapters.
Chapter 6 extends Chapter 4 to allow for an inflation sensitive natural
rate of growth. Hence, we integrate the longer-term relationship between
inflation and growth into the literature on central bank independence. As
the evidence points strongly to a predominantly inverse long-term
relationship we assume that the supply-side effect of inflation is negative.
We find that this effect reduces the inflationary bias of discretionary
monetary policy and mitigates society's credibility problem. As society's
optimal framework for monetary stability depends on the balance be-
tween credibility and flexibility we show that the higher the supply side
effect of inflation, the lower the optimal degree of central bank indepen-
dence. Hence the inflation growth nexus weakens the case for central
bank independence.
In Chapter 7 we combine the model of Chapter 4 with labour union
behaviour along the lines of New-Keynesian bargaining theories of
unemployment. This in order to integrate the study of monetary instituti-
ons with that of labour market institutions. The result is that the natural
rate of unemployment becomes endogenous. We characterize wage
setting in a totally unionized economy under a constant money supply
rule, GNP targeting, full commitment to a simple zero inflation rule, a
discretionary regime and an independent central bank. The wage formati-
on strategy of the union can be either cooperative or aggressive. We
show that the natural rate of unemployment becomes proportional to the
aggression of the union. Since the natural rate of unemployment corres-
ponds with the labour market distortion, we find that the more aggressive
the union the higher the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary
policy and the bigger society's credibility problem. With society's opti-
mal framework for monetary stability depending on the balance between
credibility and flexibility, we show that the more aggressive the union the
higher the optimal degree of central bank independence.
With society's optimal central banking institution being contingent on
the labour market regime, this Chapter stresses the recent insight that
independence should be viewed as a preventive rather than a remedial
device. Once high inflation has been allowed to develop central bank
independence alone does not suffice to extirpate it.
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Summary in Dutch
Samenvatting
Recentelijk is er wereldwijd een toenemende belangstelling voor het
vraagstuk van de onafhankelijkheid van centrale banken. Op de EG-top
in Maastricht in december 1991 werd het verdrag aangaande de Econo-
mische en Monetaire Unie (EMU) gesloten. Volgens dit verdrag zal in de
eindfase van de EMU de Europese Centrale Bank de exclusieve verant-
woordelijkheid voor het monetaire beleid krijgen. Deze instelling is qua
onafhankelijkheid van nationale en Europese politieke instituties te
vergelijken met de Deutsche Bundesbank. Verder hebben Frankrijk en
Spanje wetswijzigingen ingevoerd die hun centrale banken onafhankelij-
ker van de regering maakten.
In een aantal Angelsaksische landcn zoals Canada, Nieuw-Zeeland en
het Verenigd Koninkrijk trachten de monetaire autoriteiten monetaire
stabiliteit te bereiken door middel van een inflatie doelstelling. Hiertce
stelde Nieuw Zeeland in februari 1990 wetgeving in die de onafhan-
kelijkheid van haar Reserve Bank vergrootte. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk
wordt er op dit moment een levendige discussie gevoerd over een
mogelijk onafhankelijker positie van de Bank of England.
Ook in Oost-Europa is een dergelijke ontwikkeling gaande. Hongarije,
Polen en de Tsjechische Republiek hebben hun centrale banken onafhan-
kelijker gemaakt. Tenslotte zijn dezelfde tendensen in Latijns-Amerika te
bespeuren, waar de centrale banken van Argentinië, Chili, Mexico en
Venezuela onafhankelijker werden.
De theoretische argumenten voor centrale bank onafhankelijkheid zijn
te vinden in het academische `rules versus discretion' debat. Dit deba[
begon in het 19e eeuwse Engeland in het kader van een bezinning op de
institutionele structuur van de Bank of England.
In hoofdstuk 2 geven wij een overzicht van dit debat. We laten zien
dat de discussie zich op een tweetal hoofdthema's heeft toegespitst. Het
eerste thema dateert uit de jaren vijftig. Het vindt zijn oorsprong in het
werk van de Amerikaanse econoom Milton Friedman. Diens stelling is
dat actieve pogingen van centrale banken om de economische conjunc-
tuurcyclus te stabiliseren, gedoemd zijn te mislukken. Vanwege onvolle-
dige informatie, en allerlei vertragingen tussen concipiëring en uitvcering
van beleid, werkt actief (discretionair) ingrijpen in de economie vaak
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averechts. In plaats van de cyclus te dempen wordt zij dan versterkt.
Daarom is het beter de handen van centrale bankiers te binden door het
instellen van een vaste geldgroeiregel. Het tweede thema ging een
belangrijke rol spelen in de jaren 80 na de introductie van het begrip
tijdsconsistentie. Met behulp van speltheoretische modellen werd aange-
toond dat discretionaire monetaire politiek gepaard gaat met systemati-
sche inflatie (`inflationary bias'). Door de instelling van een regel kan
deze inflatie worden voorkomen. Een alternatieve manier om dit pro-
bleem op te lossen is het instellen van een onafhankelijke centrale bank.
Door een onafhankelijk instituut te belasten met het monetaire beleid kan
de geloofwaardigheid van de monetaire autoriteiten worden versterkt,
waardoor de inflatie in neerwaartse richting wordt omgebogen.
Het rules versus discretion debat is dus tot de dag van vandaag uiterst
relevant voor de inrichting van monetaire instituties en de vormgeving
van macroeconomische stabilisatiepolitiek. In deel I van dit prcefschrift,
(hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5), onderzoeken wij de relatie tussen deze inrich-
ting enerzijds, en economische variabelen als inflatie en economische
groei anderzijds.
In hoofdstuk 3 kwantificeren wij onafhankelijkheid aan de hand van
bepaalde aspecten van de wetgeving met betrekking tot de centrale bank.
Allereerst vergelijken we de maatstaven (indices) van centrale bank
onafhankelijkheid uit de bestaande literatuur. Vervolgens construeren wij
een nieuwe maatstaf van onafhankelijkheid, de Eijffinger-Schaling (ES)
index. Volgens de ES index zijn bijvoorbeeld centrale banken met
prijsstabiliteit als enige wettelijke doelstelling, onafltankelijker dan
centrale banken met meerdere doelstellingen.
Met behulp van deze index onderzoeken wij de onafhankelijkheid van
de centrale banken van twaalf industriële landen: Australië, België,
Canada, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië, Japan, Nederland, het Verenigd
Koninkrijk, de Verenigde Staten, Zweden en Zwitserland. De Nederland-
sche Bank, de Deutsche Bundesbank en de Schweizerische Nationalbank
blijken het onafhankelijkst te zijn. Daarna volgen de centrale banken van
België, Frankrijk, Italië, Japan, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, de Verenigde
Staten en Zweden, terwijl de Reserve Bank of Australía en de Bank of
Canada het minst onafhankelijk zijn.
Deze zogenaamde `wetgevende' benadering van prijsstabiliteit wordt
voortgezet in hoofdstuk 4. Op basis van een speltheoretisch model met
asymmetrische informatie leiden wij een aan[al stellingen af omtrent de
relatie tussen centrale bank onafhankelijkheid en de (variantie) van
inflatie en economische groei. Deze stellingen worden getcetst voor de
genoemde twaalf landen aan de hand van de maatstaven uit hoofdstuk 3.
Wat betreft de relatie tussen de onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank
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enerzijds en de inflatie en economische groei anderzijds, blijkt dat in
landen waar de centrale bank onafhankelijk is, de inflatie veel lager is
dan in landen waar dat niet het geval is. Voorts blijkt er geen verband te
bestaan tussen de onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank en het niveau
van de economische groei. Invloed op het monetaire beleid leidt op den
duur dus niet tot een hogere economische groei.
Voor een gesloten economie kan de `inflationary bias' op twee manie-
ren worden verklaard. De eerste verklaring is het werkgelegenheidsmo-
tief. Wanneer beleidsmakers erin slagen om een bepaalde inflatiever-
wachting bij het publiek te creëren, kan het vervolgens optimaal zijn om
een hogere dan verwachte inflatie te genereren. Aldus kan de economie
worden gestimuleerd, waardoor de werkloosheid zal dalen. Dit motief
ligt ten grondslag aan de modellen uit de hoofdstukken 4, 6, en 7.
De tweede verklaring, het opbrengstmotief, vindt zijn oorsprong in de
overheidsfinanciën. Het heeft betrekking op het risico dat de regering
misbruik maakt van het vermogen van de centrale bank tot de uitgifte
van basisgeld. De uitgifte van dit basisgeld vormt voor de regering
namelijk een alternatieve bron van inkomsten ('seigniorage') naast
belastingen. Derhalve zijn beperkingen met betrekking tot monetaire
financiering van begrotingstekorten een essentiële component van centrale
bank onafhankelijkheid.
Hoofdsuk 5 analyseert centrale bank onafhankelijkheid in het kader
van de cobrdinatie van het monetaire en het fiscale beleid. Wij tonen aan
dat meer economische onafliankelijkheid van de centrale bank - in de zin
van geringere monetaire financiering van overheidstekorten - leidt tot
lagere en minder persistente inflatie.
In het midden van de jaren tachtig werd door Kenneth Rogoff een
middenweg gevonden tussen `rules' en `discretion'. Rogoff laat zien dat
de samenleving haar welvaart kan verhogen door de bevoegdheid over
het monetaire beleid te delegeren naar een centrale bankier die een
sterkere afkeer van inflatie heeft (`conservatiever' is) dan de representa-
tieve kiezer. Via deze `regel' kan de geloofwaardigheid (`credibility') van
de monetaire autoriteiten worden versterkt, waardoor de inflatie in neer-
waartse richting wordt omgebogen. In zijn model bestaat er echter tevens
een rol voor actieve stabilisatiepolitiek (`discretie'). De centrale bank
heeft namelijk informatie over aanbodschokken, die de private sector
ontbeert. Daarom verhoogt gedeeltelijke monetaire accommodatie van
deze schokken de sociale welvaart. Zoals uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 2, is het
bepalen van de optimale mate van centrale bank onafhankelijkheid nu een
kwestie van het afruilen van de geloofwaardigheids (`credibility') winst,
voortkomende uit een lagere inflatie, en het verlies aan flexibiliteit ten
gevolge van een sub-optimale stabilisatie van aanbodschokken.
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In deel II van dit proefschrift (hoofdstukken 6 en 7) onderzceken wij
bepaalde determinanten van centrale bank onafhankelijkheid. Beide
hoofdstukken zijn uitbreidingen van hoofdstuk 4; het centrale model in
dit prcefschrift. In dit deel ontwikkelen wij een nieuwe grafische metho-
de ter bepaling van de optimale mate van centrale bank onafhankelijk-
heid. Wij laten zien hoe deze onafhankelijkheid afhangt van de in deze
hoofdstukken onderzochte extensies.
Hoofdstuk 6 vormt een uitbreiding van hoofdstuk 4 in de zin dat de
natuurlijke grceivoet van de produktie hier afhangt van de inflatie. In dit
hoofdstuk integreren wij dus de lange termijn relatie tussen inflatie en
groei in de literatuur van centrale bank onafliankelijkheid. Aangezien de
empirie overwegend op een invers lange-termijn verband stuit, veronder-
stellen wij een negatief aanbod-effect van inflatie. Ten gevolge van dit
effect daalt de met de discretionaire monetaire politiek gepaard gaande
systematische inflatie, (`inflationary bias') en wordt het tijdsconsisten[ie
(`credibility') probleem minder ernstig. Zoals aangetoond in hoofdstuk 2,
hangt het monetaire regime dat de maatschappelijke welvaart maximali-
seert af van de balans tussen `credibility' en `flexibility'. Naarmate het
aanbod-effect van inflatie groter wordt zal een flexibel monetair beleid
steeds wenselijker worden. Wij vinden dan ook een invers verband tussen
het aanbod-effect van inflatie en de optimale mate van centrale bank
onafhankelijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 7 combineren we het model van hoofdstuk 4 met vak-
bondsgedrag volgens Nieuw-Keynesiaanse werkloosheidstheoriëen. Resul-
taat van deze analyse is dat de natuurlijke (structurele) werkloosheid, die
in hoofdstuk 4 nog exogeen was, nu door het vakbondsgedrag wordt
bepaald. Wij bestuderen loonvorming onder diverse monetaire regimes:
een vaste geldgroeiregel, een doelstelling voor het nominale nationale
inkomen (`GNP targeting'), volledige gerichtheid op inflatiebestrijding,
een discretionair beleid, en een onafhankelijke centrale bank. De loon-
vormingsstrategie van de vakbond kan coóperatief of agressief zijn. In
het laatste geval laten wij zien dat de natuurlijke werkloosheid stijgt
naarmate de bond agressiever wordt; dat wil zeggen meer gewicht gaat
toekennen aan een relatief hoog reëel loon. In hoofdstuk 4 ís aangetoond
dat de met de discretionaire monetaire politiek gepaard gaande systemati-
sche inflatie (`inflationary bias') recht evenredig varieert met de hoogte
van de natuurlijke werkloosheid. Combineren van dit inzicht met het zo-
juist beschreven vakbondsgedrag geeft dan het volgende resultaat: hoe
agressiever de bond des te hoger de inflatie en des te ernstiger het
tijdsconsistentie (`credibility') probleem. Ook hier hangt het optimale
monetaire regime af van de balans tiissen `credibility' en `flexibility'.
Naarmate de vakbond agressiever wordt zal een op inflatiebestrijding
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gericht monetair beleid dan ook steeds wenselijker worden. Wij vinden in
dit hoofdstuk dan ook een positief verband tussen de agressie van de
vakbond en de optimale mate van centrale bank onafhankelijkheid. Het
optimale monetaire regime wordt dus mede bepaald door het op de
arbeidsmarkt heersende regime. Dit hoofdstuk is daarmee een van de
eerste bijdragen op het terrein van onderzoek naar de determinanten van
centrale bank onafhankelijkheid. Dit onderzoek staat momenteel nog in
de kinderschoenen.
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabantuiiuuuuuuiuiii ~uNi i~ u~ i~pi
